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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT
Christian D Imboden
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Economics
June 2019
Title: Essays in Public Finance
This dissertation deals with important issues in the field of public finance,
namely, how we raise government revenue via taxation and how we spend it in
the form of public goods. The first substantive chapter examines the incidence
of corporate income taxes on the owners of corporate capital, the shareholders.
By allowing stock markets to value the future impacts of corporate income tax
changes, I am able to estimate their incidence on shareholders using changes in
stock prices around changes in state-level corporate income tax rates. Estimates
are generally statistically insignificant for tax decreases, but stock prices respond
to tax increases with an approximately ten percent decline for each percent of tax
increase. In the next chapter, co-authors and I examine income reporting using
tax and survey data. As survey income data are frequently used by economists, it
is imperative that incomes are measured as accurately as possible. We find that
there are systematic differences in how individual respondents report their wage
income to the Current Population Survey versus the Internal Revenue Service
that are related to demographic characteristics, including age and educational
attainment. However, there is great heterogeneity in misreporting within groups.
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In the final substantive chapter, I examine strategic interactions between different
levels of government. I find that there are theoretical cases where a subordinate
level of government would benefit from sabotaging the plans of a dominant level of
government. I also find that there are theoretical cases where competition between
levels of government can be welfare-improving for citizens of the local government.
This dissertation includes previously unpublished co-authored material.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The design, use, and implementation of public finance systems are of key
concern for all involved in our modern economy. Tax economists are concerned
with how tax system design affects who ultimately bears the burden of taxation.
Governments use data collected from tax systems in order to examine the health
of our economy and to direct public spending. A complex system of government
entities implements various government policies, though it is not always clear which
entity should manage which role. These three interlocking aspects of public finance
are the subject of this dissertation.
In the first substantive chapter, I examine the incidence of the corporate
income tax on the owners of corporate capital, i.e. the shareholders. I examine
the response of the stock prices of regional banking stocks to changes in US state-
level corporate income tax rates. I build a novel dataset featuring the legislative
history and details of state law changes involving the corporate income tax rates on
financial corporations. I find that stock prices and corporate income tax rates are
inversely related. For tax decreases, the relationship is statistically insignificant,
but for tax increases, the effects are significant and large. Stock prices show
approximately a ten percent decrease for every percent increase in corporate
income tax rates. These effects are felt mostly during the period following the
announcement of a law change and the introduction of that law change into the
state legislature. The asymmetrical results are common in the literature about
corporate income taxes.
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The second substantive chapter includes previously unpublished co-authored
material. It is co-authored with John Voorheis of the US Census Bureau and
Caroline Weber of the University of Washington. I wrote the majority of the
chapter, with John Voorheis providing important work on the Data section and
with institutional details, and Caroline Weber providing edits. I wrote the majority
of the computer code used to create this chapter, with John Voorheis contributing
code for the visualizations of income misreporting within groups across income
levels, and Caroline Weber providing valuable supervision and code writing
lessons and examples. I conceived this chapter, which is an offshoot of another
ongoing project. In this chapter, we examine differences in wage reporting between
individuals’ Internal Revenue Service and other administrative records versus their
responses to the Current Population Survey. We measure the percentage gaps
between wages reported for survey purposes versus tax purposes. We find that
these gaps vary by demographic attributes, including age, educational attainment,
and racial and ethnic groupings. A large proportion of these gaps are due to the
rounding of numbers, but rounding does not drive results. We propose econometric
corrections for mismeasured wage data and suggest changes to survey design.
In the final substantive chapter, I examine the possible strategic interactions
between multiple levels of government via a series of abstract games. In the first
set of games, I investigate what might happen if a subordinate level of government
has the opportunity to sabotage a policy being implemented by a dominant level
of government. I find cases where the dominant level of government responds by
allowing the local level to implement policy, as well as cases where the local level of
government will indeed choose to sabotage the plans of the dominant level. In the
second series of games, I investigate what might happen if bureaucrats representing
2
these levels of government were to compete for the opportunity to implement policy
by making bids. I find that the mere existence of multiple levels of government can
be welfare improving for the citizens in these circumstances.
3
CHAPTER II
DO STOCK PRICES RESPOND TO CHANGES IN CORPORATE INCOME
TAX RATES?
Introduction
For the last few decades, Federal and state lawmakers in the United States
have paid significant attention to improving the efficacy of the corporate income
tax. Gravelle (2017) enumerates several public policy examinations at the Federal
level, including the 2005 Advisory Panel on Tax Reform, several opinion pieces
by policy makers, a 2007 Treasury Department background paper, and numerous
bills introduced in Congress. A similar level of examination has occurred at the
state level.1 Though there are numerous issues complicating the debate over the
corporate tax, in this paper, I examine the impacts of corporate tax changes on
shareholders.
The incidence of the corporate tax is notoriously slippery. Depending
on model selection, choice of functional forms within models, and model
parameterization, theory gives wildly different results for the incidence of the
corporate tax, ranging from more than one hundred percent to less than zero
percent of the burden falling on shareholders (Harberger (1962), Auerbach (2006),
Harberger (2006)). Empirical results are also far from conclusive, with a wide
variety of incidence rates. Estimates of the incidence on labor range from near
zero to up to two thousand percent.2 A minority of corporate tax incidence studies
1Most recently in Iowa, where state corporate tax rates were overhauled (Bloomberg Tax,
2014).
2For discussions see Desai et al. (2007) and Dwenger et al. (2011).
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estimate the incidence on capital (examples include Cragg et al. (1967), who
estimate that capital bears close to the full burden of the tax, and Desai et al.
(2007), who estimate that capital bears between twenty-five and fifty-five percent
of the tax).
In this paper, I try to shed some light on the existing contradictory empirical
results by providing evidence from stock markets. The major contribution of this
paper is to, for the first time, causally estimate the incidence of corporate income
taxes on shareholders, by using a large set of comparable corporate income tax
rate changes and a rich set of stock price panel data. Taking the stance that stock
markets efficiently integrate publicly available information into stock prices, stock
price changes that accompany corporate tax rate changes should inform us about
the present value of the burden falling on shareholders.
Estimating stock price changes caused by changes in tax rates at the federal
level can be difficult, as the federal tax code often changes all at once in infrequent,
major overhauls, so the effects of a particular tax change among many simultaneous
changes are difficult to tease out. Cross-country comparisons are challenging
because of the political and cultural heterogeneity of the underlying countries.
What is needed is a set of reasonably similar jurisdictions, a set of corporate
tax rate changes that vary across time and jurisdictions, and a set of stocks of
comparable companies where the jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction apportionment of
income can be ascertained.
I examine the effects of changes in state-level corporate tax rates on the value
of stocks listed on the major United States stock exchanges. For most US equities,
determining the exact state-by-state breakdown of corporate income is at best a
noisy task, as tax returns of publicly traded corporations are not publicly available
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information, and proprietary sources of corporate data may not have sufficient
data to properly allocate income across states. Fortunately, there is a subset of
stocks that permit accurate state-by-state allocation: regional bank stocks. These
stocks fulfill a number of desirable characteristics for this exercise: the companies
are often completely located within one or a handful of states, corporate taxes
represent a large proportion of their net profits, their branch units are comparable
within companies, and operations of different companies are similar. I calculate the
percentage of each firm’s income allocated to each state for tax purposes. Using the
set of state-level corporate tax rate changes from 1994-2017, I examine the change
in stock valuation of these companies around the public unveilings of corporate tax
rate changes, using a series of first-difference regressions.
First-difference regressions are necessary because stock prices follow a random
walk (Samuelson (1965) and Malkiel (1973)). The resulting regressions have
a similarity to the types of regressions found in arbitrage pricing theory (“arb
models”). I augment these regressions with similar regressions that remove the risk-
free component from stock returns, and in some cases, use historical measures of
diversifiable risk to isolate the “abnormal” component of stock returns. These latter
regressions have the flavor of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), developed
by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965). Both arb- and CAPM- style analyses yield
similar results: corporate tax rates and stock prices bear an inverse relationship,
and the sizes of the associated stock returns are greater in magnitude than what
would be expected if only future tax expenses were to change, ceteris paribus.
Further inspection reveals that this effect is almost entirely driven by tax
increases. When the full sample of stock returns and tax changes is split into
tax decreases versus increases, I find that tax decreases of about one percent are
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associated with stock price increases of about one percent, though the estimates
are statistically insignificant. On the other hand, when accounting for outliers, tax
increases of about one percent lead to an average decline in stock price of about ten
percent.
Overall, these results are large, and can possibly be explained by a
combination of the short-run incidence of the tax (that is, the initial impact on
profits before production factors can be reallocated more efficiently) as well as the
longer-run effects of interstate competition between banks, as well as competition
between C corporations (those companies directly affected by the new tax rates)
and S corporations (those companies that do not pay the corporate tax). If firms
in different states and with different tax treatments face different cost structures
due to different corporate income tax rates, then those firms with lower costs can
offer their products at lower cost to consumers, increasing their market share and
decreasing the market shares of higher cost firms. A number of possible theories
can help to explain the asymmetry between stock price responses to tax increases
versus decreases. Taxes affect the capital structure of firms asymmetrically, as the
government shares in corporate profits but not losses, and the ability for a firm
to borrow is likely more impeded by an increase in expenses than it is helped by
a decrease in expenses. However, the size of the effects suggests more is going on.
One possible suggestion is that investors, believing that business has some control
over the actions of the state government, view tax increases as a sign that the
state government is becoming less business-friendly, so the tax increase may be
a harbinger of the loss of regulatory capture of the state legislature. Finally, tax
decreases may lead to more possible choices for corporate boards compared to tax
increases. With tax increases, expenses of some firms rise while expenses of other
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firms do not, causing the higher taxed firms to cut profits in order to compete on
loan prices. On the other hand, firms facing tax decreases face more options. They
could use their newfound advantage to compete on price, or management incentives
could be so aligned as to motivate management to keep some of the lower-tax
windfall for themselves rather than passing it on to shareholders.
I further break the timing windows of the tax changes down into smaller
“subwindows,” in order to determine when, in the process of becoming law, the
tax changes impact stock prices most. I find that most of the change in stock price
occurs between when legislators first announced the upcoming change and when
they introduce the bill to the state legislature. The majority of the remainder of
the change in stock price occurs between when the bill is introduced and the bill
is passed. Little changes between when the bill is passed when the bill is signed
by the governor, consistent with the finding that governors almost never vetoed
corporate income tax rate changes between 1994-2017.
I test the robustness of my main findings with a battery of placebo tests. In
general, these tests find that the large, significant declines in stock prices caused by
tax increases are not more prevalent during time periods when these tax changes
did not occur.
These results must be taken with some caveats, as even the most basic
corporate tax incidence models show that differing production functions
yield meaningfully different results (Harberger, 1962), and banks may not be
representative of publicly traded corporations in other industries. For example,
these companies are highly levered relative to the stock market as a whole.3
3An analysis of the debt ratios of the Dow Jones Industrial Average components (sans
financial components) versus an equally sized sample of regional bank stocks, shows that the
bank stocks have total debt-to-equity ratios that are, on average, approximately six times higher
than the Dow components.
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Therefore, lawmakers considering corporate income tax rate changes need to be
cognizant of the types of firms adopting the C corporation form, if they are to have
any ability to predict the impact of these changes. However, banking is an industry
tied to most other industries, so these results may be more externally valid than
those of many single-industry studies.
The next section provides a review of related literature. After that, I describe
data used in this study while providing institutional details relevant to the data.
I then describe the methodologies used and present results for the “arb-style” and
“CAPM-style” regressions, including regressions within subwindows and placebo
regressions. I discuss reasons for the timing, magnitude, and asymmetry of results.
Finally, I conclude, commenting on avenues for future research.
Related Literature
This research follows from findings in the public finance and financial
economics literatures. First, it draws from and speaks to a venerable but ever
controversial literature on the incidence of the corporate tax. As mentioned,
conclusions about the incidence of the corporate tax are far from settled. Even
in Harberger’s seminal paper, small changes in modeling assumptions drastically
change results, from all of the burden falling on capital to most of the burden
falling on labor. It should be noted that Harberger’s baseline result has the entire
burden falling on all capital, not just corporate capital. However, this baseline
result is based on assumptions about the capital intensity of the corporate sector.
The more general model in his paper allows for the corporate sector to be more
labor intensive, which will lead to more of the burden falling on workers. A more
modern review of the theoretical literature can be found in Auerbach (2006). Of
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note, Harberger’s closed economy results reverse in an open economy model, with
all of the burden falling on labor. An important common feature of most models is
that they describe long run phenomena and ignore short run effects.
On the empirical side, most research focuses on the incidence of the corporate
tax on labor. This is at least partly due to the fact that owners of corporate
capital tend to be on the upper end of the income distribution, whereas the typical
laborer is not. Thus, determining incidence has great importance in terms of
the progressivity of the corporate tax. Examples of these labor-focused studies
include Dwenger et al. (2011), who find an elasticity of wage rates to tax rates
of -2.37, Arulampalam et al. (2012), who find an elasticity of -0.92, and Hassett
and Mathur (2010), who find an elasticity of -0.5 to -0.6. Early empirical studies
on the incidence on capital include Krzyzaniak and Musgrave (1963), who find
that capital can benefit from a tax, and Cragg, Harberger, and Mieszkowski’s
rebuttal, which reverses the 1963 results due to previously unaddressed econometric
shortcomings. A more recent study is Desai et al. (2007), who estimate the relative
burden on labor and capital by assuming that they sum to unity, and find that
twenty-five to fifty-five percent of the burden falls on capital. Gordon (1985) finds
small benefits of the corporate tax on investment. In addition, Gravelle (2017) gives
a thorough summary of other studies relating to the corporate income tax (Laffer
curve, investment, etc.) as well as describing common econometric issues that arise
in studying the corporate income tax.
This paper adds to a newer, burgeoning body of literature that relies on
changes to state corporate tax rates in the United States as a source of variation.
An early example is Feldstein and Poterba (1980), who find that an omission
of state and local taxes understates the rate of return to capital. More recent
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examples include Felix and Hines (2009), who show that unionized workers benefit
by capturing approximately half of the benefit of lower state corporate tax rates,
Giroud and Rauh (2015), who find that employment and number of establishments
both have state corporate tax elasticities of approximately -0.4, and Heider and
Ljungqvist (2015), who find that the use of leverage has a state corporate tax
elasticity of about 0.4. In addition, Ljungqvist and Smolyansky (2014) find the
asymmetric result that tax increases decrease employment and firm income but
tax decreases do little, Ljungqvist et al. (2017) find another asymmetry in that
tax increases reduce firm risk-taking while tax cuts do little, and Suarez-Serrato
and Zidar (2016) find that the narrowing of states’ corporate tax bases over time
reduce states’ ability to raise revenue through rate increases. Important themes in
this literature include the use of tax changes, not levels, as a source of variation
(implored for by Auerbach (2006)), leveraging the vast heterogeneity of these
changes over space and time, and noting asymmetric results stemming from tax
increases versus decreases.
Important for this research, Giroud and Rauh (2015) find that most state
corporate tax changes are exogenous with respect to the income of individual firms,
following a narrative method of categorizing tax changes as more or less exogenous
according to Romer and Romer (2010). This finding is supported by Ljungqvist
and Smolyansky (2014), who note that corporate tax revenues typically account for
only a small portion of state revenues. The corporate tax may be of second order
consideration for closing budget deficits, thus these changes may tend to be more
exogenous.
Previous studies differ from this paper in that they focus on non-financial
capital. Many states have different corporate tax rates on financial and non-
11
financial institutions. To my knowledge, this is the first paper to focus mainly on
the effects of changes in state corporate tax rates on financial institutions. As a
result, some of the data look slightly different, and some previous conclusions, such
as the inference that state corporate tax rates follow a random walk (Ljungqvist
and Smolyansky, 2014) must be revisited. Previous studies also look at firm
behavior as rate changes come into effect, whereas this study looks at the market’s
response to rate changes as the laws are announced and made, well before they
come into effect (or sometimes well after, in the case of retroactive law changes).
This paper begins with no prior assumption that markets will notice the
impacts of corporate income tax rates on firm prices. Much work has been done
in recent years investigating whether people respond to tax incentives, especially if
the taxes are shrouded or complex. For taxes to be incorporated into purchasing
and selling decisions (including investing decisions), these taxes must be salient.
While Rosen (1976) finds similar relationships between wage rates and working
hours and tax rates and working hours, showing that these taxes are salient, Chetty
et al. (2009) find that non-posted sales taxes do not lead to decreases in quantities
as much as similarly sized price changes, implying that non-posted sales taxes are
not salient.4 If corporate income taxes change and stock prices do not, this could
mean that these taxes had no effect on future profits (e.g., there is no incidence on
shareholders), or that such taxes do indeed have an effect, but that they are not
salient to investors. Determining the proper value of investments is the job of larger
investors, but taxes may not be salient if they are minuscule or hard to keep track
of.
4Another similar paper is Finkelstein (2009), who finds that drivers do not fully respond to
automatically deducted (and therefore less salient) road tolls.
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The efficient markets hypothesis (EMH), related to the work of Samuelson
(1965), developed by Fama (Fama (1965), Fama et al. (1969), Fama (1970)), and
made famous in the popular press by Malkiel (1973) helps to square the ambiguity
of the tax salience literature with investor behavior. Fama (1970) developed the
notion of the semi-strong form of the EMH, which states that stock prices reflect all
publicly available information. If corporate income taxes are salient, then investors
should properly evaluate their impacts when determining the values of equities.
Lo (2005) enumerates how much of widely accepted modern financial economics
is derived from the EMH. Although non-behavioral critiques of the EMH exist
(see, for example, Buffett (1984)), the majority of EMH criticisms come from
the behavioral finance camp (a summary of these criticisms can be found in Lo
(2005)). Malkiel (2003) rebuts these criticisms by noting that many of the most
famous behavioral exceptions, such as the January effect, disappear nearly as soon
as they are discovered; in other words, non-salient but material determinants of
price soon become salient, at least in efficient equities markets. Lo (2005) has an
interesting approach to this debate, reconciling the EMH and behavioral anomalies
by combining the two camps into an imperfect but rational evolutionary process
in which rational stock trading strategies are learned over time and respond to
changing market conditions. This paper takes the stance that the major US stock
markets are imperfectly efficient in the semi-strong sense, but efficient enough to
capture the impacts of publicly available information in a reasonable amount of
time (say, a few days).
Finally, this paper relates to an ongoing debate about the transparency of
publicly traded companies’ tax information. Currently, the tax returns of publicly
traded companies in the United States are not made publicly available. This paper
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makes use of company data where corporations’ business establishment locations
are identifiable using publicly available information; in most cases they are not.
This point is debated, for example in Lenter et al. (2003). While the debate is
complicated (for example, full transparency may lead to companies publishing
lower quality information), this paper suggests that persons who have detailed
information about the state-by-state allocations of corporations’ incomes may have
a trading advantage over other investors.
Data and Institutional Details
The goal of this paper is to show how changes in state corporate tax rates
effect stock returns; thus, data must consist of a sample of stock returns and a
schedule of state corporate tax law changes. For years 1994-2017, I look at changes
to states’ top marginal corporate tax rates, as these types of law changes are
most comparable across states (“states” refers to the 50 states plus the District
of Columbia).5 Table 1, which combines data culled from The Book of the States
as well as state websites, provides information on the levels of the top marginal tax
rates on C corporations for years 1994-2017 for the 51 “states” in the sample. Of
note, states exhibit wide heterogeneity in rates throughout the sample, and over
time, there is a trend towards lower tax rates. From this point onward, I ignore
5These top rate changes include changes to surtaxes, which alter the top rates effectively paid
by corporations. I only look at top rates, even in the case of states with multiple brackets, for
simplicity. First, most states only have one rate. States with multiple brackets have top brackets
beginning at incomes so low relative to the typical income of a firm in my sample so as to not
significantly affect my findings. Possible exceptions are the $250,000 top bracket in Kentucky and
the $1,000,000 brackets of New Mexico and South Dakota, which affect less than one percent of
profits in the sample of firms.
14
states with a corporate tax base that is not based on net income (for example,
states that tax gross receipts instead).6
TABLE 1.
Descriptive Statistics, Top Marginal State Corporate Tax Rates,
Levels
1994 (beginning 2017 (end
Tax variable of sample) of sample)
States taxing net income
of non-financial corporations
44 44
States taxing net income
of financial corporations
45 45
States w/ 0 top rates, non-financial corps. 4 4
States w/ 0 top rates, financial corps. 3 3
States w/ tax based on
variables other than net income
3 3
States w/ multiple corp. tax brackets 13 14
Highest bracket (STATE) $1M (NM) $1M (NM, OR)
No. states w/ different rates for
financial and non-financial corporations
15 14
Highest top marginal rate,
non-financial corporations (STATE)
12% (IA) 12% (IA)
Highest top marginal rate,
financial corporations (STATE)
12.54% (MA) 10.84% (CA)
Lowest non-zero top marginal rate,
non-financial corporations (STATE)
4% (KS) 3% (NC)
Lowest non-zero top marginal rate,
financial corporations (STATE)
1% (ME, SD) 0.25% (SD)
Corporate taxes are assessed on the taxable net incomes of Subchapter C
corporations (Subchapter S corporations and other pass-through entities are not
6States excluded for this reason are Michigan, Ohio, and Texas.
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subject to the tax). The taxable net incomes of companies in the stock sample are
substantially similar to those companies’ accounting profits for book purposes.7
Given that, under the EMH, stock prices reflect all publicly available
information, stock prices should, at the very latest, change shortly after a tax
change is made certain, i.e. when the proposed tax change is signed into law. It is
important to note that changes in tax rates do not map one-to-one with changes
in state laws; one law may enact multiple rate changes over time.8 Thus, the
events used in this study are dates relating to changes in laws, which do not always
coincide with the dates of rate changes.
Many states have different corporate tax rates for financial institutions,
and since I examine the returns to regional bank stocks specifically (explained
momentarily), my schedule of law changes looks slightly different than those
schedules used in the aforementioned literature. I identify these law changes first
by identifying changes in the top marginal rates paid by financial institutions by
comparing different years’ rate schedules found in The Book of the States for years
1994-2017 (Council of State Governments, 2017).9 Where surtaxes are employed,
top marginal rates and surtax rates are combined into one top effective marginal
rate. From these rate changes, I map the large set of top marginal rate changes to a
smaller set of corresponding law changes, by searching LexisNexis and the websites
of state legislatures. For each applicable law change, I collect five key dates: the
7Although there are a number of “M-1 adjustments” made to reconcile net income for tax
purposes and net income for book purposes, this study merely assumes that such adjustments net
to zero. Differences in the accounting presentations of tax expenses for tax purposes versus book
purposes can lead to adjustments such as deferred tax assets and liabilities. I collected firm-year
level data on deferred tax assets and liabilities, where available. Inclusion of net deferred tax asset
data does not meaningfully change results.
8A complicated example is the corporate tax law passed in Indiana in 2013, which phased in
nine successively lower rates over the course of ten years.
9For further information about the collection of rate change data, see the Appendix.
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date that the earliest talk of an impending corporate rate change was in the news,
the date the legislation was introduced, the date the legislation was passed by the
state legislature, the date the bill became law, and the date(s) the rate change(s)
in the law went into effect (laws may feature multiple rate changes over multiple
years).10 If investors view the legislative process as a process of an impending
law becoming more certain, then, under the EMH, stock prices leading up to the
signing of a law should reflect investors’ evolving notions of the probability of the
law’s passage. Of these dates, the fuzziest is the first date, hereafter called the
“first news date.” Unlike the other dates, there is some subjectivity in selecting
this date, and choosing a date that is too late may result in missing out on a period
of time when investors assessed the likelihood of an impending law change as ever
increasing (thus, by picking too late of a date I may miss the relevant stock market
reaction).11
For each law change affecting top marginal rates, additional data collected
includes whether or not the change only affected financial institutions, and
whether or not the rate changed via a surtax rate change or a regular rate change.
Additionally, based on narratives pieced together from LexisNexis news articles,
I code each law change using the four categories listed in Romer and Romer
(2010) in order to assess the exogeneity of each law change: one for law changes
designed to increase output, two for changes designed to change variables related to
output, three for dealing with inherited budget deficits, and four for philosophical
or ideological reasons such as fairness. I add a fifth category, not found in their
10These first four dates always follow in chronological order, but the fifth may not, in the case
of retroactive law changes. Nineteen of the forty-nine law changes studied were retroactive.
11Just because an impending law change is not touted in the news does not mean that
lawmakers and investors are not already discussing it in less public circles.
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paper, for exogenous law changes that were due to an outside body determining
that the tax code must change.12 Reasons one and two describe more endogenous
tax changes while the remainder are considered to be exogenous. Each law change
is given a two letter, two digit abbreviation for ease of reference, using the state
abbreviation and the year the first top rate change in the law came into effect (e.g.
MD08).
Since many law changes featured multiple rate changes over time, each law
change is distilled down to one overall top rate change, expressed in logarithmic
change in present value of future earnings of firms. For details on this procedure,
see the Appendix. This log change can be thought of as the overall percent change
in corporate tax rates.13 Table 2 shows the dates of events relating to all state law
changes relating to changes in top marginal corporate income tax rates on financial
institutions for 1994-2017. Tables 3 and 4 distill this information by displaying the
average number of days between key dates in the legislative history for a subset of
tax decreases and increases that are used in the event studies in the next section.
Table 5 provides summary information for relating to the content of each law
change, including the top rate in effect before each change, top rate or rates after
the change, and the overall magnitude of the change.
In order to assess the impact of state corporate tax rate changes on stock
prices, one must be able to determine how much of the underlying companies’
incomes are allocated to each state for tax purposes. This task is complicated by
states’ tax nexus laws, which dictate how income is apportioned to the various
12For example, this could occur when a portion of a state’s tax code was struck down by the
Supreme Court.
13Technically, it is constructed not as the change in tax rate τ , but rather the change in (1− τ),
multiplied by negative one, adjusted for the timing of the law change.
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TABLE 2.
Dates of Law Changes Relating to Top Corporate Tax Rates on
Banks
First Bill introduced Bill passed Bill became Law effective
Abbrev. news date date date law date date
AL02 3/1/99 11/15/99 11/23/99 3/21/00 1/1/01
AZ94 1/1/94 3/7/94 3/30/94 4/4/94 12/31/93
AZ99 11/4/97 5/8/98 5/8/98 5/20/98 1/1/98
AZ00 11/4/97 2/4/98 5/6/98 5/19/98 12/31/99
AZ01 1/11/99 4/7/99 4/7/99 4/15/99 1/1/01
AZ14 11/19/10 2/14/11 2/16/11 2/17/11 1/1/14
CA97 1/4/94 4/10/96 7/8/96 7/15/96 1/1/97
CO99 12/16/98 1/13/99 5/3/99 6/4/99 1/1/99
CO00 7/13/99 1/5/00 5/1/00 5/3/00 1/1/00
CT95 10/28/94 5/27/95 5/31/95 6/1/95 1/1/95
CT03 12/1/02 2/3/03 2/18/03 3/6/03 1/1/03
CT04 4/16/03 7/30/03 7/31/03 8/16/03 1/1/04
CT06 2/9/05 3/16/05 6/7/05 6/30/05 1/1/06
CT09 2/9/09 8/31/09 8/31/09 9/8/09 1/1/09
CT12 2/14/11 5/2/11 5/3/11 5/4/11 1/1/12
CT14 5/13/13 6/1/13 6/3/13 6/18/13 1/1/14
CT16 3/2/15 6/2/15 6/3/15 6/30/15 1/1/16
DC95 2/27/91 1/14/94 8/1/94 8/2/94 1/1/95
DC15 2/15/14 2/15/14 6/24/14 6/25/14 1/1/15
ID01 1/21/00 3/26/01 3/29/01 4/11/01 1/1/01
ID13 12/1/11 2/17/12 3/29/12 4/5/12 1/1/12
IL11 1/4/10 1/6/10 1/12/11 1/13/11 1/1/11
IN14 10/14/12 2/18/13 4/1/13 4/26/13 1/1/14
KS98 10/3/97 1/10/98 3/1/98 3/18/98 1/1/98
KY06 2/12/04 2/2/05 3/8/05 3/18/05 1/1/05
MA95 2/2/95 5/10/95 7/17/95 7/27/95 1/1/95
MA10 12/18/07 6/13/08 7/3/08 7/3/08 1/1/10
MD08 7/26/07 10/29/07 11/13/07 11/19/07 1/1/08
NC97 12/9/94 7/8/96 8/2/96 8/2/96 1/1/97
NC09 10/20/08 2/17/09 8/5/09 8/7/09 7/1/09
NC14 4/28/12 4/17/13 7/17/13 7/23/13 1/1/14
ND17 6/17/16 8/1/16 8/3/16 8/5/16 1/1/17
NH00 1/7/99 3/4/99 4/22/99 4/29/99 7/1/99
NH16 10/29/14 2/18/15 6/24/15 9/16/15 1/1/16
NJ06 1/17/06 6/26/06 7/8/06 7/8/06 1/1/06
NM14 1/3/13 2/14/13 3/16/13 4/4/13 1/1/14
NY00 12/17/97 1/20/98 4/14/98 4/28/98 7/1/99
NY07 4/27/05 1/11/06 3/31/06 3/31/06 1/1/07
NY16 12/10/13 1/6/14 3/31/14 3/31/14 1/1/16
OR10 11/20/08 3/12/09 6/11/09 7/20/09 1/1/10
PA94 1/15/93 3/2/93 6/14/94 6/16/94 1/1/94
PA95 11/15/94 1/23/95 6/15/95 6/30/95 1/1/95
SD01 1/13/99 1/25/00 2/18/00 3/3/00 1/1/01
TN03 3/30/99 1/31/02 7/3/02 7/4/02 7/15/02
VT97 2/5/97 3/13/97 6/12/97 6/26/97 1/1/97
VT07 1/6/04 4/21/04 5/19/04 6/7/04 1/1/07
WV07 10/30/06 10/30/06 11/13/06 11/14/06 1/1/07
WV09 2/26/07 2/15/08 3/8/08 4/1/08 1/1/09
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TABLE 3.
Mean Number of Days between Event Dates Used in Event
Studies,
Tax Decreases (Standard Deviations in Parentheses)
Legislation
Introduced
Legislation
Passed
Legislation
Signed
Legislation
Effective
First
News Date
191.65
(157.92)
228.00
(158.66)
242.06
(159.83)
567.71
(310.78)
Legislation
Introduced
60.79
(105.24)
74.00
(107.99)
345.74
(343.82)
Legislation
Passed
12.60
(18.71)
280.25
(352.71)
Legislation
Signed
251.29
(352.79)
states based on varying ratios of sales, payroll, and property. For most publicly
traded companies, this is opaque, as publicly traded companies do not have to
break down their sales, payroll, and property factors by state in their public filings,
and popular proprietary databases do not contain all three factors. I use a sample
of regional and community bank stocks in the US because they overcome this
impediment. Unlike most public firms, who raise equity capital in order to expand
perhaps nationally or even internationally, companies in the sample of regional
bank stocks tend to only have operations in one or a few states, suggesting that
part of these firms’ business strategy is to stay small and develop a community-
oriented reputation. Alternatively, the fact that these firms tend to be limited to
a small number of states may be a vestige of old state banking laws that required
banks to overcome legal obstacles to operate in multiple states. The modal firm in
my sample only operates in one state.
The business of these smaller banks is simple: they accept deposits which
are used to make loans, primarily to homeowners and small businesses. The vast
majority of these companies break down the number of bank branches that are
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TABLE 4.
Mean Number of Days between Event Dates Used in Event
Studies,
Tax Increases (Standard Deviations in Parentheses)
Legislation
Introduced
Legislation
Passed
Legislation
Signed
Legislation
Effective
First
News Date
247.67
(397.48)
362.17
(419.80)
386.83
(414.19)
422.67
(450.57)
Legislation
Introduced
114.50
(136.65)
139.17
(123.80)
175.00
(182.72)
Legislation
Passed
24.67
(46.46)
60.50
(187.55)
Legislation
Signed
35.83
(149.10)
in each state in their annual Forms 10-K, which are filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and made publicly available via the SEC’s online
Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system (EDGAR). EDGAR
only maintains filings back to 1994. I use the descriptions of bank branch locations
to allocate income for each company across multiple states, in proportion to
the number of branches.14 Corporate taxes represent a large portion of these
companies’ profits, giving investors a good reason to pay attention to the applicable
tax rates.15
The sample of regional bank stocks was created by combining a list of
regional bank stocks from InvestSnips.com and by searching the Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database (accessed via the Wharton Research
Data Service (WRDS)) for companies with Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
14This assumes that each branch within a company uses the same amount of payroll, property,
and sales (interest revenue from loans) at each branch. This assumption is unnecessary in the case
of companies with operations in only one state. For further information about the allocation of
income across states, see the appendix.
15For example, Umpqua Bank, a typical firm in my sample, paid twenty-two percent of pre-tax
accounting profit in Federal corporate income taxes and six percent of pre-tax accounting profit in
state corporate income taxes in 2017, for a total of twenty-eight percent.
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TABLE 5.
Content of Law Changes of Top Marginal Corporate Tax Rates on
Banks
Top rate Top rate(s) Overall
Abbrev. before after log size
AL02 6 6.5 0.0051
AZ94 9.3 9 -0.0034
AZ99 9 8 -0.0113
AZ00 8 7.968 -0.0003
AZ01 7.968 6.968 -0.0096
AZ14 6.968 6.5, 6, 5.5, 4.9 -0.0164
CA97 11.3 10.84 -0.0050
CO99 5 4.75 -0.0027
CO00 4.75 4.63 -0.0013
CT95 11.5 11.25, 10.75, 10.5, 9.5, 8.5, 7.5 -0.0370
CT03 7.5 9, 8.25, 7.5 0.0016
CT04 9 9.375, 7.5 0.0008
CT06 7.5 9, 7.5 0.0010
CT09 7.5 8.25, 7.5 0.0016
CT12 8.25 9, 7.5 0.0020
CT14 9 9, 7.5 0.0020
CT16 9 9, 8.25, 7.5 0.0025
DC95 10.25 9.975 -0.0030
DC15 9.975 9.4, 9, 8.5, 8.25 -0.0165
ID01 8 7.6 -0.0044
ID13 7.6 7.4 -0.0022
IL11 7.3 9.5, 7.75, 7.3 0.0075
IN14 8.5 8, 7.5, 7, 6.5, 6.25, 6, 5.5, 5, 4.9 -0.0287
KS98 6.375 4.375 -0.0215
KY06 8.25 7, 6 -0.0233
MA95 12.54 12.13, 11.72, 11.32, 10.91, 10.5 -0.0209
MA10 10.5 10, 9.5, 9 -0.0141
MD08 7 8.25 0.0135
NC97 7.75 7.5, 7.25, 7, 6.9 -0.0082
NC09 6.9 7.107, 6.9 0.0003
NC14 6.9 6, 5, 4, 3 -0.0359
ND17 7 4.31 -0.0276
NH00 7 8 0.0103
NH16 8.5 8.2, 7.9 -0.0060
NJ06 9 9.36, 9 0.0010
NM14 7.6 7.3, 6.9, 6.6, 6.2, 5.9 -0.0152
NY00 9 8.5, 8, 7.5 -0.0130
NY07 7.5 7.1 -0.0041
NY16 7.1 6.5 -0.0057
OR10 6.6 7.9, 7.6, 6.6 0.0031
PA94 12.25 11.99, 10.99, 10.75, 9.99 -0.0236
PA95 10.99 9.99 -0.0013
SD01 1 0.25 -0.0072
TN03 6 6.5 0.0052
VT97 8.25 9.75 0.0171
VT07 9.75 8.5 -0.0116
WV07 9 8.75 -0.0027
WV09 8.75 8.5, 7.75, 7, 6.5 -0.0184
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codes relating to regional banking.16 If banks lobby for lower tax rates, stock
returns could be endogenous to tax rate changes. To minimize these concerns,
I drop companies belonging to the Financial Services Roundtable lobby and
companies with a market capitalization of over ten billion dollars.17 In order to
make sure markets are efficient enough to capture publicly available information in
a timely manner, I drop banks that do not trade on major US exchanges and banks
with market capitalizations below ten million dollars, as the markets for the stocks
of these smaller banks may be too thin to obtain meaningful pricing data.18 I also
drop companies that are “too national,” i.e. that have operations in more than ten
states. Daily stock returns for the final sample of 639 firms are downloaded from
the CRSP database.
Additional firm and firm-year data are downloaded from CRSP and
Compustat. From Compustat, I have the major balance sheet and income
statement items by firm-year (total assets, liabilities and equity, pre-tax and after-
tax net income, as well as net deferred tax assets), plus the headquarters state of
each firm. These data are used to create common ratios (such as the debt to equity
ratio of each firm), as well as lagged values of the financial statement items (and
ratios derived from them).19 From CRSP, I obtain the returns to the Standard
and Poor’s 500 market index (S&P 500) firms’ market capitalization, daily trading
volume and shares outstanding (from which the proportion of shares traded daily
16InvestSnips.com is a website specializing in creating themed lists of stocks.
17The Financial Services Roundtable is the largest banking lobby in the US.
18For additional information about dropping stocks from this sample, see the appendix.
19Given that tax law changes can occur virtually anytime throughout the year, it is not clear
at what point in a year investors may be relying on brand new accounting and financial data or
somewhat stale data. I find that the choice to use contemporaneous versus prior year data for
these financial statement items and ratios does not seem to make a marked difference (potentially
owing to the similarity of a firm’s financial structure from one year to the next).
23
is computed), and well as historical measures of individual stock risk, namely each
firm’s “beta,” or the naive regression coefficient of each firm’s relationship with the
broader stock market. These betas are used to develop a historical expectation of
each stock’s co-movements with the market.
From the Federal Reserve Economic Database (FRED), I download measures
of the federal funds rate, as changes in said rate likely have impacts on the
profitability of banks’ excess reserves. The number of housing starts is also
obtained from FRED, as regional banks in particular are likely responsive to
changes in the housing market, and the federal funds rate can be viewed as a
measure of risk-free returns. Finally, from Kenneth French’s website, I download
the Fama-French components of the CAPM (namely, the risk free return and
market return (which is based on a broader set of stocks than the S&P 500)), as
well as the additional SMB (“small minus big” market capitalization, the excess
return of smaller companies versus larger companies) and HML (“high minus low,”
the excess return of higher book-to-market ratio stocks versus low book-to-market
stocks) factors, which have been shown to explain most of the shortcomings of the
predictive power of the CAPM (Fama and French, 1993).
Firms are treated based on the size of the tax change that affects their
operations. If a firm has no operations in a state of a law change, it receives a zero
treatment for that law change. If a firm only operates in one state, and that state
has a law change, the firm’s treatment for that observation is the full size of the
change as shown on Table 5, which is positive for tax increases and negative for tax
decreases. If a firm has some but not all operations in the state of a law change, its
treatment for that observation is the full treatment from Table 5 multiplied by the
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proportion of firm operations in the state in question.20 One observation contains
a firm’s stock return over a given period of time, the treatment corresponding to
that time frame, and other variables of interest including other market and time-
varying data (as enumerated previously) corresponding to that time period or
the beginning of that time period, time invariant firm characteristics, and change-
specific characteristics.
Methodology and Results
In this section, I describe some of the preliminary tests needed to study the
relationship between stock prices and expected tax rates, and I detail the design
and results of the main methodologies used to determine the causal impacts of
corporate income tax rate changes on stock prices. Stock prices are known to
follow a random walk, and I check for random walk properties in the series of
state corporate income tax rates on financial C corporations. I determine that first-
differencing variables is appropriate. First, I run a set of first-difference regressions,
regressing logarithmic stock returns on log tax rate changes and other controls. In
addition to utilizing ordinary least squares, I also use robust regressions, because
coefficient estimates produced by these regression types are less influenced by
outlier observations. The estimated equations bear a resemblance to arbitrage
pricing models. I then isolate the part of stock returns that comprises the risk
premium, and also the part that comprises the risk-adjusted abnormal return, in
order to run first-difference regressions that have a CAPM flavor. To try to isolate
the timing of the stock changes relative to the history of the tax change laws, I
then divide up the overall time window used in the main regressions into smaller
20For example, if a tax decrease’s overall size is determined to be a log change of -0.008, and a
firm has fifty percent of operations in the state in question, its treatment is -0.004.
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subwindows and run the regressions on within these subwindows (hereafter referred
to as within-subwindow regressions). Finally, I run placebo regressions as if the tax
law changes occurred a number of years prior to or after the actual law changes.
Preliminary Tests
Although it may be tempting to regress variables related to capital on
corporate tax rates (Krzyzaniak and Musgrave, 1963), such regressions are bound
to be spurious, due to the random walk properties of these time series variables.
Stock prices have long been argued to follow a random walk (hence the title of
Malkiel’s famous opus), and past studies have shown that state corporate tax rates
follow a random walk (Ljungqvist et al., 2017). Because other studies use samples
of non-financial firms, which sometimes have different corporate tax rates than
financial firms, I run Dickey-Fuller tests on the top marginal corporate tax rates
for the forty-five of fifty-one states that tax the income of financial corporations
(Dickey and Fuller, 1979).21 I fail to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for
all states tested except California and Connecticut, which reject at the one and
five percent levels, respectively. If a trend is included, Connecticut results become
statistically insignificant, and California results are only significant at the ten
percent level.22 Taken as a whole, these results suggest that top rates of state
21To be quite technical, corporate income tax rates can be thought of as a bounded variable
∈ [0, 1] (they do not have to be so confined, as corporate rates could be effectively negative). By
the strictest definition, this means that they cannot be thought of as a true random walk (neither
can stock prices follow a random walk, as stock prices cannot be negative). However, an accepted
procedure is to run Dickey-Fuller tests nonetheless. Little has been done to deal with this issue.
An exception is Cavaliere and Xu (2014). A more advanced model, appropriate to the observed
behavior of tax rates, would treat a zero rate as an absorbing state and allow regime switching
between the zero state and non-negative rates that follow a random walk.
22The results for Connecticut may be driven by the fact that the Connecticut legislature
repeatedly renewed a large surtax which was originally intended to exist for only a couple of
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income taxes on financial corporations also follow a random walk. By definition
of a random walk, these results help to alleviate concerns that investors may expect
tax rates to return to some average level after the implementation of a rate change.
First-Difference Regressions
The random walk properties of stock prices and state corporate income tax
rates make regressions of logarithmic stock returns on logarithmic tax changes
potentially spurious. I move past this issue by first-differencing, yielding the model
∆ log(Pi,t) = δTreatmenti,t + ∆X
′
i,tγ + ∆i,t, (2.1)
where ∆ log(Pi,t) are logarithmic stock returns for firm i over this timespan t,
Treatmenti,t is the firm-specific change in corporate tax rates as previously defined,
∆X
′
i,t a matrix of controls, and ∆i,t a compound error term. The matrix of
controls can be changed flexibly and can include changes in firm-specific variables
such as financial statement ratios, changes in industry-wide variables such as the
federal funds rate, and potentially even firm-specific trends. This model looks
remarkably like an arbitrage pricing model, and, as such, I shall refer to these as
“arbitrage-style” or “arb-style” models. However, excepting the firm-specific trend
coefficients, the coefficients are not firm-specific.
In the first-difference equation (2.1), the index t is shorthand for an
observation corresponding to a particular timespan, which further corresponds to
a particular law. Unless otherwise noted, the window used for each law is from the
first announcement date of a law minus five days until the date that the law was
years. California also had an unusual tax rate system for banks in the early to mid 1990s, where a
committee would set tax rates periodically (thus rates were not known far in advance).
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signed plus five days. There are forty-eight law changes, so the estimation process
effectively “stacks” forty-eight sets of first-difference observations on top of each
other. Because each tax law change has a unique history, there is a unique before
and after date for each change, as well as a unique number of days between the
beginning and ending dates of that law change. The fact that the time windows are
allowed to vary in length does stretch the framework of the usual first-difference
approach. The window of announcement date minus five days until signage date
plus five days is chosen for the following reason: markets respond to expectations,
and the announcement of a tax law change is the earliest inkling of that change, so
expectations should not change before that point; once a law is signed into law, it is
virtually certain, so markets should account for the law change by that point.23
The five day cushion on either side of the beginning and end dates is designed
to ensure that I do not miss the effect of treatment by picking too late of an
initial start date (for example, if newspaper articles are slow to report lawmakers’
announcements) or too early of an initial end date (for example, if newspapers are
slow to report the signing of tax laws). The null hypothesis that the treatment
effect is zero raises the question of whether markets are efficient with respect to
news of state-level corporate income tax changes, and the generously wide window
is quite flexible to the question of when investors respond, and allows me to pick
up the impacts on stock prices of beliefs about upcoming changes that may evolve
over time (i.e., given the same starting and ending price, I will estimate the same
treatment effect whether investors changed the stock price all in one day or slowly,
23The argument that a lawmaker’s announcement should be the first inkling of an upcoming
tax change is contentious: however, this stance rests on the random walk-like properties of the
series of state corporate income tax rates (by definition of a random walk, the expectation is
that rates tomorrow will be today’s rates) as well as the fact that most such tax changes are
categorized as exogenous relative to state macroeconomic trends, as categorized by Giroud and
Rauh (2015) and this author (for financial rate changes).
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day after day). A downside of such a long window is that, supposing treatment
does not matter at either end of the window, I risk picking up excessive noise and
losing significance. Although the panel used to create the first-difference data is not
perfectly balanced, the modal firm remains in the panel throughout.
I estimate the model in (2.1), and the regression results are displayed in Table
6. The top panel shows Treatment coefficient estimates when all observations from
all tax changes are included except for changes in North Carolina, while the middle
and bottom panels only include those observations for tax decreases and increases,
respectively. North Carolina changes are conservatively omitted for reasons more
fittingly explained in section 2.4. All regressions use a basic set of industry controls.
Moving from left to right, I begin to include law change-specific trends (to account
for possible unique market conditions that occurred during any particular law
change), and eventually firm-specific trends. Columns alternate between ordinary
least squares regressions and robust regressions. 24
Estimates are negative, implying that stock prices move inversely with
corporate income tax rates. For all law changes pooled together, Treatment
coefficient estimates range from around negative one-half to negative three and one-
half, and are lose significance as more controls are added. However, moving down
the panels, we can see that the results are very heterogeneous for tax decreases
versus tax increases. Estimates for tax decreases are insignificant and tend to be
between zero and negative one using OLS. The outlier-robust estimates imply
24For validation, I compare the first column of robust regression estimates with a column using
median absolute deviation regressions (also called least absolute deviation, quantile or MAD
regressions), and the results are very similar, suggesting that these outlier-sensitive methods
achieve a similar effect. As the MAD technique requires excessive computing power for some
specifications relative to the benefit bestowed by these additional checks, I do not display the
MAD results.
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TABLE 6.
First-Difference Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Least Robust Least Robust Least Robust
Squares Regression Squares Regression Squares Regression
All Changes:
Treatment −3.40∗∗ −2.28∗∗ −1.66 −1.37 −0.51 −0.87
(1.51) (0.97) (1.25) (0.84) (1.34) (0.86)
R2 0.0953 0.3463 0.4399
Obs. 11,787 11,787 11,787 11,787 11,787 11,786
Decreases Only:
Treatment −0.81 −1.00 −0.19 −0.62 −0.04 −0.75
(1.23) (0.95) (0.99) (0.84) (1.11) (0.86)
R2 0.2497 0.4256 0.5144
Obs. 7,027 7,027 7,027 7,026 7,027 7,024
Increases Only:
Treatment −25.75∗∗∗ −17.92∗∗∗ −18.55∗ −10.23∗∗∗ −18.73∗ −10.68∗∗∗
(7.79) (3.68) (10.18) (3.13) (10.49) (3.51)
R2 0.0998 0.2664 0.4621
Obs. 4,760 4,760 4,760 4,760 4,760 4,758
Industry Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Law Change
Specific Trends N N Y Y Y Y
Firm Specific
Trends N N N N Y Y
Standard Clustered See Clustered See Clustered See
Errors by State Footnote by State Footnote by State Footnote
This table presents results of first-difference regressions of log returns of bank stocks on
treatment sizes, where treatment is the log size of a tax change in a state multiplied by the
proportion of a firm’s operations in the state undergoing the tax change (thus, coefficient
estimates on the Treatment variable can be thought of as elasticities of stock prices on tax
law changes). Regressions are taken over the time period of five days prior to the first news date
to five days after the bill was signed into law. The top panel shows regression results when all
tax law changes are pooled together; the bottom two panels show results only for tax decreases
and tax increases, respectively. Robust regressions have no convenient R2 analogue, though all
tests shown yield F-tests with p values less than 0.0002. Robust regressions are based on an
initial screening for outliers with Cook’s distance of greater than one, followed by Li’s method
of following Huber iterations with biweight iterations in order to determine observation weights
(minimizing the influence of outliers), before finally running a weighted regression (Li, 1985).
Standard errors for robust regressions are calculated by using the correction suggested by Street
et al. (1988). Industry controls include measures of number of banks in the US, number of
housing starts, and the federal funds rate. Coefficient estimates marked with one, two, and three
stars are significant and the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively.
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stock prices changes that are, on average, smaller than a simple predicted change
in future tax expenses would suggest.
Estimates for tax increases only tend to be extremely large and significant
(despite employing many fewer observations). They range from an elasticity of
about negative twenty-five using OLS and the fewest controls, but begin to settle to
to about negative ten when more controls are included and outliers are accounted
for. A decline in stock price of about ten percent for a one percent increase in
corporate tax rates seems severe.
Many models in the financial literature, particularly the CAPM, isolate the
portions of stock returns that are in excess of the risk-free portion of returns (i.e.
the return one could earn investing in one-month Treasury bills). The CAPM also
leverages the relationship that stocks will have with broader movements in the
stock market as a whole, adjusting for risk. I slightly modify the model in (2.1)
to be more unified with the CAPM, by including these concepts. This yields
log(1 + ∆Pi,t)− log(1 +RFt) =
δTreatmenti,t + α+ β(log(1 + ∆PMkt,t)− log(1 +RFt)) + ∆X ′i,tγ + ∆i,t, (2.2)
where RFt is the return on one-month Treasuries during timespan t, and ∆PMkt,t is
the value-weighted market return of all common stocks on the NYSE, NASDAQ, or
AMEX/NYSE American stock exchanges. Consistent with other uses of the CAPM
in the literature, other controls are often added.25 Firms may have individual
intercepts αi, or these subscripts may be suppressed. The βs represent financial
25See, for example, Fama and French (1993). While the CAPM result is derived from theory
and the application of other control variables is not, such variables are included in order to make
up from some of the empirical shortcomings discovered when the CAPM is applied to actual stock
returns.
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βs. These βs may be firm-specific (in which case they are a moving average of
the previous five years’ βs), or these subscripts may be suppressed. I run these
with both firm-specific subscripts and without; I present the results with subscripts
suppressed, as the inclusion of firm-specific subscripts does not meaningfully change
results. All in all, these regressions are another set of first-difference regressions,
with steps taken to conform to the CAPM framework.
These CAPM-style regression results are displayed in Table 7. These results
are almost identical to those of Table 6, suggesting that the results of the original,
“arb-style” first-difference regressions are not driven by the inclusion of the risk-
free portion of stock returns on the left hand side, and they are not driven due to
ignoring the correlation of individual stock returns with the market. Once again,
outlier-robust estimates for tax decreases hover around negative ten.
One of the identifying assumptions underlying these sets of regressions is
the stance taken that a bank’s net income can be proportionally allocated to the
different states in which it has branches, based on the proportion of branches in
each state (taking care to heed nexus throwback rules, as previously mentioned).
Readers may have concerns that this is invalid, for instance, if the bank operates in
one higher income state and one lower income state, or in agricultural versus urban
areas. I test this identifying assumption by running the regressions using only
companies that are located within one state. The results (not shown) are largely
unchanged.
I will now test the validity of these estimates with placebo tests, in order
to make sure that the regressions were not spurious. If placebo tests suggest that
these large elasticities were due to the tax changes and not other factors, then the
large size of these estimates bears some discussion.
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TABLE 7.
CAPM-Style Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Least Robust Least Robust Least Robust
Squares Regression Squares Regression Squares Regression
All Changes:
Treatment −3.72∗∗ −2.27∗∗ −1.67 −1.37 −0.51 −0.86
(1.43) (0.97) (1.25) (0.84) (1.34) (0.85)
R2 0.0825 0.3365 0.4314
Obs. 11,787 11,787 11,787 11,787 11,787 11,783
Decreases Only:
Treatment −1.22 −1.16 −0.19 −0.63 −0.05 −0.74
(1.48) (0.96) (0.99) (0.84) (1.12) (0.86)
R2 0.2300 0.4193 0.5090
Obs. 7,027 7,027 7,027 7,027 7,027 7,001
Increases Only:
Treatment −23.74∗∗∗ −17.83∗∗∗ −18.56∗ −10.17∗∗∗ −18.71∗ −10.65∗∗∗
(8.39) (3.68) (10.18) (3.13) (10.48) (3.52)
R2 0.0429 0.2416 0.4440
Obs. 4,760 4,760 4,760 4,760 4,760 4,732
Industry Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Law Change
Specific Trends N N Y Y Y Y
Firm Specific
Trends N N N N Y Y
Standard Clustered See Clustered See Clustered See
Errors by State Footnote by State Footnote by State Footnote
This table presents results of regressions of log risk premia (log stock returns minus log risk
free returns) of bank stocks on market premia and treatment sizes, where treatment is the log
size of a tax change in a state multiplied by the proportion of a firm’s operations in the state
undergoing the tax change (thus, coefficient estimates on the Treatment variable can be thought
of as elasticities of stock prices on tax law changes). Regressions are taken over the time period
of five days prior to the first news date to five days after the bill was signed into law. The top
panel shows regression results when all tax law changes are pooled together; the bottom two
panels show results only for tax decreases and tax increases, respectively. Robust regressions
have no convenient R2 analogue, though all tests shown yield F-tests with p values less than
0.0001. Robust regressions are based on an initial screening for outliers with Cook’s distance of
greater than one, followed by Li’s method of following Huber iterations with biweight iterations
in order to determine observation weights (minimizing the influence of outliers), before finally
running a weighted regression. Standard errors for robust regressions are calculated by using
the correction suggested by Street, Carroll, and Ruppert (1988). Industry controls include
measures of number of banks in the US, number of housing starts, and the federal funds rate.
Coefficient estimates marked with one, two, and three stars are significant and the one, five, and
ten percent levels, respectively.
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Placebo Regressions
I rerun the regressions of the previous section by taking the actual treatment
values, but applying them to stock returns on different dates. I shift the dates of
the stock return timeframes t backwards one, two, three, four, and five years, and
forwards one, two, three, four, and five years. Because tax events did not happen
in these other time periods, there should be no relationship between these non-
contemporaneous returns and the actual tax changes that occurred at the actual
time of the tax law change.
Placebo regressions for the CAPM-style regressions are shown in Table 8 (for
tax law changes shifted backwards in time) and Table 9 (for tax law changes shifted
forwards in time). Placebo regressions for the “arb-style” regressions look similar.
These placebo regressions exclude North Carolina changes, as one particular
North Carolina change tends to erroneously drive significant placebo results. All
North Carolina changes are dropped even though only one is problematic. To
be consistent, the North Carolina changes are excluded therefore in the baseline
regressions.
In general, the placebo regressions on these two tables tend to not show
significance where they should not: of the sixty placebo regressions run, only seven
are significant at the ten percent level or higher, roughly what one might expect.
Of the significant results, most occur when the treatments are artificially shifted
forward in time. It is more reassuring that significance is found less before these
tax changes come into being; there is no reason why a tax change might not have a
delayed effect (the most significant and large estimate occurs for tax decreases, one
year after the true treatment). On the other hand, the placebo regressions, even
when insignificant, occasionally show large magnitudes, suggesting that the baseline
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TABLE 8.
Placebo Tests, Treatment Shifted Backwards in Time
Minus Minus Minus Minus Minus
Five Years Four Years Three Years Two Years One Year
All Changes:
Least Squares −2.48 −0.27 0.21 2.27 0.50
(1.70) (1.74) (2.28) (2.53) (1.99)
Robust Regression −0.52 1.90∗ 0.13 1.09 -0.67
(1.23) (1.12) (1.06) (1.04) (0.93)
Decreases Only:
Least Squares −1.81 0.99 0.18 2.41 -0.37
(1.74) (2.37) (2.50) (3.05) (1.96)
Robust Regression −0.19 2.79∗∗ −0.04 1.11 -1.11
(1.44) (1.32) (1.21) (1.11) (0.92)
Increases Only:
Least Squares 0.49 0.84 1.68 -4.97 -0.29
(3.51) (3.31) (1.77) (5.42) (2.84)
Robust Regression −1.74 1.67 0.04 -0.74 0.37
(3.41) (3.22) (3.26) (3.27) (3.46)
This table presents results of placebo regressions of log returns of bank stocks (net of the
risk-free component) on log treatment sizes. These placebo regressions use the actual
treatment sizes, while changing the time frame of actual law changes to fictitious time
frames. These time frames take the original time frames for each law change and shift them
back in time by one, two, three, four, and five years. The top panel shows regression results
when all tax law changes are pooled together; the bottom two panels show results only for
tax decreases and tax increases, respectively. Robust regressions are based on an initial
screening for outliers with Cook’s distance of greater than one, followed by Li’s method
of following Huber iterations with biweight iterations in order to determine observation
weights, before finally running a weighted regression. All regressions control for the number
of trading days in each window as well as the change in the federal funds rate. Standard
errors are shown in parentheses. Coefficient estimates marked with one, two, and three stars
are significant and the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively.
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TABLE 9.
Placebo Tests, Treatment Shifted Forwards in Time
Plus Plus Plus Plus Plus
One Year Two Years Three Years Four Years Five Years
All Changes:
Least Squares −1.13 −0.15 −2.42∗∗ −2.80 0.52
(2.11) (0.85) (1.15) (3.47) (0.91)
Robust Regression −0.54 −1.03 −1.74∗∗ −0.20 0.67
(0.85) (0.82) (0.88) (0.95) (0.93)
Decreases Only:
Least Squares −1.49 −0.75 −2.29∗∗ −2.80 0.23
(2.49) (0.65) (1.06) (3.89) (1.00)
Robust Regression −0.65 −1.11 −1.43 −0.18 0.41
(0.87) (0.84) (0.91) (1.03) (1.02)
Increases Only:
Least Squares −6.68 5.76 0.89 -0.53 -0.20
(4.04) (3.75) (5.99) (4.06) (9.19)
Robust Regression −8.45∗∗ 2.49 −3.72 −6.63∗∗ -6.90
(3.41) (3.30) (3.52) (3.31) (5.47)
This table presents results of placebo regressions of log returns of bank stocks (net of the
risk-free component) on log treatment sizes. These placebo regressions use the actual
treatment sizes, while changing the time frame of actual law changes to fictitious time
frames. These time frames take the original time frames for each law change and shift them
forwards in time by one, two, three, four, and five years. The top panel shows regression
results when all tax law changes are pooled together; the bottom two panels show results
only for tax decreases and tax increases, respectively. Robust regressions are based on
an initial screening for outliers with Cook’s distance of greater than one, followed by
Li’s method of following Huber iterations with biweight iterations in order to determine
observation weights, before finally running a weighted regression. All regressions control for
the number of trading days in each window as well as the change in the federal funds rate.
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Coefficient estimates marked with one, two, and
three stars are significant and the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively.
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estimates of Tables 6 and 7 could contain bias. Of the placebo tests, the largest
magnitude coefficient is 8.45. If I subtract that estimate from the baseline estimates
of elasticity for tax increases (which hover around ten percent), this produces a
magnitude of negative two percent rather than the ten percent baseline estimate.
Even if an elasticity of negative two is a lower bound on the true estimate, it is still
a large number.26
Timing
The baseline regressions suggest that investors do heed changes in state-
level corporate income tax rates, and that the effects on stock prices are large.
Until now, I have taken a fairly neutral stance on when during the course of
the legislative process do investors adjust prices, only positing that they adjust
sometime between when a law change is announced and when it is completed.
To further nail down the timing of these price changes, I divide the main window
t used in the baseline regressions into three “subwindows:” the first, from the
announcement until the date that the bill is introduced into the state legislature;
the second, from the introduction date until the date the bill is passed; and
finally, from the date of passage until the bill is signed into law. I rerun the
regressions within each of these three subwindows. Estimates using the CAPM-
style regressions with full controls are shown in Table 10.
I find that, for both tax decreases and increases, the vast majority of the price
change occurs in the first subwindow. This is statistically significant for all tax
changes, decreases, and increases, when using robust regressions. For tax increases,
26In addition to the placebos shown, I ran placebo tests, using contemporaneous stock returns
to the actual tax changes, but with changing the actual treatments to fictitious treatments, using
a distribution of random returns that simulates the actual returns (these are not shown). These
placebo tests also show a null result.
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TABLE 10.
Timing of Market Response
First Announcement Bill Introduction Bill Passage
Date Until Bill Date Until Bill Date Until Bill
Introduction Date Passage Date Signing Date
All Changes:
Least Squares −0.39 −0.20 0.03
(0.77) (0.68) (0.20)
Robust Regression −1.45∗∗∗ −0.17 0.13
(0.85) (0.31) (0.22)
Decreases Only:
Least Squares −0.08 0.13 −0.10
(0.75) (0.50) (0.18)
Robust Regression −1.17∗∗ 0.17 −0.05
(0.58) (0.34) (0.22)
Increases Only:
Least Squares −9.97∗∗ −8.82 −0.46
(3.81) (10.00) (1.20)
Robust Regression −8.06∗∗∗ −3.27∗∗∗ 1.19
(3.41) (1.24) (1.07)
This table presents results of regressions of log returns of bank stocks (net of the risk-
free component) on log treatment sizes, over various subwindows in the tax law changes’
legislative histories. The first column shows the estimated elasticity of stock prices on tax
rate changes during the time between when an upcoming bill is first announced until the bill
is introduced, the second column shows the estimated elasticity of stock prices on tax rate
changes during the time between when a bill is introduced until it is passed, and the third
column shows the estimated elasticity during the time between when a bill is passed and the
bill is signed by the governor. These regressions are otherwise the same as the CAPM-style
regressions with full controls. This table shows how much of the total response occurred
during each subwindow. The top panel shows regression results when all tax law changes
are pooled together; the bottom two panels show results only for tax decreases and tax
increases, respectively. Robust regressions are based on an initial screening for outliers with
Cook’s distance of greater than one, followed by Li’s method of following Huber iterations
with biweight iterations in order to determine observation weights, before finally running a
weighted regression. All regressions control for the number of trading days in each window
as well as the change in the federal funds rate. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Coefficient estimates marked with one, two, and three stars are significant and the one, five,
and ten percent levels, respectively.
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a significant portion - between about thirty and forty-five percent, depending on
the specification - occurs in the second subwindow, and this is significant using
robust regression. No significant price change occurs in the final subwindow. The
null result for the third subwindow makes sense, as governors signed bills in all but
one instance (where the law was vetoed, returned to chamber, and was passed with
a veto override). If investors know that these types of laws are virtually certain
once passed, there should be little to no price change in this final subwindow.
The significant stock decline (at least using robust regression) in the second
subwindow for tax increases suggests a potential opportunity for market arbitrage.
If roughly three-tenths of the decline in stock price due to a tax increase comes
after an impending bill is introduced, investors can seize advantage of this market
opportunity. Perhaps this is difficult to do, as lawmakers’ popularity is likely
positively related to tax cuts, so lawmakers may try to announce upcoming tax
increases in a low-key manner, making upcoming tax increases less salient.
Discussion
In this section, I discuss the size and asymmetry of my estimated elasticities.
I also address concerns about the external validity of my results.
Were the banks to continue on their projected growth path (see the appendix
for further details about measuring and estimating said growth), and the only
thing to change were the size of their tax expenses (due to the changes in rates),
and were these stocks properly valued before and after the law changes (within a
reasonable amount of error), then I would estimate elasticities of around negative
one, for both tax decreases and increases. That the estimates for tax increases
are larger in magnitude than unity suggests that more is going on than just a
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change in future tax expenses that is proportional to future income, assuming a
current growth path. An analysis of the competitive nature of the regional banking
industry suggests some possible reasons for the larger magnitudes.
Regional banking is a competitive industry. To most small business borrowers
and mortgage borrowers, there is little to distinguish one loan from another,
except for loan rates and terms. If we assume that homeowners are inflexible in
the lengths of their loans (for example, they seek out thirty year loans), then they
should distinguish between possible loan products by choosing the loan with the
lowest rate. There may be elements of monopolistic competition in this industry
based on location (that the banks stay small suggests there is a business advantage
to staying community oriented), so borrowers may receive some kind of good feeling
from borrowing locally. However, it is likely that most borrowers will seek out
the lowest borrowing rate. If we take this industry to be perfectly competitive,
then banks offering too high rates will make no loans; thus it is incumbent upon
banks to offer the loans at the lowest rate possible. Under the perfectly competitive
assumption, banks will offer loans at cost.
Taxes factor into the cost structure of these banks, so an increase in taxes
will force banks to raise loan rates for all banks affected by the tax. If rates are
decreased, banks will lower rates, lest their competition lower rates and take all of
the market share. However, with state-level corporate tax changes, not all banks
are affected - only banks in that state. In perfect competition, a higher rate in one
state and a lower rate in another state will cause all of the borrowers in the high
rate state to seek out lower rate loans in the lower tax state.
Of course, this does not happen exactly. The community orientation of these
banks means that there is some cost - travel costs or perhaps psychic costs of
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seeking out a bank not native to one’s area - to switching banks. If these costs are
heterogeneous, then a tax change in one state that causes loan rates to change may
induce some people to switch banks, while others may not. In this case, a higher
tax will not cause a complete erosion of market share, but a significant one.
Furthermore, state versus state competition is not the only channel for the
erosion of market share for loans issued by regional banks. Not all banks are
C corporations, and thus not all banks pay corporate income taxes. Beginning
in 1997, banks could elect to become S corporations, which are treated like
partnerships for tax purposes, meaning they are not taxed at the corporate level
and income flows through to the individual shareholders, who are taxed on their S
corporation income based on personal income tax rates. The absence of corporate
taxation is a strong incentive for banks to adopt the S corporation form. However,
converting from a publicly traded C corporation to an S corporation may be costly.
S corporations are limited in the number of shareholders they may have, and
publicly traded stocks are held by a wide variety of shareholders. Converting to
an S corporation means that a publicly traded company will first have to buy back
outstanding shares on the stock market, which will drive up the price of shares,
making the process expensive. Nonetheless, the last two decades have seen a steady
rise in the percentage of banks adopting the S corporation form, from roughly six
percent in 1997 to roughly thirty-six percent in 2014 (De and Mehran, 2014). This
occurred during a period when the number of banking institutions was steadily
decreasing each year. The bulk of the increase in S corporation banks was made up
by former C corporations converting into S corporations, and not by the emergence
of new establishments.
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The lack of corporate taxes on S corporations means that S corporation
banks do not have to raise loan rates when corporate taxes increase, unlike C
corporations. In addition to the competition between banks in different states,
banks within states featuring corporate taxes face different cost structures
depending on their organizational form. If a state’s taxes increase, forcing C
corporations to raise rates, S corporations can respond by holding their loan
interest rates steady, which should erode some of the market share of the C
corporation banks. Thus there are two sorts of competition by which publicly
traded C corporation banks can lose market share in the face of higher taxes.
Why is the magnitude for tax increases so much larger than the essentially
null result for tax decreases? An asymmetric result is par for the course in the
literature on the effects of state corporate income taxes. For example, Ljungqvist
et al. (2017) find that firms reduce risk-taking only in response to tax increases,
Ljungqvist and Smolyansky (2014) find that employment and employment income
generally only respond to tax increases, and Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) find
that firms’ leverage decisions respond only to tax increases. Taxation forces a
natural asymmetry between corporate gains and losses, because the government
shares in a firm’s gains but not their losses. Additionally, debt covenants in loan
agreements create nonlinearities that make losses potentially more impactful than
gains. However, a unique story may be taking place here.
It is possible that markets are efficient in that they understand the proper
direction of the price change, but inefficient in that they do not understand
the magnitude. Markets can possibly (relatively) overreact to tax increases
while (relatively) underreacting to tax decreases. However, a more compelling
explanation is that markets may take a tax decrease as a signal of future things
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to come in that state, not necessarily with tax rates, but with the business
environment in general. Even if one takes the stance that regional banks do not
hold much sway over their state legislatures, it is hard to imagine a world where
business as a whole does not have some kind of control over the state government.
There is likely some general sense that the business community possesses some
degree of regulatory capture over the state government. Markets may interpret tax
increases as a harbinger that the business community as a whole has lost regulatory
capture over the state legislature, meaning that more bad news (from businesses’
perspective) may be coming in the future. Thus, an elasticity of negative ten may
have a component that is based on the erosion of market share and a component
that represents future non-business-friendly events.
The placebo regressions speak to the internal validity of this research,
however, readers may have concerns that these results are not externally valid. One
nice feature of the banking industry as the subject of research is that banking is
connected to most other industries, so the usual concerns about the idiosyncrasies
of this industry are less pressing than they are for some other industries. Banks are
unusual, in general, in that they have high debt to equity ratios. This sample of
firms is also unusual in that the firms are not national, unlike most publicly traded
firms. It remains a question whether the elasticities estimated are representative
of other local industries, other banks, or firms in general. One nice validation of
results comes from the recent corporate income tax change at the Federal level,
where corporate rates were decreased from thirty-five percent to twenty-one percent
in 2017. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation reported that, nationally,
banks saw an increase in profits of over twenty-seven percent in the quarter after
this large change. This corresponds to an elasticity (of profit, not stock price,
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to tax rates) of roughly -1.25, in the ballpark of the elasticity estimates for tax
decreases when accounting for outliers.
Conclusion
In this paper, I use the wisdom of the markets to estimate the change in
capitalization value of publicly traded regional banks due to changes in state
corporate tax rates. I do this by leveraging the heterogeneous set of changes in
state corporate tax rates and by employing a variety of first-difference regressions.
My results suggest that, on average, these changes in capitalization values are far
greater than a 100% burden of the corporate tax on shareholders would suggest.
Estimates of the elasticities of stock prices to corporate income tax rates are in
the range of about negative one to zero for tax decreases and roughly negative ten
for tax increases, when employing the most controls and accounting for outliers
(where the negative sign implies and inverse relationship between tax rates and
stock prices). Placebo regressions suggest that these relationships are not spurious
but that they may contain bias.
The reason for the large magnitude is speculative, but may be driven by the
intense competition in the banking industry. Higher taxes in some states may cause
erosion of the market share of firms in those states by banks in lower tax states,
which can sustain lower loan rates. In all states, S corporations, which are not
subject to corporate tax, can compete with taxed firms. The asymmetry of results
for tax decreases versus increases is typical for the state-level corporate income
tax literature. This asymmetry may be driven by investor beliefs about regulatory
capture.
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The estimated elasticities raise the question of whether markets are correct
in their assessments of tax changes. Future work will investigate the changes in
future profits in the years following these changes. Given that investors may have
potentially over- or underreacted, I will follow up by looking at price movements
after these changes to see if any correction was made. Finally, I will investigate the
management compensation schemes of these firms in years following the changes, to
see if managers use the windfall of tax decreases to claim superior management and
increase their compensation.
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CHAPTER III
MEASURING SYSTEMATIC WAGE MISREPORTING BY DEMOGRAPHIC
GROUPS
This dissertation includes previously unpublished co-authored material. It
is co-authored with John Voorheis of the US Census Bureau and Caroline Weber
of the University of Washington. I wrote the majority of the chapter, with John
Voorheis providing important work on the Data section and with institutional
details, and Caroline Weber providing edits. I wrote the majority of the computer
code used to create this chapter, with John Voorheis contributing code for the
visualizations of income misreporting within groups across income levels, and
Caroline Weber providing valuable supervision and code writing lessons and
examples. I conceived this chapter, which is an offshoot of another ongoing project.
The views expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the
U.S. Census Bureau. All results have been reviewed to ensure that no confidential
information is disclosed. The statistical summaries reported in this paper have been
cleared by the Census Bureau’s Disclosure Review Board, release authorization
numbers CBDRB-FY18-143, CBDRB-FY18-200 and CBDRB-FY18-407.
Introduction
Demographic surveys, such as the Current Population Survey (CPS), are a
valuable source of data for economists and statisticians. CPS income data are used
by economists to estimate the scope and impacts of key labor market phenomena,
such as returns to education and the Black-White wage gap, and to generate
earnings statistics. When income data are measured with error, statistics can be
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less accurate and will be less reliable, which can introduce bias into regression
modeling.
Analyses of the methodology of economic observation reveal a number of
ways measurement errors can occur, confounding results and inferences when left
uncorrected (Morgenstern, 1963; Deaton, 1997). The more commonly acknowledged
types of measurement errors assume that the mean of the measurement errors is
zero (Bound et al., 2001). Previous studies using matched CPS and administrative
data have investigated such zero-mean error structures (Bound and Krueger, 1991;
Bollinger, 1998).
However, it is also possible that measurement error may be non-classical, i.e.
the errors may have non-zero means. This type of error is often acknowledged as a
possibility, although it has been difficult to quantify the degree to which this may
present challenges to empirical research. However, by comparing CPS data to an
alternate source such as administrative records, we can examine whether and to
what degree non-zero mean measurement errors exist in survey data.
In this paper, we examine wage misreporting by matching responses from the
CPS Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) to administrative records
from three sources: individual-level Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form W-2 and
Social Security Administration (SSA) Detailed Earnings Record (DER) wage data,
and tax unit-level IRS Form 1040 wage data. We utilize the accuracy of IRS wage
data amongst wage-earners (individuals with self-employment income are dropped
from the sample) to identify wage misreporting to the CPS. The CPS provides
detailed sociodemographic information on respondents, including race, ethnicity
and educational attainment. These matched datasets allow us to investigate the
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roles these demographic characteristics play in CPS wage misreporting and explore
heterogeneity of misreporting behavior within demographic groups.
We find evidence of heterogeneity in misreporting, finding consistent and
highly significant estimated coefficients for several sociodemographic variables,
across model specifications. Wage misreporting shows a strong relationship with
age: individuals and tax units underreport wages to the CPS by 1.5 to 2.8 percent
for each decade lived, on average. Estimated coefficients on education dummies
show that more educated individuals and tax units underreport relatively less to
the CPS relative to less educated individuals – college graduates underreport by 1.6
to 2.4 percent less than high school graduates. Within racial and ethnic indicator
variables, the estimated reporting gap for Hispanics is consistently significant and
robust across specifications, but there is heterogeneity within this group, driven
largely by educational attainment. Coefficients for the black indicator variable
only become significant and stable once outliers are excluded, also suggesting
heterogeneous reporting behaviors within this group. Hispanics underreport by 3.5
to 5 percent more than non-Hispanic whites, while Blacks under-report by 0 to 1.4
percent more than non-Hispanic whites. These relative differences in misreporting
behavior do not generally appear to be driven by potential differences in how these
groups round income when they report it to the CPS.
These results are important for the computation of racial and ethnic income
statistics and for the study of wage differentials due to racial and ethnic status.
Studies that examine the history and impacts of racial and ethnic discrimination
in labor markets are often built upon CPS income data (Card and Krueger,
1992; Trejo, 1997; Chay, 1998; Peoples and Talley, 2001; Juhn, 2003), Census
data (Reimers, 1983; Borjas and Bronars, 1989), or other survey data (Cameron
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and Heckman, 2001). In the case of simple ratios, our findings imply that racial
and ethnic wage differentials are smaller than previously calculated. Our results
also stress the importance of accounting for heterogeneity within groups when
investigating racial and ethnic wage gaps.
Our results are also highly relevant to studies on the returns to education.
Since Mincer (1958), economists have been estimated the private and social returns
to educational attainment. Many of these use survey data (Card, 1993; Kane and
Rouse, 1995; Cameron and Heckman, 2001). Our findings imply that simple ratios
of education earnings differentials will overstate the returns to education, as college
educated individuals have relatively less wage under-reporting.
Our findings add to body of knowledge showing how administrative records
can be used to improve survey designs and use of survey data. Where non-zero
mean errors arise, researchers can adjust incomes to create more accurate income
data. Survey design analysis reveals how data can be made more accurate before it
is used elsewhere.
In the next section, we describe the data used and the construction of
variables. Then we describe the model and identifying assumptions. Later, we
present our main regression results and plots of measurement error distributions,
and provide evidence of systematic measurement errors. Then we discuss the
possible mechanisms by which systematic measurement errors may occur, and the
implications of these errors, particularly for studies of racial wage differentials or
returns to schooling. Finally, we conclude and propose avenues for further research.
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Data
This project creates a novel dataset by linking data from four major sources:
the CPS ASEC, IRS Form 1040 tax returns, IRS Form W-2 wage reports, and
the SSA DER.1 The three administrative records data sources are available for
different time periods: the 1040 tax returns are available for tax years 2000-2015,
the form W-2 data are available for tax years 2005-2015, and the SSA DER extract
is available for tax years 2000-2012.
The monthly basic CPS survey collects employment information from
about 70,000 American households, and is the source of the BLS’ published
unemployment rates. The March ASEC supplement adds detailed household
income data for the previous calendar year.2 Households are surveyed for two
consecutive years, rotating in sample for four months, out of sample for eight
months, and then back in sample for the final four months. Recent survey non-
response rates have been low relative to some other household surveys, in the range
of approximately thirteen percent for the regular monthly CPS and fifteen percent
for the ASEC (U.S. Census Bureau, 2015), although it has been increasing. This
increase in non-response rates for the ASEC is likely partly due to the additional
time investment households put in when completing the lengthier ASEC. The
ASEC collects data on most Federally taxable income types, as well as types that
are not recorded on Form 1040 (such as child support and welfare assistance).
1While the two IRS datasets are available for the full population, the SSA DER data at
the Census Bureau contains only an extract for CPS respondents. Since our analysis will be
conducted using individuals in both the CPS ASEC and the administrative records, however,
this distinction will not affect our results in this paper.
2Starting in 2002, the basic monthly CPS sample size was increased from around 60,000
households to around 70,000 households, and the ASEC supplement sample size increased to
around 100,000 households.
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These data are aggregated up to the household level. The CPS ASEC also collects
demographic information such as age, gender, marital status, race and ethnicity,
and educational history.
Our second major source of data comes directly from IRS Form 1040.3
Detailed income information for all taxable categories and a few non-taxable
categories of income are reported on Form 1040. The IRS has delivered an extract
of the universe of 1040 tax returns to the Census Bureau annually since 1998.
These extracts contain the universe of tax units, but they do not contain all fields
of Form 1040, limiting us to only observe certain line items or composites of line
items. These are: wages, dividends, taxable and non-taxable interest income,
social security income, rental and royalty income, and total money income (which
is equivalent to “total income” on Form 1040). In this paper, we focus solely on
wage income. Analyses using the other income concepts can be found in Imboden,
Voorheis, Weber (Forthcoming). In addition, the 1040 data includes indicators for
various schedules filed with the tax form.
Our third source of data is a subset of the universe of Detailed Earnings
Records, which are collected by the Social Security Administration.4 These detailed
records contain self-employed earnings subject to Medicare taxes (equivalent to all
self-employment earnings reported to the Social Security Administration via IRS
forms) and wages earned for all CPS respondents that are in the Social Security
3Here, 1040 refers to both the standard 1040 form as well as short form 1040A and easy form
1040EZ.
4Unlike the 1040 data, we do not have the universe of DER observations. Rather, the SSA
delivered a subset of the DER to the Census Bureau annually beginning in 1991 for all individuals
who ever responded to the CPS ASEC. This extract was created by the SSA using a list of SSNs
sent by the Census. Before 2003, these SSNs were directly collected. After 2003, the Census sent
the SSN associated with the PIK assigned by the PVS process.
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system.5 Our fourth and related source of data comes from the universe of IRS
Form W-2s.6 These data report all gross wage income paid to an individual by an
employer in a tax year. Since an individual can work multiple jobs in a year, we
aggregate unique forms to the individual-year level by summing all wages received
by an individual across forms.
CPS ASEC records are matched to IRS and SSA records using the US
Census Bureau’s data linkage infrastructure. This data linkage infrastructure
allows for the linking of individuals across survey and administrative records using
anonymous identifiers called Protected Identity Keys (PIKs). PIKs are assigned to
individuals in an administrative records, survey or census microdata file using the
Person Identification Validation System (PVS). PVS is a probabilistic matching
algorithm which uses personally identifiable information (PII) to link individuals
to a reference file. Reference files used by PVS are modified versions of the SSA’s
Numerical Identification File called the Census Numident. The Census Numident
is the universe of individuals who have received Social Security Numbers (SSN),
and contains PII including the SSN itself, as well as age, date of birth, sex, race
and address.7 PIKs are invariant across and map one-to-one with SSNs. Once PIKs
have been assigned to a file, it is possible to match with any other administrative
records or survey records which have been assigned PIKs. We match all CPS ASEC
respondents from survey years 2001 through 2013 with IRS 1040 and SSA DER
5Virtually all tax units pay into the Social Security system, but some are exempt due to
religious objections or waivers.
6Form W-2’s are the underlying data source for the wages in the DER, for W2 and DER wage
amounts are identical in overlapping years.
7There are multiple vintages of the Numident reference file, each of which has the best PII
information for a given individual.
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data for the previous tax year (i.e. matching the 2010 CPS ASEC to tax year 2009
IRS 1040s).
Appendix table A.6 summarizes the evolution of our sample. We drop any
person records where PIKs are missing or invalid (about 10 percent of records).
Using CPS demographic fields, we create mutually exclusive dummy variables for
gender, marital status, education level (less than high school diploma completed,
high school diploma completed with no college, some college completed with no
degree, and bachelors degree completed or more) and for racial and ethnic groups
(Black, Native American, Asian, White Hispanic, and non-Hispanic White).8 Form
1040 incomes are based not on individual income data, but rather income data for
the tax unit, which may be based on one or two taxpayers, while the W-2 and DER
data are individual-level files. Thus we construct two datasets at different levels
of aggregation. We match IRS form W-2 and SSA DER administrative records
to survey records using PIKs when analyzing W-2 or DER data. When analyzing
the form 1040 data, we link individuals in the CPS to the form 1040 data by PIK,
and then collapse the individual CPS records to the tax unit so that they can be
properly compared to 1040 records.
We drop any data points where relevant income values in the ASEC were
imputed or truncated.9 Because capital gains and losses were fully imputed
throughout the sample, we drop all tax units that filed a Schedule D with their
1040. We drop any individuals and tax units that report positive self-employment
8In the current analysis, Blacks, Native Americans and Asians may be of either non-Hispanic
or Hispanic ethnicity. In future work, we will explore whether using different group definitions (i.e.
defining Hispanics of any race as a single group) affects our baseline results.
9CPS item non-responses are imputed using a “hot deck” methodology. For the protection
of personal information, large income amounts reported to the CPS are truncated at various
thresholds that vary by income type and across years.
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income to the IRS (as measured by filing any of Schedules C, E, or F) or the CPS,
because there may be confusion between some types of self-employment income
and wages. We drop any tax units who are outside of working age or who are
considered dependents for tax purposes. We start with 1,034,373 matched tax unit
records, and are left with 348,507 records after sample restrictions.10
Our analysis will focus on the difference between reported wages, salary
and bonuses in the CPS and administrative wage data. Despite the differences in
income categories and definitions between the CPS, SSA, and IRS data, it is also
possible to define other income concepts that are directly comparable between the
CPS and the administrative sources, however we leave this to subsequent research.
We define two two types of wage misreporting – extensive margin misreporting,
where no wages are reported in the CPS ASEC for individuals with non-zero wages
in linked administrative records and vice versa, and intensive margin misreporting,
which we measure using the wage reporting differential, or “gap.” On the extensive
margin, the indicator for having wages of record R, R ∈ {CPS,W-2,DER}, is
defined as
Iist,R =

1, if yist,R > 0
0, otherwise,
(3.1)
where yist,R is wage income recorded by source R. On the intensive margin, the
wage misreporting gap is defined as
Gist,Admin = log(yist,CPS)− log(yist,Admin) (3.2)
10Further data cleaning documentation is in the appendix.
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where Gist,Admin is the wage reporting differential for tax unit/individual i in state
s and year t, based on record Admin ∈ {W-2,DER}.
Selected descriptive statistics of the final sample are presented in Table 11.
Most tax units report wages to both the CPS and IRS–about ninety-four percent
report wages to the IRS, while ninety-two percent report wages on the CPS. More
wages are reported to the CPS than the IRS (this is found in all comparable
income types). However, the mean wage reporting differential is positive, meaning
that IRS wages are greater than CPS wages for the average gap (this is also true
for all other income types except interest plus dividends). Differences between
means of levels and mean reporting differentials across the unrestricted sample
could be driven by outliers.
Statistics may differ from those of the general US taxpaying population where
CPS sampling methods and response rates differ from a sample of all taxpaying
Americans, or where our data cleaning methods systematically removed members
of certain groups from our original sample. Most notably, the CPS oversamples
Hispanic Americans.11 Consequently, the proportion of a racial/ethnic group in
our data that differs most from that of the general US population of Hispanics,
with more than a two percentage point difference in representation. Our sample
also contains more females than the general population, perhaps because of higher
response rates by females and/or higher incarceration rates among males.12
11It is possible to reweight the CPS sample weights by the inverse probability of linkage to
create weights to target to the US noninstitutional population.
12Prisoners and other institutionalized people are not in the CPS sample frame.
55
TABLE 11.
Descriptive Statistics
Demographic Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Median
Survey Year 641,000 2009 4.31 2009
Age 641,000 41.18 9.960 41
Female 641,000 0.5371 0.4986 1
Married 641,000 0.6309 0.4826 1
White Non-Hispanic 641,000 0.6538 0.4757 1
Black 641,000 0.1200 0.3249 0
White Hispanic 641,000 0.1497 0.3568 0
Asian 641,000 0.0623 0.2418 0
Native American 641,000 0.0141 0.1181 0
Less Than High School 641,000 0.1003 0.3004 0
High School Only 641,000 0.3101 0.4626 0
Some College 641,000 0.2984 0.4575 0
Bachelor’s Degree 641,000 0.2911 0.4543 0
Income Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Median
CPS Wages 641,000 36,730 45,690 30,000
W-2 Wages 641,000 12,700 38,390 0
DER Wages 641,000 27,650 46,070 20,450
1040 Wages 641,000 58,960 69,180 45,320
Has CPS Wages 641,000 0.8670 0.3396 1
Has W-2 Wages 641,000 0.3120 0.4633 0
Has DER Wages 641,000 0.7145 0.4516 1
CPS W-2 Wage Gap 191,000 0.0287 0.5919 0.0112
CPS DER Wage Gap 437,000 0.0305 0.5825 0.0107
Source: CPS ASEC, IRS W-2, SSA DER and IRS 1040s, 2001-2016
This table presents descriptive statistics for the major explanatory variables and dependent variables
used in the regressions. Figures are rounded to four significant digits. Medians are interpolated over
at least fifty observations. All racial and ethnic categories and educational categories are mutually
exclusive. Approved for release by the Census DRB, authorization numbers CBDRB-FY18-143,
CBDRB-FY18-200 and CBDRB-FY18-407.
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Identification and Model Specification
Our central identifying assumption is that IRS wage data are sufficiently
accurate that wage reporting differentials are attributable to measurement error
in CPS recorded wages. Hereafter, “wages” refers specifically to wages as defined
by the IRS. The IRS includes most employer to employee remuneration in this
category, including salaries, tips, commissions, and bonuses.13 Note that only
taxable wages are reported on IRS form 1040.14
In the US, wages are subject to employment taxes (Social Security, Medicare,
and Federal unemployment insurance taxes) and income taxes, and are generally
subject to employer withholding of Federal income and employment taxes. After
year end, employers send duplicate wage earnings statements to their employees
and to the IRS directly. The duplicate statements allow the IRS to verify the
amount of wages earned by the tax unit. Discrepancies increase the probability
that a tax unit will be audited, which should discourage misreporting (Allingham
and Sandmo, 1972; Slemrod, 2007; Slemrod and Bakija, 2008). From audit-based
estimates, only one percent of wage income in the US is underreported to the IRS
(Internal Revenue Service, 2016). The IRS attributes the accuracy of reported
wages, relative to other income types, to greater withholding and information
requirements (Internal Revenue Service, 2016).
Using wages from the administrative records as a benchmark, we attribute
differences between IRS/SSA and CPS reported wages to measurement error on
the CPS. We interpret mismatch in reporting between CPS and administrative
13The CPS also explicitly includes salaries, tips, commissions, and bonuses in their definition of
wages.
14Pre-tax payroll deductions, e.g. for employer sponsored health insurance or tax-advantaged
retirement plans, are not included in taxable wages as a general rule.
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records sources – e.g. reporting no wages in the CPS when a non-zero W-2 or DER
wage report exists – as misreporting on the extensive margin. Similarly, we can
interpret Gist as the percent of wages over-reported (if Gist has a positive sign) or
underreported (if Gist has a negative sign) to the CPS on the intensive margin.
IRS and CPS wage data are comparable, as they measure the same type of income
earned over the same time period. By design, they are reported close together in
time: wages earned during one tax year are typically reported to the ASEC in
March and to the IRS before mid-April of the following year (U.S. Census Bureau,
2006). We regress indicators for having wages in of one record type on a rich set
of demographic information and fixed effects, conditional on individuals reporting
wages to a complementary source. We also regress the differentials between IRS
reported wages and CPS reported wages on a rich set of covariates and fixed
effects, conditional on households reporting some wages to both the IRS and CPS.
Coefficient estimates will not indicate the degree of misreporting per se, but rather
will ascribe the degree of relative misreporting.
With the IRS data assumed as our benchmark, we are mostly focused on
negative values of Gist; that is, when income is underreported to the CPS. However,
we will also observe positive values of Gist, which can occur due to random
measurement error or individuals choosing to over-report wages to the CPS.
There also may be differences in misreporting at different parts of the
wage distribution, shown by Brummet et al. (2018) to occur in the Consumer
Expenditure Survey. We will consider multiple explanations for the data patterns
we observe later in this chapter.
Demographic characteristics, tax unit characteristics, and state and
year effects are likely to partially explain wage misreporting to the CPS. We
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assume that these demographic characteristics are exogeneous to wage reporting
differentials. CPS designs vary across years, as do the timing between survey dates
and tax deadlines.
Our extensive and intensive margin models take the form
Yist = α + δDemogsit + φFEst + ist, (3.3)
where Yist is an indicator for whether non-zero wages were reported in the CPS or
administrative data for the extensive margin models, and equal to the previously
defined wage gap Gist in the intensive margin models. Demogsit is a vector of
demographic dummy variables, FEst is a vector of state and year fixed effects,
and ist is an error term. Demographic characteristics are determined by either the
individual or the characteristics of the primary earner in the tax unit, and include
age, gender, marital status, racial and ethnic group, and education level. Card and
Krueger (1992) show the interactions between racial characteristics and the effects
of schooling, and Cameron and Heckman (2001) show the interactions of gender,
racial and ethnic characteristics, and schooling. Thus we also include interactions
between education and race/ethnicity and interactions between gender and race.
State fixed effects include fixed effects for US territories. We cluster standard errors
at the primary sampling unit (PSU) level for all regressions.
Results
Extensive Margin Analysis
We begin by examining the extensive margin of reporting, by examining
the degree to which demographic characteristics are associated with 1) reporting
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positive wages on the CPS ASEC, given administrative records reports of positive
wages in the W-2 or DER data or 2) whether positive wages exist in administrative
records, given a report of positive wages in the CPS ASEC. That is, we estimate
regressions of form in equation 3.3, where Yist is an indicator variable equal
to one for positive wage reports (in either the CPS ASEC or administrative
records) or zero otherwise. In this set up, positive coefficients are interpreted as
a relative decrease in extensive margin misreporting, while negative coefficients are
interpreted as a relative increase in extensive margin misreporting.
Table 12 summarizes the results of these extensive margin regressions. In
this table, the first two columns capture extensive margin misreporting using the
DER data as a reference, while the final two columns use the W-2 data. The first
and third columns report the results for regressions using an indicator for positive
administrative records wages as a dependent variable for the subset of individuals
with CPS wages. If individuals do not have administrative wages, but do have CPS
wages, then this suggests individuals claimed wages on the CPS when, in fact, they
had none. Columns two and four perform the opposite task, reporting regression
results using an indicator for positive CPS wages as a dependent variable, for the
subset of individuals with positive administrative records wages.
Across the four extensive margin misreporting concepts, there is substantial
evidence of heterogeneity in misreporting along multiple demographic dimensions
– virtually all of the coefficients for our demographic characteristics of interest
are statistically significant. In general, these results point towards a gradient in
misreporting along education lines – college educated individuals are less likely
to misreport wages on the extensive margin, but individuals with less than a
high school education are more likely to misreport. There is also important
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TABLE 12.
Extensive Margin Linear Probability Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable hasderwages hasCPSwages hasw2wages hasCPSwages
Married −0.0136∗∗∗ -0.0006 −0.0052∗∗∗ −0.0050∗
(0.0019) (0.0023) (0.0007) (0.0029)
Female 0.0048∗∗∗ −0.0360∗∗∗ -0.0001 −0.0412∗∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0031) (0.0007) (0.0040)
Black -0.0005 −0.0292∗∗∗ 0.0008 −0.0263∗∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0027) (0.0008) (0.0039)
Asian −0.0117∗∗∗ −0.0191∗∗∗ −0.0033∗∗∗ −0.0178∗∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0030) (0.0012) (0.0035)
Native American -0.0121 −0.0302∗∗ -0.0091 −0.0357∗∗∗
(0.0095) (0.0122) (0.0061) (0.0135)
White Hispanic −0.0367∗∗∗ −0.0159∗∗∗ −0.0041∗∗∗ −0.0128∗∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0008) (0.0037)
Less Than High School −0.0397∗∗∗ −0.0325∗∗∗ −0.0090∗∗∗ −0.0332∗∗∗
(0.0037) (0.0032) (0.0016) (0.0042)
Some College 0.0218∗∗∗ 0.0148∗∗∗ 0.0034∗∗∗ 0.0171∗∗∗
(0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0009) (0.0033)
Bachelor’s Degree 0.0192∗∗∗ 0.0294∗∗∗ 0.0041∗∗∗ 0.0292∗∗∗
(0.0020) (0.0025) (0.0008) (0.0031)
Age 0.0011∗∗∗ 0.0006∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗ 0.0006∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0002)
Observations 381,000 296,000 381,000 168,000
Adjusted R2 0.863 0.015 0.959 0.017
Conditional on Has CPS wages Has DER wages Has CPS wages Has W-2 wages
State Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Interaction Terms N N N N
Source: CPS ASEC, IRS W-2and SSA DER, 2001-2016
This table presents the results of linear probability model regressions of indicator variables of wage
reporting on key demographic indicators at the individual level. These indicators take on a value of
one when the individual reports wages to the respective source, e.g. hasCPSwages takes on a value of
one when the individual reports positive wages to the CPS. Inclusion in each regression is conditional
on having wages in the opposite source, e.g. only observations with positive CPS wages are included
in the regression for hasderwages. The baseline tax unit is male, White, unmarried, and has a high
school diploma but no college. Standard errors are clustered at the sampling unit level. For the
reported coefficients, those marked with three stars are significant at the one percent level, those
marked with two stars are significant at the five percent level, and those marked with one star are
significant at the ten percent level. Approved for release by the Census DRB, authorization numbers
CBDRB-FY18-143, CBDRB-FY18-200 and CBDRB-FY18-407.
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heterogeneity across racial and ethnic groups – all non-whites are more likely to
misreport wages on the extensive margin relative to non-Hispanic whites.
There is some interesting heterogeneity across the types of extensive margin
misreporting. For instance, Blacks have no statistically significant relative difference
in having DER wages conditional on reporting CPS wages, but Blacks are 2.9
percent more likely to misreport having wages on the CPS conditional on having
DER wages. Similarly, married individuals are not statistically more likely to
misreport CPS wages than non-married individuals, but are 1.4 percent less
likely to have DER wages than unmarried individuals if they report CPS wages.
Hispanics, however, are both more likely to misreport CPS wages and less likely to
have DER wages if they report CPS wages relative to non-Hispanic Whites.
On the other hand, there is a very consistent pattern across educational
groups, suggesting a gradient where more educated people are more likely to report
wages accurately on the extensive margin. People with less than a high school
diploma are about 4 percent less likely to have DER wages if they report CPS
wages and are 3.2 percent more likely to misreport having CPS wages relative to
high school graduates. On the other hand, college graduates are 1.9 percent more
likely to have DER wages if they report CPS wages and are 2.9 percent less likely
to misreport CPS wages if they have DER wages, again relative to high school
graduates.
Individual Level Analysis
We now turn to analysis of the demographic correlates of intensive margin
misreporting. We begin by examining the relationship between demographic
characteristics and the level of misreporting at the individual level by analyzing
62
regressions using the log difference between DER wages and CPS wages and
between W-2 wages and CPS wages, respectively, as dependent variables. Note
that these wage gaps can be positive or negative. We can interpret the coefficients
in terms of relative misreporting. Thus a positive coefficient is interpreted as a
decrease in under-reporting (or increase in over-reporting) relative to the reference
category, while a negative coefficient can be interpreted as an decrease in over-
reporting (or increase in under-reporting) relative to the reference category. These
summary measures are useful for understanding, for example, how accurate or
inaccurate existing estimates of various wage gaps are. However, it is not fully
satisfying as we would like to know whether they different groups are different in
their under reporting behavior, over-reporting behavior or both. To understand
this, we will turn to some figures later on in this section.
Table 13 reports results from these intensive margin individual level
regressions. The first two columns of this table report results from an unrestricted
sample, while the final two columns report results from a trimmed sample which
excludes the top and bottom five percent of the administrative wage distribution,
since misreporting may be very different at the tails of the distribution than in the
middle. The first and third columns report results using the wage gap between CPS
and DER wages, while the second and fourth columns report results using the wage
gap between CPS and W-2 wages. All regressions include interactions between
education and race/ethnicity categories, however we report only interactions which
are statistically significant in a majority of models, as well as terms which involve
interaction with the Black variable, as these may be of interest for the black/white
wage gaps.
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TABLE 13.
Individual Level Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable CPSderwagegap CPSw2wagegap CPSderwagegap CPSw2wagegap
Married 0.0042 0.0050 -0.0005 -0.0000
(0.0061) (0.0079) (0.0028) (0.0033)
Female 0.0191∗∗ 0.0279∗∗ 0.0029 0.0068
(0.0079) (0.0116) (0.0035) (0.0047)
Black 0.0048 -0.0013 −0.0123∗∗ −0.0143∗∗
(0.0143) (0.0209) (0.0052) (0.0072)
Asian -0.0110 0.0115 −0.0282∗∗ -0.0118
(0.0240) (0.0276) (0.0113) (0.0137)
Native American 0.0062 0.0456 0.0065 0.0288
(0.0398) (0.0579) (0.0218) (0.0254)
White Hispanic −0.0504∗∗∗ −0.0459∗∗∗ −0.0353∗∗∗ −0.0386∗∗∗
(0.0118) (0.0155) (0.0060) (0.0085)
Less Than High School -0.0212 -0.0162 -0.0044 -0.0024
(0.0149) (0.0186) (0.0064) (0.0087)
Some College 0.0128 0.0215∗ 0.0137∗∗∗ 0.0187∗∗∗
(0.0095) (0.0115) (0.0039) (0.0050)
Bachelor’s Degree 0.0165∗∗ 0.0212∗∗ 0.0171∗∗∗ 0.0243∗∗∗
(0.0073) (0.0098) (0.0035) (0.0047)
Age −0.0027∗∗∗ −0.0028∗∗∗ −0.0015∗∗∗ −0.0017∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Female x Black 0− 0.0413∗∗∗ -0.0262 -0.0039 0.0005
(0.0144) (0.0193) (0.0061) (0.0084)
Less Than HS x Black 0.0241 0.0131 −0.0186∗ -0.0193
(0.0205) (0.0282) (0.0109) (0.0136)
Some College x Black 0.0122 0.0077 0.0088 0.0070
(0.0114) (0.0144) (0.0058) (0.0071)
Bachelor’s Degree x Black 0.0451∗∗∗ 0.0477∗∗∗ 0.0054 0.0090
(0.0149) (0.0196) (0.0088) (0.0096)
Less Than HS x White Hispanic −0.0385∗∗ −0.0666∗∗∗ −0.0397∗∗∗ −0.0514∗∗∗
(0.0191) (0.0248) (0.0081) (0.0119)
Some College x White Hispanic 0.0351∗∗∗ 0.0428∗∗∗ 0.0109∗∗ 0.0071
(0.0125) (0.0156) (0.0050) (0.0091)
Bachelor’s Degree x White Hispanic 0.0573∗∗∗ 0.0538∗∗∗ 0.0218∗∗∗ 0.0183∗∗
(0.0129) (0.0175) (0.0069) (0.0085)
Observations 283,000 161,000 254,000 145,000
Adjusted R2 0.008 0.010 0.012 0.015
State Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Race/Gender Interactions Y Y Y Y
Race/Education Interactions Y Y Y Y
Gender/Education Interactions Y Y Y Y
Percentile Range 0-100 0-100 5-95 5-95
Source: CPS ASEC, IRS W-2and SSA DER, 2001-2016
This table presents the results of regressions of the CPS versus administrative records wage gaps on key demographic
indicators at the individual level. These gaps are defined as the difference between total log wages reported to the CPS
less total log wages reported to the respective administrative record, e.g. CPSw2wagegap measures the gap between CPS
reported wages and W-2 reported wages. The coefficients of only a few selected interaction terms are shown. The baseline
tax unit is male, White, unmarried, and has a high school diploma but no college. Standard errors are clustered at the
sampling unit level. For the reported coefficients, those marked with three stars are significant at the one percent level,
those marked with two stars are significant at the five percent level, and those marked with one star are significant at
the ten percent level. Columns 3 and 4 truncate the sample at the 5th and 95th percentiles of the administrative records
earnings distribution. Approved for release by the Census DRB, authorization numbers CBDRB-FY18-143, CBDRB-FY18-
200 and CBDRB-FY18-407.
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Here we observe less robust evidence of misreporting across race and ethnic
groups relative to the extensive margin. In the unrestricted sample, there is no
statistically significant difference in relative misreporting between, e.g. Blacks
and Whites, although Hispanics under-report wages about five percentage points
more than whites. There is more robust evidence of meaningful heterogeneity in
reporting across racial groups when focusing on the middle of the distribution, as
in columns 3 and 4, which exclude the top five and bottom five percent of the wage
distribution. Blacks have 1.2 percentage point higher under-reporting rates in the
trimmed DER-CPS sample, and 1.4 percentage points in the trimmed W2-CPS
sample.
On the other hand, we observe much more robust evidence for an educational
gradient in misreporting, particularly for Hispanics. Individuals with more
education have lower under-reporting than individuals with less education,
and these relative effects are monotonic over levels of education. Although not
statistically significant, individuals with less than a High school degree under-report
wages by about two percentage points more, relative to high school graduates,
while college graduates under-report wages by about the same amount less. This
gradient is even more stark when looking at Hispanics: a similar education gradient
exists, but at much greater magnitudes. College educated Hispanics are under-
report wages by as much as 6.7 percentage points less than Hispanic high school
graduates, and Hispanics with less than a High School degree under-report by as
much as 3.9 percentage points more than Hispanic high school graduates.
To further explore where this heterogeneity may be coming from, we examine
the distribution of misreporting using several visualizations. First, we examine
kernel density plots, which visualize the distribution of misreporting. Figure 1
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shows this visualization, broken down by the race and ethnicity categories used
in the regression analysis above, for the three sets of wage gaps (CPS wages minus
DER, W-2 and 1040 wages respectively). Three things are immediately evident
from these graphs. First, the density leans to the right, suggesting a tendency
towards over-reporting. Second, whites have more mass near zero than non-
whites, which is consistent with the regressions above. Third, the tails of the
distribution are relatively “fat”: there instances of both large under- and over-
reporting. A similar set of conclusions can be drawn from Figure 2, which shows
kernel density plots by education level: there is a tendency towards over-reporting
by all education groups, although college graduates have more mass near zero.
FIGURE 1.
Kernel Density Plots of Wage Reporting Differentials by Race and
Ethnicity
Source: CPS ASEC, IRS W-2, SSA DER and IRS 1040s, 2001-2016
This figure shows kernel density plots of the fifth through ninety-fifth percentiles of wage reporting differentials for
the mutually exclusive racial and ethnic groups, conditional on tax units reporting wages to both the IRS and CPS.
Wage reporting differentials Gist are shown along the horizontal axis, and density is along the vertical axis. The
distribution of wage reporting differentials of tax units with a non-Hispanic white primary earner are plotted in
grey, percentage gaps of tax units with a Hispanic white primary earner are plotted in green, percentage gaps of tax
units with a black primary earner are plotted in black, percentage gaps of tax units with an Asian primary earner
are plotted in red, and the percentage gaps of tax units with a Native American primary earner are plotted in blue.
We use an Gaussian kernel. Approved for release by the Census DRB, authorization numbers CBDRB-FY18-143,
CBDRB-FY18-200 and CBDRB-FY18-407.
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FIGURE 2.
Kernel Density Plots of Wage Reporting Differentials by
Education Level
Source: CPS ASEC, IRS W-2, SSA DER and IRS 1040s, 2001-2016
This figure shows kernel density plots of the fifth through ninety-fifth percentiles of wage reporting differentials
for the mutually exclusive education groups, conditional on tax units reporting wages to both the IRS and CPS.
Wage reporting differentials Gist are shown along the horizontal axis, and density is along the vertical axis. The
distribution of wage reporting differentials of tax units with a primary earner who did not complete high school
are plotted in blue, percentage gaps of tax units with a primary earner who only completed high school are plotted
in red, percentage gaps of tax units with a primary earner who completed high school but did not complete a
bachelor’s degree are plotted in green, and the percentage gaps of tax units with a primary earner who completed a
bachelor’s degree are plotted in black. Approved for release by the Census DRB, authorization numbers CBDRB-
FY18-143, CBDRB-FY18-200 and CBDRB-FY18-407.
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These kernel density plots are informative, but necessarily obscure
heterogeneity across the wage distribution. A final visualization sheds light on this,
and potentially rationalizes our previous set of results. Figure 3 shows estimates of
the average wage gap by percentile of the administrative records wage distribution.
The left panel breaks the visualization down by education level, while the right
panel breaks it down by race. Here we can see that the kernel density plots were
obscuring an important fact: over-reporting occurs primarily at the bottom of
the wage distribution, while under-reporting primarily occurs at the top. This
pattern occurs for all race and education groups, but there is heterogeneity in
the degree of under-reporting at the top of the distribution and over-reporting at
the bottom which is consistent with our regression results above: at the bottom,
individuals with less than a high school degree have much larger over-reporting
than individuals with a bachelor’s degree, while at the top they have much
larger under-reporting than college graduates. This suggests that the education
gradient in misreporting should properly be thought of as a gradient in absolute
misreporting.
It remains a very interesting question why individuals overreport at the
bottom of the income distribution and underreport at the top. One competing
explanation for the overreporting at the bottom of the income distribution is that
there is shadow economic activity being reported to the CPS. This would generate
patterns consistent with our findings. To consider this as an explanation, we must
relax the assumption that the administrative records are the more correct source of
wage data. In order to examine the validity of this competing explanation, we look
into the industries and occupations of individuals that exhibit this behavior and see
whether they are in occupations where shadow economic activity is likely.
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FIGURE 3.
Wage Reporting Differentials Across the Wage distribution, by
Education Level and Race
−0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Percentile of DER Wages
lo
g(C
PS
 W
a
ge
s)−
log
(D
ER
 W
a
ge
s)
Educ.
gotbach
hsonly
lessthanhs
somecoll
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Percentile of DER Wages
lo
g(C
PS
 W
a
ge
s)−
log
(D
ER
 W
a
ge
s)
Race
AIAN
Asian
Black
Hispanic
White
Source: CPS ASEC, SSA DER, 2001-2016
The graphs shown above are generated by fitting a generalized additive model (GAM) to the bivariate wage
percentile (horizontal axis) and wage misreporting (vertical axis) data. GAMs use smoothing splines to fit a
smooth non-linear function to data. The left graph shows the relationships between the CPS/DER wage gaps
and percentiles of DER wages, by education level, while the graph on the right shows the same relationships by
racial and ethnic groups. These models are generated by utilizing the entire educational or racial/ethnic subset
of the dataset to fit each model. Graphs of GAMs using the same subsets but instead using the CPS/W2 wage
gaps by the same DER wage percentiles (not shown) look quite similar. Approved for release by the Census DRB,
authorization numbers CBDRB-FY18-143, CBDRB-FY18-200 and CBDRB-FY18-407.
Tables 14 and 15 repeat the individual level regressions, with additional
dummy variables for industry and occupation, respectively. These indicators come
from the CPS. In cases where the number of industry or occupation indicators
changed across CPS years, a crosswalk is implemented to ensure consistency in
coding. In addition to the independent variables shown in Tables 14 and 15, these
regressions included the major demographic controls for age, gender, race, and
education level (though no demographic interaction terms were included). It is
paramount to note that the dependent variables measure the relative degree of
misreporting, which is relative to a baseline respondent with both an industry and
occupation in the “not in universe” category.
In Table 14, note that the signs of the coefficients on most of the industry
indicators change when comparing the unrestricted sample versus the sample
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TABLE 14.
Individual Level Regressions, by Industry
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable CPSderwagegap CPSw2wagegap CPSderwagegap CPSw2wagegap
Agriculture 0.0374 0.0170 0.00834 -0.0230
(0.0277) (0.0359) (0.0161) (0.0200)
Mining -0.0573 -0.0709 −0.0497∗∗∗ −0.0697∗∗∗
(0.0397) (0.0465) (0.0175) (0.0229)
Construction 0.0410∗ 0.0453 −0.0216 ∗ ∗ −0.0328∗∗∗
(0.0230) (0.0279) (0.00881) (0.0107)
Manufacturing 0.0124 0.00981 −0.0191∗∗ −0.0249∗∗∗
(0.0191) (0.0221) (0.00744) (0.00892)
Trade 0.0558∗∗∗ 0.0616∗∗∗ -0.00234 -0.00924
(0.0183) (0.0230) (0.00732) (0.00931)
Transportation & Utilities 0.0196 0.0254 −0.0165∗ −0.0229∗∗
(0.0223) (0.0286) (0.00872) (0.0105)
Information 0.00998 -0.00140 -0.00681 -0.0212
(0.0237) (0.0328) (0.0103) (0.0134)
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 0.0239 0.0253 -0.00558 -0.0110
(0.0217) (0.0262) (0.00918) (0.0115)
Professional 0.0594∗∗∗ 0.0710∗∗∗ -0.00406 -0.00430
(0.0184) (0.0245) (0.00741) (0.00975)
Education and Health Care 0.0404∗∗ 0.0392∗ -0.00277 -0.0129
(0.0197) (0.0237) (0.00744) (0.00924)
Leisure 0.0783∗∗∗ 0.0940∗∗∗ 0.0133∗ 0.0107
(0.0215) (0.0282) (0.00775) (0.0101)
Other Services 0.0771∗∗∗ 0.0663∗∗ 0.00994 0.000883
(0.0233) (0.0310) (0.00990) (0.0124)
Public Administration 0.0464∗∗ 0.0277 0.00560 -0.00547
(0.0218) (0.0275) (0.00892) (0.0119)
Armed Forces 0.239 0.357 0.0593 0.0309
(0.147) (0.300) (0.0914) (0.0700)
Observations 283,000 161,000 254,000 145,000
Adjusted R2 0.009 0.010 0.012 0.014
State Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Demographic Controls Y Y Y Y
Percentile Range 0-100 0-100 5-95 5-95
Source: CPS ASEC, IRS W-2and SSA DER, 2001-2016
This table presents results of regressions of CPS vs. administrative records wage gaps on CPS industry
indicators at the individual level. These gaps are the difference between total log wages reported to the
CPS less total log wages reported to the administrative record, e.g. CPSw2wagegap measures the gap
between CPS reported wages and W-2 reported wages. Standard errors are clustered at the sampling unit
level. Reported coefficients marked with three stars are significant at the one percent level, those marked
with two stars are significant at the five percent level, and those marked with one star are significant at
the ten percent level. Approved for release by the Census DRB, authorization numbers CBDRB-FY18-
143, CBDRB-FY18-200 and CBDRB-FY18-407.
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TABLE 15.
Individual Level Regressions, by Occupation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable CPSderwagegap CPSw2wagegap CPSderwagegap CPSw2wagegap
Management 0.0771∗∗∗ 0.0803∗∗∗ 0.0133∗ 0.00820
(0.0206) (0.0262) (0.00787) (0.0103)
Professional 0.0446∗∗ 0.0403∗ -0.00230 -0.0112
(0.0196) (0.0240) (0.00828) (0.0105)
Service 0.0392∗∗ 0.0488∗∗ -0.00457 -0.00948
(0.0196) (0.0241) (0.00720) (0.00897)
Sales 0.0602∗∗∗ 0.0724∗∗∗ 0.00378 -0.00211
(0.0186) (0.0241) (0.00813) (0.0102)
Office 0.0505∗∗∗ 0.0501∗∗ 0.00302 -0.00299
(0.0195) (0.0237) (0.00749) (0.00930)
Farming -0.00861 -0.0256 -0.0145 −0.0344∗
(0.0292) (0.0387) (0.0160) (0.0195)
Construction 0.0407∗ 0.0414 −0.0224∗∗ −0.0341∗∗∗
(0.0239) (0.0296) (0.00886) (0.0110)
Installation 0.0375∗ 0.0349 -0.0135 −0.0338∗∗∗
(0.0217) (0.0274) (0.0100) (0.0126)
Production 0.0176 0.0125 −0.0244∗∗∗ −0.0345∗∗∗
(0.0196) (0.0231) (0.00793) (0.00944)
Transportation 0.0287 0.0242 -0.0125 -0.0175
(0.0213) (0.0264) (0.00839) (0.0113)
Armed Forces 0.243∗ 0.360 0.0613 0.0331
(0.146) (0.299) (0.0911) (0.0700)
Observations 283,000 161,000 254,000 145,000
Adjusted R2 0.008 0.010 0.012 0.014
State Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Race, Gender, Education, Y Y Y Y
& Age Controls
Percentile Range 0-100 0-100 5-95 5-95
Source: CPS ASEC, IRS W-2and SSA DER, 2001-2016
This table presents the results of regressions of the CPS versus administrative records wage gaps on CPS
occupation indicators at the individual level. These gaps are defined as the difference between total log
wages reported to the CPS less total log wages reported to the respective administrative record, e.g.
CPSw2wagegap measures the gap between CPS reported wages and W-2 reported wages. Standard errors
are clustered at the sampling unit level. For the reported coefficients, those marked with three stars
are significant at the one percent level, those marked with two stars are significant at the five percent
level, and those marked with one star are significant at the ten percent level. Approved for release by the
Census DRB, authorization numbers CBDRB-FY18-143, CBDRB-FY18-200 and CBDRB-FY18-407.
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trimmed at the fifth and ninety-fifth percentiles. This is consistent with a large
amount of overreporting on the CPS in the upper end of the sample for most
professions. This difference is most notable for the trade, professional, and leisure
industries. Overall, respondents in the armed forces relatively overreport the
most, but this is likely due to the fact that combat pay is non-taxable and would
be excluded from taxable wages on Forms W-2. Future iterations of this work
will drop respondents in the armed forces for this reason. In the unrestricted
sample, respondents in the trade, professional, leisure, and other services industries
relatively overreport the most, while those in the mining industry relatively
underreport the most by a wide margin. In the trimmed sample, those in
the leisure industry continue to relatively overreport and those in the mining
industry continue to relatively underreport, however the coefficients on most
other indicators attenuate towards zero. Interestingly, the coefficients for the
construction, manufacturing, and transportation industries are significant and
substantially negative in the trimmed sample. These industries tend to be more
heavily unionized than most, though the education and health care industry, which
is more unionized than the mining industry, does not share this degree of relative
underreporting.
Table 15, showing regression results for occupation indicators, should also
be interpreted with the same caveats as Table 14. Again, we see the same large
amount of relative overreporting by respondents working in the armed forces,
again, likely due to the non-taxability of combat pay. In addition, respondents
with management and sales positions tend to relatively overreport to the CPS in
the untrimmed sample. However, again, most of these larger coefficients disappear
when we move to the trimmed sample, indicating that these large effects in
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the upper tails are not indicative of the occupation as a whole. However, when
looking at the trimmed sample, we see that respondents with jobs in construction
and production show the greatest degree of relative underreporting to the CPS,
consistent with the findings for the construction and manufacturing industries in
Table 14.
Going forward, it would be very useful as we try to understand the role of the
shadow economy in what appears to be “overreporting to the CPS,” to be able to
see industry and occupation reporting across the distribution as we did earlier for
racial and educational groups. This would allow us to isolate their contribution to
the overreporting phenomenon we are trying to explain.
Sources of Misreporting: Rounding
We have shown the demographic traits associated with wage misreporting;
now we search for the mechanisms by which individuals may misreport. In
particular, we look at rounding. If individuals in different demographic groups
round in systematic ways, then those rounding heuristics could translate into a
large amount of misreporting. For example, if members of a demographic group
tend to use a rounding heuristic where they drop all digits after the thousands
place, then that group will tend to underreport wages to the CPS. If another group
uses a different rounding heuristic, such as tending to round up to the nearest ten
thousand dollars, the effects of rounding will go in the opposite direction. It is also
the case that systematic rounding choices will have a larger percent gap effect at
the bottom end of the distribution where rounding to the nearest 1,000 say, is
a much larger change than at the top of the distribution. Thus it is important
to determine how much wage misreporting is based on rounding as opposed to
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deviations where the CPS respondent intentionally aims to inflate or deflate their
wages to the CPS for other reasons.
We begin by constructing dummy variables for different degrees of wage
rounding on the CPS. These are defined as
Iist,X =

1, if yist,CPS mod (X ∗ 1, 000) = 0
0, otherwise,
(3.4)
for X ∈ {1, 5, 10} and where yist,CPS is wage income as reported to the CPS. In
other words, these dummies indicate if CPS reported wages are reported to the
nearest one, five, or ten thousand dollars. Table 16 displays the results of simple
regressions of the gap variables and absolute values of gap variables on these three
rounding dummy variables. It is clear that rounding accounts for a hefty portion of
misreporting. However, these simple regression coefficients are difficult to interpret
for two main reasons: first, the fact that numbers are rounded on the CPS does
not necessarily mean that they are incorrect, just that they are round (so, in
cases where the W-2 or DER number is also round, these coefficients are possibly
attenuated); and second, the log difference caused by, say, rounding to the nearest
ten thousand dollars is likely much larger at lower income levels than higher income
levels, due to the simple nature of the natural logarithm function. Therefore, these
coefficient estimates may give some insight into the overall scope of the rounding
problem, without pinpoint accuracy.
To further examine the effects on specific regression coefficients, we take
two approaches. First, we re-run the individual level regressions using only CPS
respondents who do not report wages that are rounded to the nearest thousand,
and compare the results with the full-sample regressions. Second, we mimic the
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TABLE 16.
Effects of Rounding
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable CPSderwagegap CPSw2wagegap Abs(CPSderwagegap) Abs(CPSw2wagegap)
Rounded 1,000 0.111∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ −0.109∗∗∗ −0.112∗∗∗
(0.00399) (0.00533) (0.00420) (0.00590)
Rounded 5,000 0.0401∗∗∗ 0.0400∗∗∗ 0.0210∗∗∗ 0.0195∗∗∗
(0.00280) (0.00392) (0.00235) (0.00310)
Rounded 10,000 0.0109∗∗∗ 0.00817∗∗ 0.0142∗∗∗ 0.0131∗∗∗
(0.00318) (0.00392) (0.00275) (0.00341)
Observations 336,000 191,000 336,000 191,000
Adjusted R2 0.009 0.008 0.006 0.006
State Fixed Effects N N N N
Year Fixed Effects N N N N
Race, Gender, Education, N N N N
& Age Controls
Percentile Range 0-100 0-100 0-100 0-100
Source: CPS ASEC, IRS W-2and SSA DER, 2001-2016
This table presents the results of regressions of the CPS versus administrative records wage gaps on
indicator variables for the degree of rounding of wages reported to the CPS. These indicators are set
equal to one if the respondent’s wages are rounded to the nearest one, five, or ten thousand. The gaps are
defined as the difference between total log wages reported to the CPS less total log wages reported to the
respective administrative record, e.g. CPSw2wagegap measures the gap between CPS reported wages and
W-2 reported wages. “Abs” refers to the absolute value, e.g. Abs(CPSw2wagegap) measures the absolute
value of the gap between CPS reported wages and W-2 reported wages. The coefficients of only a few
selected interaction terms are shown. The baseline tax unit is male, White, unmarried, and has a high
school diploma but no college. Standard errors are clustered at the sampling unit level. For the reported
coefficients, those marked with three stars are significant at the one percent level, those marked with
two stars are significant at the five percent level, and those marked with one star are significant at the
ten percent level. Approved for release by the Census DRB, authorization numbers CBDRB-FY18-143,
CBDRB-FY18-200 and CBDRB-FY18-407.
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rounding of CPS respondents by rounding administrative wages as well, and re-run
the individual level regressions using the rounding adjusted wage gaps.
The first approach is shown in Table 17, which shows regression results for
most demographic and a few selected industry variables. Note that only about
eighteen percent of respondents in the sample report wages that are not rounded
to a nearest thousand dollars of some sort.
Despite the loss in power, most coefficient estimates for the demographic
variables are highly significant. Focusing on columns (3) and (4) of Table 17, we
can see that most of the coefficients share the same signs as their corresponding
coefficients on Table 13 (for demographic variables) and Table 14 (for industry
variables). Coefficient estimates are similar to the full sample for racial and ethnic
indicators. For educational indicators, estimates increase for LessThanHighSchool
and Bachelor′sDegree, when industry controls are included. This suggests that
rounding is causing some of the relative underreporting of less educated individuals,
while mitigating some of the relative overreporting of more educated individuals.
For age, the most stable coefficient thus far, estimates for non-rounders only are
only about half the magnitude of previous estimates. This is consistent with the
idea that individuals budget more conservatively by mentally rounding down as
they age, as excluding rounders attenuates these estimates. Looking at industries,
coefficient estimates here for the mining and construction industries are less
significant and closer to zero, suggesting that rounding is driving previously
reported estimates for these industries. Coefficient estimates here for agriculture
and public administration are larger in magnitude and more significant than
before, suggesting that rounding was previously creating a lot of noise in these
estimates. However, these suggestive findings are not certain, as individuals who
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TABLE 17.
Individual Level Regressions, Respondents without Rounded Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable CPSderwagegap CPSw2wagegap CPSderwagegap CPSw2wagegap
Black −0.0501∗∗∗ −0.0379∗∗ −0.0161∗∗∗ −0.0128∗∗
(0.0122) (0.0165) (0.00438) (0.00584)
Asian −0.0707∗∗∗ −0.0701∗∗∗ −0.0278∗∗∗ −0.0309∗∗∗
(0.0198) (0.0241) (0.00618) (0.0100)
Native American −0.0722∗∗ −0.0587∗ -0.0147 -0.0152
(0.0291) (0.0332) (0.0109) (0.0147)
White Hispanic −0.0670∗∗∗ −0.0609∗∗∗ −0.0357∗∗∗ −0.0313∗∗∗
(0.0118) (0.0171) (0.00449) (0.00649)
Less Than High School −0.0472∗∗∗ −0.0573∗∗∗ −0.0158∗∗∗ −0.0225∗∗∗
(0.0124) (0.0157) (0.00469) (0.00681)
Some College 0.0250∗∗∗ 0.0313∗∗∗ 0.0164∗∗∗ 0.0178∗∗∗
(0.00810) (0.00963) (0.00303) (0.00398)
Bachelor’s Degree 0.0576∗∗∗ 0.0608∗∗∗ 0.0325∗∗∗ 0.0345∗∗∗
(0.00935) (0.0126) (0.00309) (0.00409)
Age −0.00167∗∗∗ −0.00157∗∗∗ −0.000786∗∗∗ −0.000641∗∗∗
(0.000320) (0.000465) (0.000122) (0.000167)
Agriculture 0.0894∗∗ 0.0971∗∗ −0.0376∗∗ −0.0442∗∗
(0.0352) (0.0467) (0.0157) (0.0206)
Construction 0.0611∗∗∗ 0.0589∗∗ 0.000462 -0.00191
(0.0184) (0.0244) (0.00650) (0.00919)
Mining 0.0354 0.0411 −0.0394∗∗ -0.0347
(0.0494) (0.0613) (0.0160) (0.0240)
Public Administration 0.0962∗∗∗ 0.0832∗∗∗ 0.0155∗∗∗ 0.0203∗∗∗
(0.0155) (0.0211) (0.00566) (0.00774)
Observations 61,000 35,000 52,500 30,000
Adjusted R2 0.008 0.009 0.011 0.011
State Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Race, Gender, Education, Y Y Y Y
& Age Controls
Industry Controls Y Y Y Y
Percentile Range 0-100 0-100 5-95 5-95
Source: CPS ASEC, IRS W-2and SSA DER, 2001-2016
This table presents the results of regressions of the CPS versus administrative records wage gaps at the
individual level for only those CPS respondents whose wages were not rounded to the nearest thousand
dollars. These gaps are defined as the difference between total log wages reported to the CPS less
total log wages reported to the respective administrative record, e.g. CPSw2wagegap measures the gap
between CPS reported wages and W-2 reported wages. Selected coefficients are shown. Standard errors
are clustered at the sampling unit level. For the reported coefficients, those marked with three stars
are significant at the one percent level, those marked with two stars are significant at the five percent
level, and those marked with one star are significant at the ten percent level. Approved for release by the
Census DRB, authorization numbers CBDRB-FY18-143, CBDRB-FY18-200 and CBDRB-FY18-407.
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round may tend to share unobserved characteristics and systematically differ from
non-rounders, or vice versa.
For the next approach, we simulate the rounding approach taken by CPS
respondents. We are able to observe whether they reported wages to the nearest
one, five, or ten thousand dollars, or whether they did not round to a nearest
thousand. If they reported wages on the CPS that are divisible by ten thousand,
we assume that they meant to round to the nearest ten thousand and round the
corresponding administrative record wages to those wages’ nearest ten thousand. If
they reported CPS wages that are divisible by five thousand but not ten thousand,
we assume that they meant to round to the nearest five thousand and round their
administrative record wages to those wages’ nearest five thousand. If they reported
CPS wages that are divisible by one thousand but not by five or ten thousand
dollars, we assume that they meant to round to the nearest one thousand dollars
and round their administrative record wages to those wages’ nearest one thousand
dollars. The remaining gap between reported CPS wages and administrative record
wages, adjusted for rounding to these thousand dollar increments, cannot be the
result of rounding, unless respondents rounded to a lower or higher amount (such
as the nearest hundred dollars or million dollars), or unless they used a non-
standard rounding algorithm, such as always rounding up or down. Regression
results using these modified wage gaps are shown on Table 18. Columns (1) and
(3) show results when we mimic the rounding, and columns (2) and (4) show results
when we do not, for comparison. In general, coefficient estimates look similar to
before, but with attenuated magnitudes. The same patterns of underreporting by
historically disadvantaged racial and ethnic groups and the gradient with respect to
education level hold as before. The decrease in the magnitude of the Age coefficient
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is consistent with the idea that much of the underreporting as respondents get older
is due to rounding. Selected industries are shown. The industry coefficients that
changed substantially the most are in the mining and construction industries, both
by greatly decreasing the magnitudes of coefficient estimates. In particular, a great
deal (about a couple of percentage points) of the wage gaps for respondents in the
mining industry is likely caused by rounding.
We may also be interested in how the s-shaped curves plotted in Figure 3
change when we address rounding, particularly because rounding will be a bigger
deal as a percentage at the bottom of the income distribution. The results are not
yet publicly available, but we can report that while the s-shaped curves flatten
some, the overall s-shaped patterns remain.
Overall, we find in this section that while rounding can play some role in
estimates of particular variables, we see no clear overarching effect of rounding on
misreporting across all variables for all our different rounding sensitivity analysis.
Implications for Estimates of the Income Distribution
Public use CPS data are often used to prepare estimates of the income
distribution as well as statistics derived from the income distribution, such as the
Gini coefficient. A summary of relevant research using CPS data to this end can
be found in (Burkhauser et al., 2012). The s-shaped pattern of wage reporting–
that lower wage amounts tend to be overreported to the CPS while higher wage
amounts tend to be underreported–suggests that CPS-based measures of inequality
will understate the degree of inequality, ceteris paribus, due to this compression.
In recent years, researchers such as Burkhauser et al. have noticed that CPS-
based measures of inequality tend to show inequality slowing in the 1990s, while
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TABLE 18.
Individual Level Regressions, Misreporting Not Likely Caused by
Rounding
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable CPSderwagegap CPSderwagegap CPSderwagegap CPSderwagegap
Researchers Rounded
CPS Responses Y N Y N
Black -0.00394 -0.00116 −0.0112 ∗ ∗∗ −0.0151∗∗∗
(0.00428) (0.00816) (0.00207) (0.00382)
Asian -0.00932 −0.0183∗ −0.0188∗∗∗ −0.0240∗∗∗
(0.00717) (0.00963) (0.00305) (0.00533)
Native American −0.0218∗∗ -0.0382 −0.0155∗∗∗ 0.00209
(0.0110) (0.0236) (0.00509) (0.0129)
White Hispanic −0.0324∗∗∗ −0.0413∗∗∗ −0.0258∗∗∗ −0.0305∗∗∗
(0.00485) (0.00734) (0.00244) (0.00324)
Less Than High School −0.0545∗∗∗ −0.0515∗∗∗ −0.0298∗∗∗ −0.0307∗∗∗
(0.00486) (0.00783) (0.00243) (0.00434)
Some College 0.0159∗∗∗ 0.0360∗∗∗ 0.0131∗∗∗ 0.0189∗∗∗
(0.00271) (0.00765) (0.00124) (0.00351)
Bachelor’s Degree 0.0191∗∗∗ 0.0401∗∗∗ 0.0186∗∗∗ 0.0241∗∗∗
(0.00312) (0.00777) (0.00158) (0.00511)
Age −0.00262∗∗∗ −0.00261∗∗∗ −0.00107∗∗∗ −0.00145∗∗∗
(0.000133) (0.000293) (0.0000552) (0.000121)
Mining −0.0968∗∗∗ −0.573∗∗∗ −0.0404∗∗∗ −0.0497∗∗∗
(0.0124) (0.0397) (0.00645) (0.0175)
Construction −0.0144∗∗ 0.0410∗ −0.0156∗∗∗ −0.0216∗∗∗
(0.00666) (0.0230) (0.00298) (0.00881)
Constant -0.0655 -0.116 0.0142∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗
(0.415) (0.407) (341.4) (0.0124)
Observations 336,000 283,000 301,000 254,000
Adjusted R2 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.010
State Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Race, Gender, Education, Y Y Y Y
& Age Controls
Industry Controls Y Y Y Y
Percentile Range 0-100 0-100 5-95 5-95
Source: CPS ASEC, IRS W-2 and SSA DER, 2001-2016
This table presents results of regressions of the CPS vs. DER wage gaps at the individual level after
adjusting administrative records by rounding. If CPS reported wages are reported to the nearest ten
thousand dollars, we round DER wages to the nearest ten thousand dollars before regressing, and so
on. The wage gaps are defined as the difference between total log wages reported to the CPS less total
log wages reported on SSA DER records. Selected coefficients are shown. Columns (2) and (4) repeat
coefficient estimates shown on Table 14, do not incorporate researcher-created rounding, and are shown
for comparison. Standard errors are clustered at the sampling unit level. For the reported coefficients,
those marked with three stars are significant at the one percent level, those marked with two stars are
significant at the five percent level, and those marked with one star are significant at the ten percent level.
Approved for release by the Census DRB, authorization numbers CBDRB-FY18-143, CBDRB-FY18-200
and CBDRB-FY18-407.
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IRS-based measures tend to find gains to the richest Americans rising rapidly
throughout this time period (Piketty and Saez, 2008). Taking into account the
compression of reported wages in the CPS may not fully reconcile the differing
conclusions made from the CPS and IRS data - indeed, certain other differences
(such as the extensive top-coping of income data for richer Americans on the
CPS) make this task challenging. However, the persistent s-shaped pattern, found
across all racial and ethnic groups and education levels, even when accounting
for rounding, suggests that changes over time in the degree of compression may
account for some of the divergence in conclusions made from the CPS versus IRS
data. Whether or not such an effect is found remains to be the subject of future
research.
Tax Unit Level Analysis
Finally, for completeness, we repeat the regression analysis of the last section
at the tax unit level, comparing form 1040 wages to CPS wages. Forms 1040
are filed at by tax units, including married units, so demographic indicators are
collapsed to the tax unit level using the average characteristics of the unit. Thus
a unit with one spouse with some college but another spouse with a different level
of education would be coded as a 0.5 for the “Some College” variable. Interaction
terms are excluded because half values confound the interpretation of such terms.
Regression results are presented in Table 19.
In general, coefficients take similar signs, magnitudes, and significances as
in the individual level analyses. Age is robust, the same pattern emerges amongst
the educational dummies, and the coefficients on the racial and ethnic indicators
are similar to earlier estimates, though attenuated in the case of White Hispanic
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TABLE 19.
Tax Unit Regressions
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable CPS1040wagegap CPS1040wagegap CPS1040wagegap
Married −0.0316∗∗∗ −0.0237∗∗∗ −0.0067∗∗∗
(0.0036) (0.0028) (0.0018)
Black -0.0018 -0.0044 −0.0143∗∗∗
(0.0054) (0.0044) (0.0029)
Asian −0.0190∗∗ −0.0220∗∗∗ −0.0254∗∗∗
(0.0076) (0.0055) (0.0042)
Native American 0.0080 -0.0018 -0.0107
(0.0175) (0.0122) (0.0080)
White Hispanic −0.0406∗∗∗ −0.0361∗∗∗ −0.0265∗∗∗
(0.0070) (0.0050) (0.0032)
Less Than High School −0.0838∗∗∗ −0.0611∗∗∗ −0.0356∗∗∗
(0.0076) (0.0060) (0.0044)
Some College 0.0157∗∗∗ 0.0217∗∗∗ 0.0166∗∗∗
(0.0043) (0.0035) (0.0025)
Bachelor’s Degree 0.0301∗∗∗ 0.0281∗∗∗ 0.0251∗∗∗
(0.0044) (0.0035) (0.0027)
Age −0.0023∗∗∗ −0.0022∗∗∗ −0.0013∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Observations 180,000 176,000 162,000
Adjusted R2 0.009 0.010 0.009
State Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Percentile Range 0-100 1-99 5-95
Source: CPS ASEC, IRS 1040, 2001-2016
This table presents the results of regressions of the CPS versus 1040 wage gap on key demographic
indicators at the tax unit level. This gap is defined as the difference between total log wages reported
to the CPS less total log wages reported on form 1040. Where tax units are married, these demographic
indicators are based on the average demographics of the couple. The baseline tax unit is White,
unmarried, and has a high school diploma but no college. Standard errors are clustered at the sampling
unit level. For the reported coefficients, those marked with three stars are significant at the one percent
level, those marked with two stars are significant at the five percent level, and those marked with one star
are significant at the ten percent level. Approved for release by the Census DRB, authorization numbers
CBDRB-FY18-143, CBDRB-FY18-200 and CBDRB-FY18-407.
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and more significant in the case of Asian. However, a new pattern emerges with
the Married indicator, where filing as a married unit is associated with a two-thirds
to three percent underreporting to the CPS relative to the IRS. This is in stark
contrast to the insignificant, near-zero coefficient estimates in the individual level
analyses.
Discussion
We now discuss the implications of using income data with systematic
measurement errors for statistical compilation or regression modeling. Statistics
compiled from CPS wage data can be adjusted, and regressions can be modified to
account for non-zero mean errors. The end of this discussion proposes mechanisms
by which measurement errors may be systematically introduced into survey income
data.
Suppose we are interested in cases where wages are reported with systematic
error in a way that is correlated with a demographic indicator variable. In the case
of simple ratios that use CPS wage data, where wages are systematically scaled up
or down by a factor, the corrections are simple. For example, if we were measuring
a natural logarithmic Black-White wage differential of average incomes,
∆BW = log(y¯
∗
White)− log(y¯∗Black) (3.5)
using measured average incomes
y¯Black = y¯
∗
Black(1− δBlack), (3.6)
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and we had estimated the coefficient on the Black indicator, δˆBlack in our model.
The proper adjustment would be
∆BW = log(y¯
∗
White)− log(
y¯Black
1− δBlack )
=log(y¯∗White)− log(y¯Black) + log(1− δBlack).(3.7)
Assuming the wage differential was positive and the error not bigger than the
measured differential, this has the effect of tightening the calculated racial wage
differential. This case is analogous to the case where both White and Black
incomes are measured each with non-zero mean errors, because we are only
investigating the differential.
Implications for regressions can be complicated. We present the simple
case in which the dependent variable is survey income, and the incomes for one
demographic group are measured with error. Suppose we consider a true model,
Y˜ ∗ = X∗β + U, (3.8)
where Y ∗ are incomes, Y˜ ∗ are the natural logarithms of those incomes, and X∗ are
explanatory variables. Suppose incomes for one demographic group, say, Blacks, are
misreported to surveys with both systematic and random errors, as in
yi = y
∗
i (1− δBlackBlacki)vi. (3.9)
Here, δBlack is the income reporting differential estimated from our regressions as
δˆBlack, and vi is a median one, log-normally distributed error, where log(vi) = v˜i.
After taking logarithms, the log(vi) will become an additive error term on the right
hand side and decrease model efficiency. We normalize so that the Black indicator
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is the Kth of K independent variables. By using the systematically mismeasured
incomes in our dependent variable, an OLS regression will really run the regression

log(y∗1(1− δBlackBlack1))
...
log(y∗n(1− δBlackBlackn))

=

x11 . . . x1K−1 Black1
...
. . .
...
...
xn1 . . . xnK−1 Blackn


β1
...
βK−1
βBlack

+

u1 − v˜1
...
un − v˜n

=

y˜∗1
...
y˜∗n
+

log(1− δBlackBlack1)
...
log(1− δBlackBlackn)
 ≈

y˜∗1
...
y˜∗n
+

−δBlackBlack1
...
−δBlackBlackn
 ,
and the pathology is clear: using measured underreported incomes is akin to
inflating the magnitude of the independent variable Black itself (rather than it
taking values {0, 1}, having it take values approximately {0, 1 + δBlack}). The
prescriptions, imputing incomes for the dependent variable or scaling down the
related indicator variable on the right hand side by approximately 1
1+δBlack
, are
equivalent. Computationally, the latter fix requires fewer steps. Incomes can be
imputed, conditional on Black = 1. The latter fix requires no knowledge of the
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status of Blacki, because all positive and zero values of Black can be scaled down
by the exact same factor.
An even simpler fix can be applied post mortem in this simple case. Because
the estimated coefficient on Black, βˆBlack, was estimated in the faulty regression,
we have
βˆBlackBlack = β
∗
Black(1 + δBlack)Black (3.10)
and the adjusted coefficient can be obtained by dividing the estimate through by
(1 + δBlack). As in the simple case of comparing median wages, the systematic
reporting differential δBlack > 0 causes the magnitude of the Black-White wage gap
to be overstated when the dependent variable is recorded with systematic error.
If this type of error in the dependent variable occurs due to multiple reporting
differentials for multiple demographic groups, the estimated coefficients on the
indicator variables corresponding to those errors can each be adjusted by a similar
scaling down (or up) of the estimate.
Rather than having to impute incomes, modify statistics, and employ fixes
while regression modeling, we would like to measure incomes more accurately.
An analysis of the income reporting process suggests avenues where systematic
misreporting may occur and potentially be mitigated.
To contrast the incentives for measurement error on the CPS, we note the
incentives to properly report wages to the IRS. IRS wages are typically reported as
follows: an employee performs work for an employer; when the employee is paid,
income and employment taxes are withheld by the employer or the employer’s
agent; after year end, the employer or employer’s agent send duplicate statements
of wage earnings for the tax year to the employee and the IRS; the employee or an
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agent of the employee prepare a Form 1040 for the employee, using the duplicate
wage earnings statement which has instructions on how to report those wages on
Form 1040 (and usually attaching the wage earnings statement to Form 1040).
Employment taxes incentivize employees against reporting non-wage income
types as wages. Employees are incentivized to fully report wages earned for
compliance purposes. Wage expenses are deductible from the taxable income
of the employer, so the employer has incentive to report all wages paid to the
employee. While simple recording errors occur, the tax unit is strongly incentivized
to record no more and no less than actual wages earned on Form 1040. However,
the employee may not be aware of the existence of duplicate records, may not
know that incorrectly reported wages may easily trigger an audit, may suffer
cognitive costs in properly completing Form 1040, or for other reasons make gross,
intermittent errors in wage reporting such as failing to report wages earned.15
On the other hand, CPS wages are reported as follows: the survey respondent
receives a letter preparing the household for the upcoming regular CPS interviews;
the interviewer establishes personal contact for the initial interview and may
perform subsequent interviews by phone; when it is time for the ASEC, the
interviewer asks the respondent additional detailed income questions; the
respondent answers the items; the interviewer records the items. In the case of IRS
wage reporting, a wage earning tax unit has financial incentives not to overreport
or underreport wages; here, the household has no such incentives. Furthermore, a
15One notable exception bears mentioning here: cash tips paid by customers to employees.
Such tips are paid to the employee directly by the customer and thus never enter the employer’s
books as revenue. Thus, the usual check on employee underreporting, the employer’s incentive to
minimize its taxable income, fails. Additionally, employees are allowed to estimate tips earned.
Here, duplicate statements sent by employers will only estimate the amount of tips earned, and
thus employees may underreport tips, undetected. A 1993 IRS study found that more than half
of all tips were unreported to the IRS. After implementation of programs, by 2004, nominal tips
reported to the IRS had more than doubled (U.S. Treasury Department, 2007).
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CPS interviewer has no duplicate wage earnings statements and cannot audit the
respondent to validate wage amounts reported by the respondent. In considering
pathways for systematic error to occur, we note that the ASEC is longer and more
time intensive than the usual CPS interview.
Wage incomes can be recorded with error if they are not remembered properly
(if the household either literally forgets, or loses or ignores wage statements). In
years where wage statements were sent out later than others, it is possible that a
household was interviewed for the ASEC before receiving such statements, and we
might expect for memories to be worse and reported wages more variable. If actual
prior year wages are forgotten, and household members hold the same jobs, they
may heuristically recall current incomes and use them as a proxy for prior year
incomes. In the case where real wages rise or are stagnant, and there is positive
inflation, we should expect these errors to cause wages to be overstated.
Once wages are recalled, either correctly or incorrectly, households may report
them accurately or inaccurately to the interviewer. Due to the length of the ASEC,
households may cut corners to save time, for example, by rounding numbers or
leaving out income items entirely. Households may be incentivized to misreport
wages based on the implications of the survey. The introductory letter to the CPS
tells households that their answers in the survey will be used to represent hundreds
of households like them (U.S. Census Bureau, 2006). Households may strategically
underreport or overreport incomes if they believe that their responses may lead to
some future beneficial public policy outcome. Also, households may worry about
exposing themselves to theft may be more likely to underreport incomes.
These potential sources of error are due to timing, time investment, and self-
interest. When surveys are completed before respondent receive wage statements,
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responses should be noisier. Many of the problems that arise in properly recording
wages on the CPS occur because greater accuracy likely involves spending more
time, but there is no penalty for being inaccurate. The CPS could experiment
with providing respondents with directions for year-end recordkeeping that aim
to reduce response time (such as preparing respondents to keep wage statements in
a set place and leaving a message about the upcoming interview). To address self-
interest, the CPS could experiment with different introductory letters that do and
do not emphasize the fact that survey responses will be used to represent similar
households.
Conclusion
In this paper, we match household IRS wage records to CPS wage records
and calculate wage reporting differentials. We utilize the accuracy of IRS wage
reporting to attribute any reporting differences to wage mismeasurement on the
CPS. We find that households of racial and ethnic minorities and less educated
households underreport wages to the CPS, relative to non-Hispanic Whites and
more educated households. Wage underreporting on the CPS tends to also increase
with age.
Based on these results, wage differentials for racial and ethnic groups that
are derived from uncorrected CPS data are overstated. Simple calculations of
the returns to education will be overstated as well. Implications in regressions
are more complicated and can be analytically unpredictable. These results cast
doubt on the assumption that CPS recorded wages can be used as a measure of IRS
wages earned, unless adjustments are made. Our results suggest that CPS wage
underreporting is not independent of demographic factors.
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In this paper, we controlled for related demographic characteristics and
included interaction terms between race and ethnicity, gender, and education in
many regressions. However, many within-group heterogeneities, such as occupation,
remain unexplored. Users of these results should be cautious in that these results
only estimate degrees of relative reporting between groups and do not represent all
members of these groups.
Timing of wage reporting may matter. When respondents have their duplicate
wage statements not long before the ASEC is conducted, they should be more
accurate. The due dates of the duplicate statements changed throughout the
sample. We can see if the variance of wage reports increases when deadlines
are later and possibly after the ASEC. We can tailor our approach more to the
intricacies of the CPS, exploiting the panel qualities of the survey.
Finally, we note the potential danger in naively applying our results.
Estimates of wage reporting differentials by demographic groups represent the
average tendencies of those households relative to baseline tendencies. While
we control for many factors, we do not provide regression-based heterogeneity
analyses within groups. An average effect we detect could be driven by a specific
subset of any one demographic group, which Figure 3 suggests may be the case.
Further research is needed to determine whether the relative differentials we find
are representative of groups as a whole, or merely particular subsets of demographic
groups.
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CHAPTER IV
GAMES OF FISCAL MANAGEMENT
Introduction and Related Literature
I write this from the city of Eugene, part of Lane County, in the state of
Oregon, which in turn is part of the United States of America. These are all
geographical areas as well as government jurisdictions. Just as these areas are
nested within one another, their governments are nested as well: as a county
lies within a state, a county is beholden to the laws and procedures of the state.
Typically in this hierarchy, geographical areas that are subsets of other areas have
governments that are subordinate to the bigger government.
Up and down this chain of nested governments, the different levels of
government produce public goods, and typically collect tax revenue. Ideal design
of public goods production would have any specification of public goods produced
at as low cost as possible, by delegating the responsibility of implementing those
public goods to the different levels of government in the most efficient manner,
including considerations for the overhead costs of the different levels, economies of
scale, and externalities created by one level of government that spill onto another.
Likewise, ideal tax system design would have a given amount of revenue collected
with the lowest collection costs possible and the lowest deadweight loss possible. If
everyone were to act upon an agreed upon set of rational social welfare preferences,
society would agree upon a set of public policies that maximizes social welfare.
It is not apparent that public goods are provided at as low cost as possible,
nor is it apparent that that particular public goods are provided by the lowest cost
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provider. One might argue, for example, that firefighting is a fairly homogeneous
commodity that could best be provided at a national level, utilizing economies
of scale in order to provide the same quality and required amount of public
good for as low cost as possible. Or, one could argue that firefighting techniques
and expectations differ from area to area, where firefighters near airports need
familiarity with certain chemicals and firefighters in agricultural areas need to
tap ponds as a source of water, so the importance of local knowledge means that
local organizations should provide the good. In reality, we often see one type
of good provided by one level of government with support from other levels of
government, or by multiple levels of government at once. Why should one level
of government provide a public good over another? For some public goods, this is
sometimes intuitively clear; common sense says that defense should be provided for
at the national level. For other goods, it is not obvious. For taxes, it is even less
straightforward. Which level or levels of government should collect sales taxes, or
income taxes, or excise taxes, and why?
It is not remarkable that different levels of government produce different
baskets of public goods; if localness provides informational gains due to closeness
and largeness provides economies of scale and power, then we should not be
surprised if public goods that rely of customization tend to be provided at the
more local levels and public goods that rely on efficiency and force tend to be
provided at the highest ranking levels. From a tax perspective, the assortment of
taxes collected at different levels of government is even more puzzling; the hierarchy
of taxing organizations no doubt creates inefficiency due to redundancy of tasks.
In our current information age, it is a wonder why we do not collect the same
amount of revenue under one umbrella and costlessly transfer it to the various
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government levels, enjoying a great reduction in overhead expenses. Of course, not
all government workers are perfectly benevolent public servants, and transfers are
not costless.
These na¨ıve ideals break down immediately if one realizes first that the
different levels of government may not be aligned in their preferences: the social
welfare functions that represent their preferences elicit different rankings of possible
policy choices. Furthermore, one can easily imagine the inefficiencies that can arise
due to government agents acting in their own interests. One can extend the notion
of differing roles in government having incongruent motives to the similar idea that
different levels of government may act in ways that hamper the goals and intentions
of the other levels of government. Weird and unexpected results that arise due to
strategic interactions of different levels of government are of particular interest.
In this paper, I explore the interactions of different levels of government
with regard to public policy decisions, particularly asking the questions of who
should provide which public good and who should implement taxes. The models
presented in this paper are not meant to closely resemble reality. They are abstract
along a number of dimensions. First, I simplify the analysis to only emphasize the
interactions between but two government entities, which I call the “Empire” and
the “Village.” The Village represents a geographical subset of the geographical area
of the Empire, and is subordinate to the Empire in that the Empire can dictate
some of the actions of the Village, or associate guaranteed punishments with
particular actions of the Village. Second, I limit the analysis to the examination
of public goods and taxes that pertain to the Village or the stakeholders of the
Village. Third, I ignore any complications of representative democracy; here, the
Village has no direct say in the decisions of the Empire (such as voting power -
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though their strategies may cause the Empire to act differently based on strategic
considerations). Fourth, the Empire and the Village are non-distinct other than
that the Empire is bigger in some general sense, has some unique efficiencies in
public goods production, and can set rules for the Village. Finally, I take the
abstraction that public goods fulfill certain distinct and understood “roles,” so
that one can delineate between policy decisions that fulfill a specific role such as
firefighting or policing (this ignores the possibility for combined goods, such as
“public safety,” that may be composites of more commonly known public goods
such as firefighting and policing). The Village has the benefit of localness, and is
beholden to the rules of the Empire. Despite these abstractions, I hope that an
analysis of a variety of models will present some insight into the real world.
The models explored in this paper are called games of fiscal management,
because a major consideration of these games is which level - the Empire or the
Village - will manage (or implement) a particular policy. These policies are meant
to fulfill particular roles of government in general, consistent with the assumption
of a known set of roles as delineated in the preceding paragraph. I explore two
types of games. In the first set of games, the Empire has ultimate control over
which level of government implements a particular role, but rebellious actions
of the Village can influence the Empire’s behavior. In the second, bureaucrats of
different government levels compete for control of roles (rather than the government
decision-makers competing). Consistent throughout is the notion that the Empire
benefits from economies of scale while the Village benefits from some sense of
localness. These games are also consistent in that choices in policy space are
among the players’ actions. The primary novelty of this paper is the application of
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strategic decision-making to the delegation of public policy roles to different layers
of government.
This paper provides a new approach to the growing body of research on
fiscal competition. A general review of this literature can be found in Wilson
(1999). Horizontal fiscal competition (that is, competition between locales of
relatively equal stature) over public goods provision is introduced in Tiebout
(1956), which introduces some important insights. First, he acknowledges that
the level of local spending in the United States is such that local expenditures
cannot be ignored. Second, he notes that the manner in which federal and local
governments provide public goods to the people is fundamentally different, in that
national governments have to provide goods to a wide swath of individuals with
vastly differing preferences, while local public goods tend to be more customized
to the specific types of people living in a locality. Third, the key result of the
paper is the idea that individuals will move to the municipalities that provide their
favored offered set of public goods, provided that said municipalities are not yet at
capacity. Thus, horizontal fiscal competition between localities is welfare-improving.
Unfortunately, his assumptions of perfect mobility and full relevant information are
not particularly realistic. His analysis focuses on quantities and types of public
goods, but taxes implicitly linger in the background. While Tiebout does not
explicit focus on the role of taxation in his model, Mieszkowski and Zodrow (1989)
provide a review of tax extensions to the Tiebout model.
Subsequent to Tiebout, the literature on fiscal competition focuses on
externalities created by horizontal and vertical competition (competition among
the hierarchy of government levels). Williams (1966) is one of the first papers to
call attention to the spillovers between localities when they provide public goods.
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Because local public goods may cause spillovers to nearby areas, those areas receive
positive externalities. However, if local governments are only concerned with their
citizens, they will ignore these externalities, and, as a whole, provide levels of public
goods that are too low. On the tax side, horizontal competition may also create
externalities for municipalities. If individuals are relatively mobile, high rates in
one municipality may incentivize individuals to switch municipalities, lowering the
tax base of their original municipality, as discussed in Oates (1972). This results
in the condition that, taken as a whole, local tax rates are set too low from a
social optimality perspective. Wilson (1999) examines horizontal public goods
externalities, and finds that public goods are produced inefficiently, requiring a
sub-optimally high level of inputs, while providing a theoretical definition for tax
competition of this type. Keen and Marchand (1997) examine the composition of
public goods in a horizontal competition setting, finding that more local public
goods are provided at low levels that are sub-optimal.
A less explored subfield in public finance concerns itself with the interactions
of different government entities in vertical fiscal competition, where competition
occurs between multiple levels of government. In general, Oates’ treatise concerns
itself with interactions of this type. Hoyt and Jensen (1996) investigate the role of
the timing of the announcements and commitments to policies at national and local
levels, finding that early commitments can be welfare improving. Wrede (1996)
investigates the interaction of different levels of Leviathan (revenue-maximizing)
governments that share a common income tax base. He finds that, while a system
of pure local competition drives Leviathans to lower tax rates so that the net result
is that tax rates are on the upward sloping side of the Laffer curve, a combination
of vertical and horizontal externalities leads to mixed results. Vertical externalities
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are negative, as one level of government taxing a shared tax base reduces the
tax base for other levels of government. These conflicting externalities lead to
ambiguous results, meaning that uncoordinated Leviathans do not necessarily
end up on the wrong side of the Laffer curve. Though not looking at Leviathans,
Jametti and Bru¨lhart (2004) investigate the relationship between horizontal and
vertical tax externalities among Swiss municipalities, finding that the effects of
vertical externalities dominate. Devereux and Redoano (2007) examine both
vertical and horizontal externalities in the context of excise taxes, and is the first
paper to allow for both types of externalities in an empirical setting with regard to
excise taxes. They find that horizontal externalities matter most when the taxed
commodities have low transport costs (like cigarettes) and that vertical externalities
matter most when the commodities face high transport costs (like gasoline).
A common thread of vertical fiscal competition literature is the idea that local
and national governments share the same government roles, for example, income
tax collection. What sets this paper apart is the idea that the management or
implementation of such roles matter, and, in many cases, there is only one level of
government that is the chief implementer (for example, while schools may have to
face federal or state restrictions, their ultimate implementation is at the local level
in most cases). This creates an all-or-nothing aspect of vertical fiscal competition
and is the subject of this paper.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I describe a class of games
of fiscal management that I call games of sabotage. In and of itself, sabotage,
unlike other illicit acts like theft, creates net costs for both the sabotaged and the
saboteur. The mere existence of sabotage implies that it serves a strategic purpose,
even if sabotage would never be consumed in isolation. In the section following,
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I describe a class of games where bureaucrats of different levels of government
compete by bidding for the opportunity to implement some public policy. In
these games, the existence of a losing bidder restores consumer surplus. Finally, I
conclude.
Games of Sabotage
In these games of sabotage, the Empire, the larger, more efficient layer of
government, and the Village, the smaller, more local layer of government, compete
for the chance to implement some “role” of government. “Role” here takes a
colloquial meaning, and could refer to fire protection, defense, or property tax
collection. The players in this game are, abstractly, the Empire and the Village
themselves; the Empire and Village each are modeled as one organism, so we can
think of these entities as having some unified, decision making process such as a
leader or median voter. Regardless of the role of government in question, the role
pertains to the domain of the Village; if the role is defense, this can be thought of
as defense as it pertains to the Village (even if ultimately produced at a national
level), or if it is fire protection, it may be purely local. There are individuals I,
{1, 2, 3, ..., i, ..., I} who are stakeholders of the public policies enacted upon the
Village. These individuals do not play the game, and include the residents of the
Village but may also include outside stakeholders, such as those who trade with
the Village or appointees of the Empire who are assigned to work on the Village.
The Empire and the Village have social welfare preferences over the utilities
UI = {u1, u2, u3, ..., ui, ..., uI} of the stakeholders of the Village. Each player j,
j ∈ {Empire, V illage}, makes a policy decision. A policy decision is a choice in
public policy space {TI , P}, where TI is a tax schedule TI = {τ1, τ2, τ3, ..., τi, ..., τI}
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and P is a vector of public goods (so each “role” can contain multiple public goods,
and a tax schedule can contain multiple types of taxes, though the τs represent
net amounts).1 Utilities UI are functions of the individual’s tax, the public goods
schedule, and other things θ such as private consumption, so ui = f(τi, P ; θi). Each
player chooses a policy decision that maximizes SWj = f(UI) = f(TI , P ; Θ),
where SWj is the social welfare function that represents the preferences of player
j and Θ = {θ1, θ2, θ3, ..., θi, ..., θI}. The players’ social welfare preferences may be
identical, but it is generally assumed that they are “competing” in the sense of
preferring societal outcomes differently.
A further discussion of the policy decision can be found in the appendix. To
sum up, each player brings distinct advantages to their policy outcomes. If put in
charge of a particular role, the Empire can implement policies at a lower cost than
the Village and can take advantage of its large size. On the other hand, the Village
has the benefit of having local knowledge of its citizens and can customize policies
to increase its citizens’ utility. These policy decisions essentially “fill in” two of the
three payoffs that are explained shortly, and, in the game, the policy decisions are
known to both players.
The basic game has but two decision nodes. The Empire, being in control
over the Village, decides which level of government should implement their policy
choice for the government role in question. Village decides whether or not to
sabotage the Empire, if the Empire decides that the Empire should implement
policy. A further description of sabotage and its related payoffs can also be found
in the appendix. The threat of sabotage spurs the dynamics of these games.
1This abstracts away from the different distortionary effects of different types of taxes.
Distinctly different types of taxes can be incorporated into the analysis by changing {TI , P} to
{TAI , TBI , TCI , ..., P}, where TAI , TBI , etc. are the different types of taxes, and individual utilities
take into account all types of taxes.
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Basic Sequential Game
The basic game unfolds as follows: the Empire decides whether to let
the Empire or the Village implement. This strategy set is {Empire, V illage},
abbreviated {E, V }. If the Empire chooses Empire, the Village chooses whether
to not interfere with the Empire’s implementation or to sabotage their endeavor,
notated {abide, sabotage}, or {a, s}. If the Empire instead chooses V illage, the
game ends (the Village does not have an opportunity to sabotage itself).
This game is represented in extensive form in Figure 4. The payoffs pijActions
refer to the payoff to player j given the history of actions played by each player.
For example, piEE,a is the payoff to the Empire if the actions played are Empire
and abide.2 Although I shall look at specific parameterizations of payoffs, there is
no requirement about the ordering of payoffs in general, except that the nature of
sabotage dictates that piEE,a > pi
E
E,s and pi
V
E,a > pi
V
E,s.
To fix ideas, let us take the payoff of player j to be five if they get to
implement their plan, free of sabotage. If the other player gets to implement, free
of sabotage, then a player only receives a payoff of three. If the Empire’s plan is
sabotaged, then each player receives negative one. These payoffs are shown in
Figure 5. These specific numbers represent a typical set of payoffs, as explained
in the appendix.
The single shot game with these payoffs is homeomorphic to the famous chain
store paradox of Selten (1978). There, the story goes, an upstart store decides
whether to enter the market area of an established store, which is taken to be in
the more powerful position. The incumbent may retaliate against market entry by
2Due to the multiplicity of strategies in extensions to this basic model, it is more compact in
general to denote the payoffs in terms of actions rather than strategies.
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FIGURE 4.
Basic Sequential Game, Generic Payoffs
FIGURE 5.
Basic Sequential Game, Specific Payoffs
fighting, which hurts both players. Ironically, here, the weaker Village is the one to
respond to the first move of the dominant Empire.
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This game has two Nash equilibria, {Empire, abide} and {V illage, sabotage},
but the threat of sabotage is not credible, making {E, a} the only subgame perfect
equilibrium. In any single shot game, the Empire will implement all policy roles
and the Village will always abide, giving the players payoffs of five and three,
respectively.
Reversed Sequence
Suppose the Village can commit to the choice of sabotage or no sabotage
before the Empire chooses the policy implementer, and the Village’s choice is
known to the Empire. Figure 6 shows the resulting game (note that the listed order
of the payoffs is reversed, as well as the order of play). Again, there are two Nash
equilibria, similar to before (now {s, V } and {a,E} instead of {V, s} and {E, a}),
and again, only one (now {s, V }) is subgame perfect. By making it clear that the
Village will definitely sabotage, fates are reversed and the Village receives its full
payoff of five while the Empire receives only three.
FIGURE 6.
Reversed Order Sequential Game, Specific Payoffs
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Simultaneous Play
Suppose that the Empire and the Village choose their actions simultaneously.
This can be understood as a situation where sabotage requires advanced planning,
before it is known whether the Empire will select Empire. The Village’s plan to
sabotage the Empire is contingent upon the Empire choosing itself as the policy
implementer. This game can be represented in normal form, as in the top panel
of Figure 7.3 This game has two pure strategy Nash equilibria, where the Empire
and the Village play {E, a} or {V, s}. There are no non-degenerate mixed strategy
equilibria. The Village’s strategy of sabotage is weakly dominated and is thus never
played if the Empire plays a mixed strategy, leaving {E, a} as the only (degenerate)
mixed strategy equilibrium.
FIGURE 7.
Simultaneous Games, Standard and Modified Payoffs
3For a diagrammatic representation of this simultaneous game in extensive form, the reader
can view either of the proper subgames in Figure 9.
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However, something interesting happens when the payoffs to the Village are
changed slightly. Suppose the Village receives some kind of behavioral response
to choosing sabotage, only to discover that the Empire has chosen V illage and
therefore the Village will not actually have to sabotage the Empire. It is reasonable
to believe that, under these circumstances, the Village will experience a feeling of
relief, increasing the utility of its citizens and thus increasing the payout to the
Village. The modified payoffs are shown in the bottom panel of Figure 7, where
the five in the bottom right corner has been replaced by a six. Again, there are
the same two pure strategy Nash equilibria as before, but, more importantly, the
strategy of sabotage is no longer weakly dominated. In fact, the threat of sabotage
is so great that the Empire chooses V illage most of the time. With these particular
payoffs, the Village placates with abide with two-thirds probability, but the threat
of such a low sabotage payoff is so great that Empire only chooses Empire with
one-fifth probability! This game has an expected payoff of three to the Empire
(equal to the Empire’s guaranteed minimum payoff), but has an expected payoff
to the Village of 4.6, nearly the full five that the Village receives under its most
preferred outcome. There are examples of chain store paradox applications where
a small chance that the chain store enjoys fighting the market entrant is enough
to deter most potential entrants (see Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and
Roberts (1982)), whereas here we have an example where a small premium on not
having to fight results in the Village nearly always getting its preferred outcome.
Lobbying
I now investigate whether the Village can exhibit a signal, distinct from
committing to sabotage, that will induce the Empire to choose the Village’s
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preferred action of V illage, giving the Village its highest payoff. In particular, the
Village can, at a cost, lobby the Empire. It is assumed that the act of lobbying
does nothing to persuade the Empire and it reduces the payoffs to the Village by
two. Lobbying does nothing to change the payoffs to the Empire. The idea that
sending an expensive signal can possibly benefit the Village is based on Ben-Porath
and Dekel (1992), who modify the “battle of the sexes” game to include an initial
node where one player may visibly “burn money” in front of the other player. By
burning money in their model, their first player reduces all of his payoffs, with
the result that only one terminal node leads to a payoff that is greater than his
guaranteed minimum payoff if he does not burn money. Their other player, seeing
this, realizes that he must only be taking the burning money path if he is expecting
his highest payoff down that path. Knowing his intention, their second player
chooses her action based on the highest payoff she can get if the first player plays
his intention. This way, the money burner gets his preferred payoff, less the cost of
lobbying. Their conclusion is arrived at via a forward induction argument.
The Village begins the game with a choice of actions, {lobby, do not lobby},
or {l, d}. This is diagrammed in Figure 8. With the pair of actions available to
the Empire and the pair of pairs available to the Village, there are now eight
strategies available to the Village and four to the Empire, for a total of thirty-two
combinations. Due to the multiplicity of strategy profiles, I only focus on subgame
perfect equilibria. In this simple sequential game based on the basic game, there is
only one subgame perfect equilibrium, where the Village does not lobby, the Empire
selects itself as implementer, and the Village abides with the Empire’s plan.
The original burning money example involved non-singleton information
sets, so it may be more fruitful to apply the concept of burning money to the
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FIGURE 8.
Fully Sequential Game with Lobbying
simultaneous game. This is shown diagrammatically in Figure 9. The logic of
the original burning money example is sometimes viewed as contentious (Vega-
Redondo, 2003), and it is tough to see on inspection whether it holds up here.
One way to show the existence of the burning money equilibrium in the original
example is to rewrite the game in matrix form, and successively eliminate weakly
dominated strategies until the burning money equilibrium (if any) is revealed.
The payoff matrix for the simultaneous game of sabotage is shown in Figure 10.
The Village has the strategies {la, ls, da, ds}, which refer to lobby then abide,
lobby then sabotage, do not lobby then abide, and do not lobby then sabotage.
The Empire has the strategies {EE,EV, V E, V V }, which refer to select Empire if
the Village lobbies and Empire if the Village does not lobby, select Empire if the
Village lobbies and the Village if the Village does not lobby, select Village if the
Village lobbies and the Empire if the Village does not lobby, and always select the
Village. As the modified simultaneous game before, the Village gets a premium for
not having to go through with a threat of sabotage.
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FIGURE 9.
Game with Lobbying Followed by Simultaneous Play, Modified
Payoffs
FIGURE 10.
Game with Lobbying and Simultaneous Play in Normal Form
The process of removing weakly dominated strategies ultimately proceeds
differently than that of the “burning money” version of the battle of the sexes.
First, the strategy la is weakly dominated by da, similar to the first elimination in
the battle of the sexes. Now, EE and EV are weakly dominated by V E and V V ,
respectively, meaning that the Empire will always select the Village as implementer
as long as the Village lobbies. At this point, no more strategies are eliminated by
removing weakly dominated strategies, leaving a three by two game. Solving this
game for mixed strategies graphically reveals that there are two mixed or partially
mixed strategies of {{la, ls, da, ds}, {EE,EV, V E, V V }}: {{0, 0, 2
3
, 1
3
}, {0, 0, 1
5
, 4
5
}}
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and {{0, 1, 0, 0}, {0, 0, 1
2
, 1
2
}}. Interestingly, the Village never gets to implement if
the premium for not having to carry out a planned sabotage is taken away (because
then all of the Village’s strategies are weakly dominated by da). In addition, this
game has four pure strategy Nash equilibria of {da,EE}, {ds, EV }, {ls, V E}, and
{ds, V V }, and within the three by two subgame, two pure strategy Nash equilibria
of {ls, V E}, and {ds, V V }. Just like the battle of the sexes, “burning money”
achieves the effect of at least tending to get the initial actor their favored outcome.
Future Work: Repeated Play
By taking the original sequential game as a stage game, it forms the basis
for a repeated game. Let there be m rounds of the stage game, with intermediate
payoffs to the players paid after each stage. As the number of rounds increased,
the number of Nash equilibria gets large, but only one equilibrium is rationalizable.
Starting from the final stage m, the Village will either end the game implementing
the fiscal policy (as ordained by the Empire), or by choosing whether to abide or
sabotage. Maximizing payoffs, the Village will choose abide. The Empire, knowing
this, knows that the payoff from choosing Empire in the final stage will be five, so
the Empire chooses this. In the previous round m − 1, the Village will understand
this, and maximize payoffs by playing abide if forced to make this choice. The
Empire understands and realizes that Empire will result in a higher payoff. This
backwards induction argument continues back through rounds m − 2, m − 3 and
so on, all the way back to round 1. Thus, in every stage of the subgame perfect
equilibrium, the Empire chooses itself to be the implementer and the Village
always goes along. Note that this solitary rationalizable equilibrium was arrived at
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independently of any understanding of the intertemporal preferences of the players,
e.g. their discounting patterns.
If repeated play is infinite, a number of more interesting equilibria emerge.
Assuming that players are time consistent in their preferences regarding their
intermediate payoffs according to discount factors δj, δj ∈ (0, 1), each player j
maximizes
∑∞
m=1 δ
m
j pi
j
m, where pi
j
m is player j’s intermediate payoff from the mth
stage of the repeated game. The analysis of these many equilibria is the subject
of future work, especially considering situations where players have incomplete
knowledge, particularly with respect to the value of the other player’s discount
factor.
Modern Applications
I have mentioned that these models are abstractions and not meant to
emulate the real world. Furthermore, they have some features that are incompatible
with a one-to-one comparison with the present condition of the United States, most
notably, that I avoid any issues of federalism (the Village has no direct say over
the decisions of the Empire and can only induce the Empire to act via strategic
interaction) and that I only model one Village (the strategic implications of the
presence of multiple Villages bears some consideration) and only have one or the
other level of government implement policy fulfilling a particular government role.
However, this repeated model may be of some assistance in understanding the
refusal of some states (who, in this analogy, are like Villages) to refuse Federal
funds for the expansion of Medicaid.
Medicaid is a government healthcare program where the Federal government
provides funding to the states for the healthcare of poorer individuals and the
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states administer these funds. States can opt into or out of the program. Under
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, more commonly known
as “Obamacare,” state funds for Medicaid were greatly expanded. From the
perspective of the states, these funds could be nearly seen as free money, yet
initially, twenty-two states refused these expanded funds, and to this date, fourteen
states still refuse these funds (Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, 2019). In
isolation, these state choices are not rational, implying that either lawmakers in
those states are irrational, decision-making processes in those states are irrational
(such as legislatures with individual preferences that make voting preferences
intransitive), or, more likely, that these choices serve some strategic purpose.
In the context of the games of sabotage so far described, refusal of funding is a
“sabotage” action that makes states worse off in each stage than if they were to
accept the funds. However, if states were to be able to reallocate the taxes used
to create funds for Medicaid expansion, and were to control this aspect of the
public provision of healthcare, they would pick an altogether different point in
policy space. From the dissenting states’ perspective they would be better off
in control in the long run. So, while these states may be behaving in a way that
seems counterintuitive, irrational, and wasteful, the strategic implications of their
acts may be believed on the part of these dissenting states to be leading to an
outcome where control over this policy role reverts back to these states, as the
Federal government grows tired with their sabotage and realizes that it is better
off receiving a string of payoffs where the states are the implementers, rather than
continuing to receive a string of sabotage payoffs.
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Bidding Bureaucrats
In this section, I describe models where once again, competition is between
the Empire and the Village, and the government role in question pertains to the
domain of the Village. However, here, the game is static, and the government levels
do not compete directly, but rather, bureaucrats - agents of the Empire and the
Village - compete for the opportunity to implement a policy role in accordance
with their bureaucratic desires. Whereas the Empire had ultimate control before of
who is the implementer, here, choice of implementer belongs to some non-player
decision maker who chooses the plan that maximizes consumer surplus of the
Village. Bureaucrats draft competing bids or proposals, and thus the game bears
many similar features to an auction.
The jumping off point for the models in this section is the static budget-
maximizing model of Niskanen (1968). I adopt and simplify the notation used by
Niskanen. The context of this model is the production of a particular public good,
so the choice of taxes shall take a back seat for now (though it is implied that the
costs of this public good production are covered, so we may think of these policies
as “balanced budget” prescriptions with taxes implicit in the background). The
marginal value function, or inverse demand function MB = a − bQ is the vertical
sum of the marginal values to the residents of the Village. It will simplify analysis
to consider cases where a bureaucrat’s of player j’s agency produces public goods at
constant marginal cost, or MCj = cj. Constant marginal cost means that the units
of quantity and currency can be redefined so that the linear marginal benefit curve
is given simply by MB = 1 − Q. In the one-government model, the bureaucrat
maximizes his budget Bj = Qj − 12Q2j by offering a level of production that the
public is just indifferent to receiving - he offers a quantity greater than the socially
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optimal level in such a way that the consumer surplus is obliterated. This is shown
in Figure 11, where area Z shows the area of maximum consumer surplus (and
the surplus gained under theoretical perfect market competition for government
services). Area Z is perfectly offset by area Z’, and the bureaucrat chooses a budget
producing Q∗ units of the public good (Niskanen imposes the additional constraint
that the budget must at least equal the total costs of production TC = cQ∗).
If marginal cost is less than one-half, then an additional restriction is that the
bureaucrat may not produce public goods at a quantity for which there is no
positive marginal benefit. In stark contrast to a market valuation situation in which
a monopolist produces a quantity that is too low relative to the social optimum,
the sole bureaucrat produces a quantity that is too high relative to the social
optimum.
With two bureaucrats competing for the opportunity to produce one public
good, they shall share a demand curve but have differing cost functions. The
Empire, being large and benefiting from economies of scale, can produce the good
at lower marginal cost than the Village, or cE < cV before local pride is considered.
However, the Village’s local pride means that the Village can produce the same
quality good as the Empire, but it will provide more consumer surplus due to local
pride. For each unit of the public good produced, citizens of the Village put a
local premium on that good of `. We could treat this as the Empire and Village
bureaucrats as interacting with different demand curves MBE = 1 − QE and
MBV = 1 + ` − QV , but it is far simpler to consider ` to be incorporated in the
Village’s net marginal cost, so that ` lowers cV . After local pride is considered, it
is possible that cV < cE, or that still cE < cV . The game with two competing
bureaucrats is shown in Figure 12.
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FIGURE 11.
Basic Niskanen Model with One Level of Government
The game works as follows: the Empire’s bureaucrat and the Village’s
bureaucrat simultaneously each choose a quantity Qj, with no knowledge of the
other’s bid. Costs and demands are known to all. The decision-maker reviews the
quantity bids and chooses the implementer that maximizes consumer surplus for
the Village. In this sense, the decision-maker acts in a deterministic manner, so
the players of the game are really just the two bureaucrats. If a bureaucrat’s bid is
chosen, she receives his planned budget Bj. If not, she receives nothing - this is an
all or nothing game. The decision maker rejects either bid if a bid creates negative
net consumer surplus.4
4If the decision maker is indifferent between the two proposals, a tiebreaker rule of some sort
can be implemented - either the decision maker chooses one plan at random, or has lexicographic
preferences over the two bureaucrats in case of a tie.
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FIGURE 12.
Niskanen Model with Competing Levels of Government
The following analysis refers to the cases where each cj >
1
2
, but the case
of cj <
1
2
produces similar results using similar logic, just with slightly different
algebra. If cE < cV , the Empire has the distinct advantage of being big and
operating at lower cost, and it is clear that the Empire can force a win. First,
consider that no player benefits from a bid of less than 1 − cj, the socially optimal
(consumer surplus maximizing) quantity given their marginal cost. No player can
bid more than 2(1 − cj), the point at which any larger quantity leads to a situation
where total costs TCj exceed budget Bj. Now consider any quantity choice of the
Village, 1 − cV ≤ QV ≤ 2(1 − cV ). Because the Empire has the cost advantage,
it can always best any resulting consumer surplus CSV implied by the Village’s bid
(this is easy to see, because, given cE < cV the Empire has the largest maximum
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possible consumer surplus CSj. For any QV bid, where QV > 1 − cV , the best
response of the Empire is to bid the quantity QE that produces CSE such that
CSE = CSV . As the maximum CSV =
1
2
(1−cV )2, this drives the Empire to produce
QE = 1 − cE +
√
(1− cE)2 + (1− cV )2. This can be seen in Figure 12. Without
competition, the Empire would produce at level Q∗, as before, wiping out consumer
surplus in areas U and V with areas Y and Z. Here, because the Village can offer
maximum consumer surplus of area U, the Empire offers QE, where consumer
surplus of U and V is only offset by area Y (so that U+V-Y=U, or V=Y), greatly
reducing the loss in consumer surplus to the Village, as compared to the theorized
perfectly competitive outcome. (If cE > cV , than the above analysis can be reversed
by simply switching the E and V subscripts.)
Supposing cE < cV , the Empire can always win.
5 However, as the (net)
cV approaches the value of cE, the bureaucratic overproduction of the Empire
shrinks. This result has echoes of the result of Bertrand competition in a duopoly
for market goods (Mas-Colell et al., 1995). There, the entrance of a second supplier
drives the duopolists from producing a too-small quantity to producing the
perfectly competitive market quantity. Here, quantity competition in an all-or-
nothing setting drives the competing bureaucrats from producing too much of a
quantity to producing the perfectly competitive market quantity, in the case where
cE = cV . Even more remarkably, because ` has the effect of lowering cV closer to
cE, a mere increase in local pride can be welfare improving for the Village, even
if their bureaucrat is never chosen to implement policy. Niskanen (1971) employs
5The exact bid may depend on tiebreaker rules - if the decision maker chooses a plan
randomly if he is indifferent, the Empire can guarantee a win by bidding a quantity slightly less
than QE = 1− cE +
√
(1− cE)2 + (1− cV )2.
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a vertical fiscal competition variant of his model, except that the roles of levels of
government in his extension are based on exogenously determined tax shares.
Conclusion
In this paper, I abstractly examine the role of the strategic interactions of
levels of government in circumstances where only one level of government is tasked
with the implementation of some public policy role. In the first set of models
examined, the possibility that a subordinate level of government may sabotage the
plans of the dominant level creates a variety of interesting outcomes, where results
depend on order of play, simultaneity of play, and repetition of play. In the second
set of models, I examine the strategic interactions between two levels of budget
maximizing bureaucrats. The mere existence of competition between government
levels is welfare-improving, even if the dominant level of government always gets
to control policy. As we live in a complex world where a hierarchy of governments
are nested within one another, it is important to continue to analyze vertical fiscal
competition. Future research shall include further extensions of the models explored
in this paper, with particular emphasis on the importance of imperfect information
and intertemporal tradeoffs.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, I have examined facets of public finance relating to the
design, use, and implementation of public finance policy outcomes. These aspects of
the public finance system impact the daily lives of citizens.
In Chapter II, I examine the movements of stock prices around changes in
state corporate income tax rate laws. I find that tax increases of one percent are
associated with a decline in stock price of about ten percent. Responses to tax
decreases have a similar inverse relationship but are not significant at conventional
levels of statistical significance. These results are paramount as state lawmakers
must decide what to do with the blend of taxes in their state. My findings suggest
that publicly traded companies in states suffer greatly when corporate income taxes
are raised, but do not benefit as much as tax decreases may suggest.
Chapter III includes previously unpublished co-authored material. In
this chapter, co-authors John Voorheis, Caroline Weber, and I examine wage
misreporting by comparing wage income data from the Current Population Survey
and administrative records. We find that the gaps between these two sets of data
are related to the demographic characteristics of respondents. We find patterns
for age, educational attainment, and some racial and ethnic groups. Within all
groups examined, survey respondents with lower wages tend to overreport their
wages to the CPS, while respondents with higher wages tend to overreport. A great
proportion of these gaps are created by rounding numbers, but our results maintain
even after accounting for rounding. Our results have important implications
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for research into the gender wage gap, racial and ethnic wage gaps, and the
measurement of income inequality.
Finally, I augment the empirical chapters with a theoretical chapter. In
Chapter IV, I use game theory to model the interactions between multiple levels
of government, a less studied aspect of public finance. One set of models deals with
the possibility that a subordinate level of government may subvert the policy goals
of a larger level of government through sabotage. Depending on the structure of the
game, there are times when the subordinate level will sabotage the dominant level,
and times when the dominant level will let the subordinate level implement policy
to its liking. Finally, a second set of games explores the interactions of bureaucrats.
I find that when bureaucrats of different levels compete over the opportunity to
implement policy, the results are generally welfare improving.
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APPENDIX
Corporate Income Tax Data Collection
In this section, I further detail the data collection process. In addition to
using The Book of the States for identifying tax rate changes, I also use similar
spreadsheets from the Tax Foundation as a double check. Both of these sources list
many rates that are different than the actual statutory marginal rates firms would
eventually pay, due to the simple fact that a large number of tax law changes are
made retroactively, whereas these two sources are forward-looking. Many states
have additional types of taxes on corporations, such as franchise taxes, but they
are deemed to be too small to worry about. The business tax systems of Michigan,
Ohio, and Texas are generally ignored because their alternative tax forms are not
directly comparable to taxes on net income.
The SIC codes used in identifying potential bank stock for the sample are
codes 6021, 6022, 6029, 6035, and 6036. Some additional criteria are used for
dropping firms from my sample. Firms are only kept if they are listed on the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the National Association of Securities Dealers
Automated Quotation exchange (NASDAQ), the NYSE American exchange (f.k.a.
the American Stock Exchange or AMEX), and the NYSE Arca exchange (f.k.a. the
Archipelago Exchange or ArcaEx). Firms are also dropped if they are accidentally
coded with the wrong SIC code, if their business resembles some type of financial
service company other that a community bank (such as a credit card processing
company), if they are duplicates, if no stock price data is available or if they
have less than one year of data available, and if they have operations in foreign
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countries. In general, stocks are identified with their CRSP permanent number or
PERMNO, which is the only key unique to a specific financial instrument. When
Compustat data are needed, a crosswalk is made between their PERMNOs and
their Committee on Uniform Security Identification Procedures (CUSIP) numbers.
Banks’ 10-K filings on EDGAR are generally a good source for the number
of bank branches in each state. In some cases, the firm could not be found on
EDGAR, so filings or annual reports are accessed on Morningstar.com or the
company’s website. The company profile on Yahoo! Finance is used as a last resort.
Firms are dropped if no source of location data is found. When firms list the states
of their operations but not the number of branches, values for the proportions of
income for those states are set to missing while values for states with no operations
are set to zero. If a firm lists a string of known locations “and others,” or uses some
other vague description, the firm is dropped.
Although income is apportioned to each state using a simple assumption of
same payroll, property, and sales at each branch, I do heed state nexus throwback
rules. Throwback rules work as follows: if a firm is located in a state with a
throwback rule and earns income from a state with no corporate income tax,
income from the non-taxing state is apportioned to the taxing state, or “thrown
back.” Schedules of these state-by-state rules are found via the Tax Foundation.
Estimating the Growth Rate and Rate of Return
Multiple times in this paper, I make use of g, the growth rate of the earnings
of bank stocks, and r, the required rate of return on these stocks. Values for these
parameters are not readily available, so I estimate them.
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To estimate g, I assume that publicly traded regional banks’ earnings grow
at a constant rate. I identify nineteen states whose top corporate tax rates for
financial institutions did not change from 1994-2017 (including zero rate states).
I then identify 85 firms in my sample of bank stocks whose income only comes from
these nineteen states. This is to ensure that changes in state corporate tax rates do
not directly effect these firms’ earnings. Using the CompuStat database, accessed
through WRDS, I download the daily listings of earnings per share (EPS) for these
stocks. These EPS are only updated quarterly, at different dates for different firms.
In order to adjust for these timing differences, I collapse the mean of these EPS
within each quarter for each stock (essentially smoothing out the EPS). Because
the financial crisis beginning in 2007 was an outlier event, I only keep quarterly
EPS values up until Q1 2007. I drop the few stocks that have negative values for
these smoothed EPS. I then take the logarithm of these smoothed EPS and regress
them on an index for each quarter in a time series regression, with fixed effects for
each stock. This provides an estimated coefficient on the quarterly index variable of
0.0162, with a p-value of 0.000. This quarterly rate corresponds to an annual rate
of 6.7%, which I round down to 6.5% due to the dropped stocks with negative EPS.
To estimate r, I assume prices of bank stocks can be approximated by the
aforementioned dividend growth model. For the same set of eighty-five stocks, I
download daily stock prices and EPS from CompuStat. I create a variable which is
the current EPS divided by the current price for all stock/day combinations. This
variable should be equal to the expression r − g. I take the mean of this variable
and substitute my estimate of g, yielding a quarterly estimate of r of 0.0321, which
corresponds to an annual rate of 0.1349. I also estimate r by rearranging equation
the dividend growth model so that
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d0 =
(
r − g
1 + g
)
P.
I regress d0 on P , forcing the intercept to be zero. This provides an estimate of
( r−g
1+g
) of 0.0159 with an R-squared of 0.91. Plugging in my estimate of g, I solve
for r, obtaining a quarterly estimate of 0.0325, which corresponds to an annual
estimate of 0.1364. I take the two annual estimates of r and round them to 13.5%.
Comparing Tax Law Changes
Comparing different tax laws would be easy if one single new rate went
into effect immediately after tax rate change laws were passed. Comparisons are
complicated by the fact that most such laws go into effect months after they are
passed, and tax rate change laws are often bundles of multiple rates that get
phased in over multiple years. To compare these different laws, I use a baseline
model that relies on a ceteris paribus assumption: that net incomes before state
corporate taxes of my sample stocks will keep on their current growth path. This
means that the only presumed difference comes from differences between the old
top rate(s) and new top rate(s).
I fix the date that a tax law change “happened” as the date the bill was
signed into law, rounded to the nearest quarter end. I move the date(s) a law
will go into effect to the following January 1st, as the vast majority of stocks in
my sample have a December 31st. I create a schedule for each tax law change of
the number of quarters left (as of the signing date) under the current top rate, the
number of quarters under the first new top rate, the number of quarters under the
next new top rate, and so on, until at last there is a “final” rate that continues
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indefinitely. I make a similar schedule for the top tax rate(s) that were in effect
before the new tax law change was made.
I assume a dividend growth model.
Pit =
∞∑
k=1
(1− τ)d0
(
1 + g
1 + r
)t
, (A.1)
Normalizing d0 to unity, I create a column of the next 1,000 quarters of
earnings, growing at rate g, assuming no tax. This sum approximates the value
of the infinite sum to within a tolerance of 10−6. I create another column that
discounts these earnings at rate r. The sum of this second column gives the present
value of a prototypical firm’s earnings under the assumption of no tax. For each
tax law change the sample for which stocks exist with fifty percent or more of
operations in the state in question, I make two columns: one for the tax rate τ
for each quarter as was scheduled before the law changed, and one with the new
rates after the change. I create companion columns for each of these two columns
that adjust the original column of earnings by a factor of 1 − τ . The sums of these
tax-adjusted columns give the present value of a prototypical firm’s earnings under
the old tax law and the new tax law. The difference of the differences between
these sums and the no-tax column’s sum gives the percent change, adjusted for the
time value of money and future earnings growth. In the case of retroactive tax law
changes, a small additional “sweetener” was calculated and added to the after-law-
change-column’s sum, to take into account the sudden realization of profits from
unanticipated increased earnings from quarters past. In future research, it would
be interesting to see if such sweeteners are more commonly associated with smaller
tax cuts, as this kind of sweetener could be a way to placate people for tax cuts of
underwhelming magnitude.
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Event Studies
This section documents one of the additional methodologies used to try to
determine the impacts of corporate income tax law changes on stock prices, namely
financial event studies. The financial event study, developed by Fama, et al. (1969)
is a common financial inference tool that employs the use of first differences in
stock prices to determine unusual stock return behavior related to an event. Unlike
the large number of relatively recent corporate income tax rate changes, tax events
often occur in isolation, making causal inference difficult, as the impacts of the tax
event may not be distinguishable from other contemporaneous events. For example,
Lang and Shackelford (2000) are restricted to this kind of analysis. Event studies of
this type are also very useful for visualizing changes in stock prices in time around
an event, as time unfolds. Thus, they are useful for pinning down when an impact
is felt in the markets.
The intention of an event study exercise in the context of changes in
corporate income tax rates is twofold: first, to visualize changes in stock prices, and
second, to square this paper with some of the rest of the literature. However, while
most of the conclusions derived from these event studies conform to the conclusions
derived from the first-differenced regressions, the event studies I created were
problematic and in some instances, produced results that are at odds with some
of the regression results. They are documented here in the interest of completeness
and in the hope that their shortcomings may eventually be overcome. The flaws in
these particular event studies are likely caused by a small sample size, a treatment
variable that is not restricted to {0, 1}, and the fact that the timelines for the law
changes are all different (e.g. the number of days between introduction of a bill and
the passage of that bill is different for all law changes).
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The procedure used for this technique is as follows: I regress stocks’ returns
on market returns (and other factors) well before the occurrence of some event;
this establishes a model of how the stock typically moves with the market; then, in
an event window surrounding the event in question, I use the model to predict the
expected returns for the stocks; deviations from the model’s prediction are dubbed
abnormal returns, and the sum of these, dubbed cumulative abnormal returns
(CAR) explain the portion of returns’ behavior due to the event in question.
When events for different stocks are associated with different dates, event dates
are all normalized to be time zero, effectively stacking multiple events on top of
one another and taking the average CAR at each point in time. The time periods
involved are known as the “estimation window,” the time period over which the
model is run, the “gap,” a space between the estimation window and the period
to be studied, and the “event window,” which is the period under study, centered
around a particular event.
I create the event studies in this paper using WRDS’ built-in EVTSTUDY
module, using the Carhart four-factor estimating model (Carhart (1997)),
Rˆit = αi +RFt + β1,i(RMkt,t −RFt) + β2,iSMBt + β3,iHMLt + β4,iMOMt,
where Rˆit represents the expected return to stock i over some time frame t, based
on actual market return RMkt,t (which usually comes from a broad-based stock
index such as the S&P 500), RFt is the risk-free rate (to adjust for risk), and there
are factors for the return premiums of small company stocks over larger stocks
SMBt (based on market capitalization), high book-to-market-value stocks (“value
stocks”) over low book-to-market-value stocks (“growth stocks”) HMLt, and
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momentum MOMt, which adjusts for the markets’ tendency to stick with winners
over losers.1
I run event studies separately for tax increases and decreases, for both using
each of the five dates for each tax law change’s legislative history, for a total of ten
studies. For all event studies, I estimate the Carhart model using an estimation
window of five hundred days, a gap of three hundred days, and an event window of
thirty days on either side of each event. The long estimation window was chosen
so as to establish a strong relationship between the stocks in my sample and the
market, and the long gap was chosen so that the estimation window avoids other
events in the legislative history of the same tax law change.2 The event study
stacks the abnormal returns of multiple stocks on top of one another, which is
problematic for visualization if the impact of a change on one stock is tiny (i.e.
if a small proportion of a firm’s bank branches are in the state of a law change)
- then the combination of returns for these smaller impact stocks should visually
mitigate the stock returns for firms with a larger tax impact, meaning that some
kind of cutoff should be chosen. For all event studies, I only include firms whose
treatment effect (log change from Table 5 multiplied by the proportion of that
firm’s operations in the affected state) is greater than 0.005 (in other words, if the
1A number of other models are commonly used. Event study models available in WRDS’
EVTSTUDY module include the market model (Fama et al. (1969)),
Rˆit = αi + βiRMkt,t,
the Fama-French three-factor model (Fama and French, (1992)),
Rˆit = αi +RFt + β1,i(RMkt,t −RFt) + β2,iSMBt + β3,iHMLt,
the market-adjusted model, which adapts the market model by forcing β to equal unity, and the
above described Carhart model. These other models produce substantially similar images.
2For example, if the gap were shorter, and I run an event study on one of the later dates in a
law’s legislative history, estimation of the model may be tarnished by stock price changes due to
the anticipation of said law’s passage.
126
profits of a firm are expected to change by more than half of one percent, ceteris
paribus). The number of stocks applicable to each tax change varies even within
a single tax change’s legislative history, as stocks may have been trading during
the estimation window or event window relative to one date but not another. The
result of this is that each event study utilizes only dozens of stock observations,
rather than the thousands utilized in the first-differenced regressions. This leads to
weak power and rather noisy event studies, with results driven by companies with
operations that tend to be concentrated in states where the largest tax changes
occurred.
Figures A1 and A2 show the results of the event studies. Tables 3 and 4 are
helpful in figuring out how each of the five panels in each figure fit together with
one another across time. Figure A1 shows the CAR for tax decreases for firms
with treatment sizes greater than 0.005 in magnitude. Notably, there is an upward
spike exactly coinciding with the first news date, suggesting that markets are
incorporating news of impending tax law changes in close to real time. However,
this spike is largely driven by firms located in the state of New York (an event
study, excluding New York tax changes (not shown) looks similar, but without the
dramatic spike). Also, there is some upward movement in stock prices beginning
about twenty days prior to lawmakers publicly announcing interest in a tax cut.
This could be due to noise, misspecification of the first news date for some law
changes, or investor pre-knowledge of upcoming, unannounced events. After the
initial spike, prices seem to be somewhat mean-reverting. The remaining panels in
Figure A1 are mostly flat and noisy.
Figure A2 shows the CAR for tax increases. In general, the CAR exhibit a
downward trend, as predicted. However, significant negative CAR do not appear
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FIGURE A1.
Event Studies, Tax Decreases, Firms with Log Treatments Greater
Than 0.005 in Magnitude
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FIGURE A2.
Event Studies, Tax Increases, Firms with Log Treatments Greater
Than 0.005 in Magnitude
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until panels (c) and (d), around the dates tax increase bills are actually passed.
Although these images are more descriptive than causal, they suggest that markets
believe potential tax decreases will occur as they are announced, but markets wait
to incorporate news of tax increases until they are nearly certain (and are possibly
slower to do so even after they are signed into law). As is discovered in the main
body of this paper (from the within-subwindows regressions), this latter suggestion
is likely erroneous. The images in Figure A2 are noisier than those in Figure A1, as
the event studies for tax increases only employ about one fifth of the firms (there
are far fewer tax increases in the sample).
The timing of the reactions of stock prices, coupled with the EMH, suggests
that lawmakers signal potential tax decreases well before they are introduced as
bills, and that these signals are heeded. This is consistent with the conclusions
drawn from the within-subwindows regressions in the main body of the paper.
On the other hand, the timing for increases based on these event studies suggests
they do not send signals in advance or that the signals are unheeded early on
in the legislative process. While this disagrees with the findings of the within-
subwindows regressions, it is possible that the subsample of firms with absolute
value treatments greater than 0.005 behave differently than other firms.
Perhaps shockingly, the magnitudes of the CAR seem quite large relative
to the size of the tax rate changes, even when compared to regression results.
However, these figures suffer from the wide range of treatment sizes, which in
these figures range in (log) magnitude from 0.0050 to 0.0370. Therefore direct
comparisons about the magnitude of changes rather than the direction of changes
are difficult.
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I challenge my event study findings, as tenuous as they may be, with a series
of placebo event studies. For the first set of tests, I rerun the original event studies,
but substituting twenty random stocks from my sample of bank stocks for each
event, conditional on the random stocks having no operations in the states in
question. Flat, insignificant results should help to alleviate concerns that my results
in the previous section were driven by events where the banking sector as a whole
diverged from its usual relationship with the market. Figures A3 and A4 show
these results for tax decreases and increases, respectively. In general they are flat
and insignificant, however, they do sometimes show trends and occasional spikes.
These movements in what should be a null result show that these highly correlated
stocks and the banking sector as a whole can diverge from the market sometimes in
unpredictable ways.
Next, I rerun the original event studies using the original companies, except
that I shift all dates backwards by four years. I choose this date because it is far
before the events in question (so that the event window of later dates like the date
the law becomes effective do not coincide with earlier actual dates, such as the
first news date). Figures A5 and A6 display these results for tax decreases and
increases, respectively.
These results are less convincing. While most of these are flat and
insignificant, the CAR in panels (c) and (d) of Figure A6 veer sharply downward.
The basket of stocks used to make this graph come from only six states, and thus
have highly correlated returns within states, so the coincidence of unusual events in
just a few of these states could significantly drive results. As these same stocks
were used in the original event studies, this means that concerns that random
events are driving results are not alleviated. While the event studies are helpful
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FIGURE A3.
Event Study Placebo Tests, Tax Decreases, Using Random Firms with
No Operations in State of Tax Law Change
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FIGURE A4.
Event Study Placebo Tests, Tax Increases, Using Random Firms with
No Operations in State of Tax Law Change
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FIGURE A5.
Event Study Placebo Tests, Tax Decreases, Shifting Event Dates
Backwards in Time by Four Years
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FIGURE A6.
Event Study Placebo Tests, Tax Increases, Shifting Event Dates
Backwards in Time by Four Years
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as a diagnostic and descriptive tool to help visualize changes in stock prices brought
on by changes in tax laws, they make inference difficult and occasionally produce
results that seem to be at odds with the regressions.
Cleaning of Matched CPS/Administrative Data
Table A1 documents the evolution of the sample size as the sample was
cleaned from all matchable records to those that are able to be neatly compared
using all five income measures (the description of these measures is in section A.6).
The sample is restricted along four criteria for comparability, each resulting in the
pruning of between two and twenty-eight percent of the existing samples. The age
criterion (made to avoid unusual behavior at either end of the age spectrum) is the
most restrictive, eliminating thirty-one percent of the existing sample.
TABLE A1.
Sample Evolution
Sample Records Remaining Percent of Previous Row
CPS/IRS/DER matched unit records 1,034,000
Units receive no Social Security income of any type 855,000 83
Units represent working age non-dependents 591,000 69
No income amounts are imputed by the CPS 424,000 72
Units appear on only one 1040 per year 417,000 98
Units do not file a Schedule D 349,000 84
Source: CPS ASEC, IRS W-2 and SSA DER, 2001-2016. Approved for release by the
Census DRB, authorization numbers CBDRB-FY18-143, CBDRB-FY18-200 and
CBDRB-FY18-407.
Variable Construction
The five measures of income that are comparable between CPS and
administrative records are: wages, interest plus dividends, total money income,
self-employment earnings, and wages plus self-employment earnings. These incomes
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are constructed at the tax unit/household level. They are constructed as follows.
Wages are simply the sum of IRS wages for the tax unit and the sum of each
member of that unit’s total wages as reported to the CPS. Interest plus dividends
is the sum of IRS taxable interest, non-taxable interest, and dividends.3 CPS
interest plus dividends is simply interest plus dividends (the CPS does not make
the taxable/non-taxable distinction). IRS total money income, by our construction,
adds non-taxable interest back into “total income,” and so is really IRS total
money income plus non-taxable interest. CPS total money income is the sum
of CPS components that most closely matches this IRS line item, given that
we dropped data points based on comparability. The CPS total money income
therefore is the sum of wages, interest, dividends, sole-proprietor earnings, farm
income, alimony, rental income, retirement income, unemployment compensation,
and other income. Because IRS total money income includes taxable refunds,
credits, and offsets of state and local taxes, but the CPS has no measure of those
items, that difference remains a potential wedge in the direct comparability of
IRS total money income and CPS total money income. Administrative self-
employment earnings are self-employment earnings subject to Medicare taxes. CPS
self-employment earnings are the sum of sole-proprietor earnings, farm income,
and rental income. Administrative wages plus self-employment is the sum of DER
wages and self-employment earnings subject to Medicare taxes, and CPS wages
plus self-employment earnings is the sum of CPS reported wages, sole-proprietor
earnings, farm income, and rental income.
3The IRS does make the distinction between qualified and non-qualified dividends, but both
are included in IRS “total income” and the distinction in tax treatment comes later on Form 1040.
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Payoff Determination in Sabotage Games
In this appendix I justify the choices of payoffs employed in the games
of sabotage. We can think of an arbitrary social welfare considering body of
government as having a set of utility possibilities available to it, which can be
thought as the union of utility possibilities sets corresponding to any specific public
policy choices (so that the utility possibilities present when fulfilling any particular
government role can correspond to exactly one policy action or a set of actions). A
simple two-individual sample utility possibilities set is labelled “UP” and bounded
by the solid curve in Figure A7.
The Empire has a distinct advantage over any arbitrary government body, in
that it is large and powerful. This advantage allows it to achieve utility possibilities
that an arbitrary government body could not, for example stretching a budget
further by producing public goods at a lower cost due to economies of scale. This
effectively stretches the utility possibilities set available to the Empire outward,
as shown by the set labelled “UPE” and bounded by the regular dashed curve in
Figure A7. The Village also has a distinct advantage over an arbitrary government
body in that it is close to the people who are the target of government action in
these models. The Village knows its people, knows what will please them, knows
local obstacles to policy implementation and can avoid potential pitfalls of which
an outsider may be unaware. This local knowledge also allows it to achieve utility
possibilities beyond that of the arbitrary government body, and is also shown as a
stretching of the original utility possibilities set in Figure A7, labelled “UP V ” and
featuring an alternating dashed curve. In addition, local pride in the efforts of the
Village may also stretch UP V outward.
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FIGURE A7.
Maximization Problems of the Empire and the Village
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As explained, the Empire and the Village each have preferences over policy
outcomes that can be represented by social welfare functions. These are indicated
by indifference curves in Figure A7. The Empire’s sample indifference curve
is shown in the regular dashed pattern and the Village’s curve is shown in the
alternating dashed pattern. As shown, each entity prefers the set of individual
utilities on the frontier of their corresponding utility possibilities set that touches
the indifference curve that touches but does not cut into the set. These preferred
points are labelled e∗ and v∗ on Figure A7. These points are the preferred policies
of the two players, and correspond to the payoffs piEE,a and pi
V
V , respectively. The
payoffs piVE,a and pi
E
V are the values of the Village’s and Empire’s social welfare
functions at the opposite player’s optimum (these indifference curves are not
shown).
To ease interpretation, we can think of these payoffs as loosely having three
components. First, there is the effect of the player choosing a possible utility level
as if it were an arbitrary government body. Second, the Empire confers a premium
to any player receiving a payoff when the Empire is the implementer, which is the
effect of the Empire’s power, size, and ability to implement policies at low cost.
Third, the Village confers a premium to any player receiving a payoff when the
Village is the implementer, which can be thought of as the increased utility due to
local knowledge and pride.
The final payoffs to be determined are the payoffs received when the Empire
is the implementer but the Village sabotages the Empire’s implementation. As
the act of sabotage confers no immediate benefit (unlike other harmful actions
like theft, that enrichen the thief) and weakens the saboteur in the short run, the
beneficial impacts of sabotage on the saboteur must occur later, due to strategic
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interaction. The payoffs under sabotage are thus lower for both the Empire and
the Village, relative to the payoffs received at point e∗ in Figure A7. The set of the
possible utilities under sabotage are shown by the dashed rectangle in Figure A8
(which, though not shown, stretches into negative utilities). While the sabotage, by
definition, results in a payoff lower than the utility received at e∗, and thus can be
anywhere in that set, it will help interpretation to think of the act of sabotage as
particularly damaging to both players, such that the sabotage payoffs are far lower
than the non-sabotage payoffs.
Now, the Empire and Village need not have social welfare preferences that
are different or even so different that it is always the case that the Village and
Empire pick their own preferred policy implementation. For example, in the case
of identical social welfare preferences, the premium conferred by the Empire’s size
may be greater than the premium conferred by the Village’s localness, in which
case both Empire and Village will prefer that the Empire implements, and vice
versa. This simple result explains many historical results that are beyond the
current scope of this paper.
In general, however, I assume that, for most government roles, the Empire
and the Village have distinctly different views on proper implementation, so that
the Empire prefers its own plan despite the Village’s local advantage, and the
Village prefers its own plan despite the Empire’s size advantage. If we take each
player’s payoffs to be four under their preferred plan but two under the other
player’s preferred plan before incorporating their local or size premia, and give each
player’s premium a value of one, then players receive a payoff of five under their
plan and three under their opponent’s plan. As the sabotage payoffs are meant to
be particularly bad, for each player, they shall be assigned a value of negative one.
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FIGURE A8.
Effects of Village Sabotage on the Utility Possibilities Set
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These payoffs are shown in Figure 5 in the main body of the paper and comprise
the “standard payoffs” of this game.
143
REFERENCES CITED
Allingham, M. G. and Sandmo, A. (1972). Income tax evasion: A theoretical
analysis. Journal of Public Economics, 1(3-4):323–338.
Arulampalam, W., Devereux, M. P., and Maffini, G. (2012). The direct incidence of
corporate income tax on wages. European Economic Review, 56(6):1038–1054.
Auerbach, A. J. (2006). Who bears the corporate tax? a review of what we know.
Tax Policy and the Economy, 20:1–40.
Ben-Porath, E. and Dekel, E. (1992). Signaling future actions and the potential for
sacrifice. Journal of Economic Theory, 57(1):36–51.
Bloomberg Tax (2014). Iowa governor signs tax reform & conformity bill.
https://www.bna.com/iowa-governor-signs-n57982093083/. Accessed:
2018-05-18.
Bollinger, C. R. (1998). Measurement error in the current population survey: A
nonparametric look. Journal of Labor Economics, 16(3):576–594.
Borjas, G. J. and Bronars, S. G. (1989). Consumer discrimination and
self-employment. Journal of Political Economy, 97(3):581–605.
Bound, J., Brown, C., and Mathiowetz, N. (2001). Measurement error in survey
data. Handbook of econometrics, 5:3705–3843.
Bound, J. and Krueger, A. B. (1991). The extent of measurement error in
longitudinal earnings data: Do two wrongs make a right? Journal of Labor
Economics, 9(1):1–24.
Brummet, Q., Flanagan-Doyle, D., Mitchell, J., Voorheis, J., Erhard, L., and
McBride, B. (2018). Investigating the use of administrative records in the
consumer expenditure survey. CARRA Working Paper 2018-01.
Buffett, W. E. (1984). The superinvestors of graham-and-doddsville. Hermes, pages
4–15.
Burkhauser, R. V., Feng, S., Jenkins, S. P., and Larrimore, J. (2012). Recent trends
in top income shares in the usa: Reconciling estimates from march cps and irs
tax return data. Review of Economics and Statistics, 94(2):371–388.
Cameron, S. V. and Heckman, J. J. (2001). The dynamics of educational
attainment for black, hispanic, and white males. Journal of Political
Economy, 109(3):455–499.
144
Card, D. (1993). Using geographic variation in college proximity to estimate the
return to schooling. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Card, D. and Krueger, A. B. (1992). School quality and black-white relative
earnings: A direct assessment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
107(1):151–200.
Cavaliere, G. and Xu, F. (2014). Testing for unit roots in bounded time series.
Journal of Econometrics, 178:259–272.
Chay, K. Y. (1998). The impact of federal civil rights policy on black economic
progress: Evidence from the equal employment opportunity act of 1972. ILR
Review, 51(4):608–632.
Chetty, R., Looney, A., and Kroft, K. (2009). Salience and taxation: Theory and
evidence. American Economic Review, 99(4):1145–77.
Council of State Governments (1994-2017). The Book of the States. Council of
State Governments.
Cragg, J. G., Harberger, A. C., and Mieszkowski, P. (1967). Empirical evidence on
the incidence of the corporation income tax. Journal of Political Economy,
75(6):811–821.
De, R. and Mehran, H. (2014). Evolution of s-corporation banks.
https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2014/11/
evolution-of-s-corporation-banks.html. Accessed: 2019-04-18.
Deaton, A. (1997). The Analysis of Household Surveys: a Microeconometric
Approach to Development Policy. World Bank Publications.
Desai, M. A., Foley, C. F., and Hines, J. R. (2007). Labor and capital shares of the
corporate tax burden: International evidence. Conference on Who Pays the
Corporate Tax in an Open Economy.
Devereux, Michael P., B. L. and Redoano, M. (2007). Horizontal and vertical
indirect tax competition: Theory and some evidence from the usa. Journal of
Public Economics, 91(3-4):451–479.
Dickey, D. A. and Fuller, W. A. (1979). Distribution of the estimators for
autoregressive time series with a unit root. Journal of the American
Statistical Association, 74(366a):427–431.
Dwenger, N., Rattenhuber, P., and Steiner, V. (2011). Sharing the burden?
empirical evidence on corporate tax incidence. German Economic Review.
145
Fama, E. F. (1965). The behavior of stock-market prices. The Journal of Business,
38(1):34–105.
Fama, E. F. (1970). Efficient capital markets: A review of theory and empirical
work. The Journal of Finance, 25(2):383–417.
Fama, E. F., Fisher, L., Jensen, M., and Roll, R. (1969). The adjustment of stock
prices to new information. International Economic Review, 10(1):1–21.
Fama, E. F. and French, K. R. (1993). Common risk factors in the returns on
stocks and bonds. Journal of Financial Economics, 33(1):3–56.
Feldstein, M. S. and Poterba, J. M. (1980). State and local taxes and the rate of
return on nonfinancial corporate capital (revised as w0740).
Felix, R. A. and Hines, J. R. (2009). Corporate taxes and union wages in the
united states. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Giroud, X. and Rauh, J. (2015). State taxation and the reallocation of business
activity: Evidence from establishment-level data. Technical report, National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Gordon, R. H. (1985). Taxation of corporate capital income: Tax revenues versus
tax distortions. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100(1):1–27.
Gravelle, J. (2017). Corporate tax reform: Issues for congress. Technical report,
Congressional Research Committee.
Harberger, A. C. (1962). The incidence of the corporation income tax. Journal of
Political Economy, 70(3):215–240.
Harberger, A. C. (2006). Taxation and income distribution: Myths and realities.
The Challenges of Tax Reform in a Global Economy, pages 13–37.
Hassett, K. A. and Mathur, A. (2010). Spatial tax competition and domestic
wages.
Heider, F. and Ljungqvist, A. (2015). As certain as debt and taxes: Estimating the
tax sensitivity of leverage from state tax changes. Journal of Financial
Economics, 118(3):684–712.
Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation (2019). Status of state action on the medicaid
expansion decision.
https://www.kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/
state-activity-around-expanding-medicaid-under-the-affordable\
-care-act/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:
%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D. Accessed: 2019-04-12.
146
Hoyt, W. H. and Jensen, R. A. (1996). Precommitment in a system of hierarchical
governments. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 26(5):481–504.
Internal Revenue Service (2016). Federal tax compliance research: Tax gap
estimates for tax years 2008-2010. Technical Report 1415 (Rev. 5-2016),
Internal Revenue Service Office of Research, Analysis, and Statistics,
Washington, D.C.
Jametti, M. and Bru¨lhart, M. (2004). Horizontal versus vertical tax competition:
An empirical test. Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter
Meetings.
Juhn, C. (2003). Labor market dropouts and trends in the wages of black and
white men. ILR Review, 56(4):643–662.
Kane, T. J. and Rouse, C. E. (1995). Labor-market returns to two- and four-year
college. The American Economic Review, 85(3):600–614.
Keen, M. and Marchand, M. (1997). Fiscal competition and the pattern of public
spending. Journal of Public Economics, 66(1):33–53.
Kreps, D. M. and Wilson, R. (1982). Reputation and imperfect information.
Journal of Economic Theory, 27(2):253–279.
Krzyzaniak, M. and Musgrave, R. A. (1963). The Shifting of the Corporation
Income Tax. Johns Hopkins Press.
Lenter, D., Slemrod, J., and Shackelford, D. (2003). Public disclosure of corporate
tax return information: Accounting, economics, and legal perspectives.
National Tax Journal, pages 803–830.
Li, G. (1985). Exploring Data Tables, Trends, and Shapes, chapter Robust
regression. John Wiley & Sons, New York.
Lintner, J. (1965). Security prices, risk, and maximal gains from diversification.
The Journal of Finance, 20(4):587–615.
Ljungqvist, A. and Smolyansky, M. (2014). To cut or not to cut? on the impact of
corporate taxes on employment and income. Technical report, National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Ljungqvist, A., Zhang, L., and Zuo, L. (2017). Sharing risk with the government:
How taxes affect corporate risk taking. Journal of Accounting Research.
Lo, A. W. (2005). Reconciling efficient markets with behavioral finance: the
adaptive markets hypothesis. Journal of Investment Consulting, 7(2):21–44.
147
Malkiel, B. G. (1973). A Random Walk Down Wall Street. Norton.
Malkiel, B. G. (2003). The efficient market hypothesis and its critics. Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 17(1):59–82.
Mas-Colell, A., Whinston, M. D., and Green, J. R. (1995). Microeconomic Theory.
Oxford University Press.
Mieszkowski, P. and Zodrow, G. R. (1989). Taxation and the tiebout model: the
differential effects of head taxes, taxes on land rents, and property taxes.
Journal of Economic Literature, 27(3):1098–1146.
Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J. (1982). Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence.
Journal of Economic Theory, 27(2):280–312.
Mincer, J. (1958). Investment in human capital and personal income distribution.
Journal of Political Economy, 66(4):281–302.
Morgenstern, O. (1963). On the Accuracy of Economic Observations. Princeton
University Press.
Niskanen, W. A. (1968). The peculiar economics of bureaucracy. The American
Economic Review, 58(2):293–305.
Niskanen, W. A. (1971). Bureaucracy and Representative Government. Transaction
Publishers.
Oates, W. (1972). Fiscal Federalism. Edward Elgar Publishing.
Peoples, J. and Talley, W. K. (2001). Black-white earnings differentials:
Privatization versus deregulation. The American Economic Review,
91(2):164–168.
Piketty, T. and Saez, E. (2008). Income inequality in the united states, 19131998
(tables and figures updated to 2006).
http://www.econ.berkeley.edu/ saez/TabFig2006.xls.
Reimers, C. W. (1983). Labor market discrimination against hispanic and black
men. The Review of Economics and Statistics, pages 570–579.
Romer, C. D. and Romer, D. H. (2010). The macroeconomic effects of tax changes:
estimates based on a new measure of fiscal shocks. American Economic
Review, 100(3):763–801.
Rosen, H. S. (1976). Taxes in a labor supply model with joint wage-hours
determination. Econometrica, 44(3):485.
148
Samuelson, P. A. (1965). Proof that properly anticipated prices fluctuate randomly.
Industrial Management Review, 6(2):41.
Selten, R. (1978). The chain store paradox. Theory and Decision, 9(2):127–159.
Sharpe, W. F. (1964). Capital asset prices: A theory of market equilibrium under
conditions of risk. The Journal of Finance, 19(3):425–442.
Slemrod, J. (2007). Cheating ourselves: The economics of tax evasion. The Journal
of Economic Perspectives, 21(1):25–48.
Slemrod, J. and Bakija, J. (2008). Taxing Ourselves: a Citizen’s Guide to the
Debate over Taxes. MIT Press.
Street, J. O., Carroll, R. J., and Ruppert, D. (1988). A note on computing robust
regression estimates via iteratively reweighted least squares. The American
Statistician, 42(2):152–154.
Suarez-Serrato, J. C. and Zidar, O. (2016). Who benefits from state corporate tax
cuts? a local labor markets approach with heterogeneous firms. American
Economic Review, 106(9):2582–2624.
Tiebout, C. M. (1956). A pure theory of local expenditures. Journal of Political
Economy, 64(5):416–424.
Trejo, S. J. (1997). Why do mexican americans earn low wages? Journal of
Political Economy, 105(6):1235–1268.
U.S. Census Bureau (2006). Current population survey: Design and methodology.
Technical Report 66, United States Bureau of the Census.
U.S. Census Bureau (2015). Cps non-response. http://www.census.gov/programs-
surveys/cps/technical-documentation/methodology/non-response-rates.html.
U.S. Treasury Department (2007). Irs and the tax gap. Technical report, Treasury
Inspector General for Tax Administration, Washington, D.C.
Vega-Redondo, F. (2003). Economics and the Theory of Games. Cambridge
University Press.
Williams, A. (1966). The optimal provision of public goods in a system of local
government. Journal of Political Economy, 74(1):18–33.
Wilson, J. D. (1999). Theories of tax competition. National Tax Journal, pages
269–304.
Wrede, M. (1996). Vertical and horizontal tax competition: Will uncoordinated
leviathans end up on the wrong side of the laffer curve. FinanzArchiv/Public
Finance Analysis, pages 461–479.
149
